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OCCIDENTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM

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OCCIDENTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM

[Lectures on the Harris Foundation 1925]

By

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PREFACE

The Harris Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago have been made possible through the generosity of the heirs of Norman Wait Harris and Emma Gale Harris, who donated to the University a fund to be known as "The Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation" on January 27, 1923. The letter of gift contains the following statement:

> It is apparent that a knowledge of world-affairs was never of more importance to Americans than today. The spirit of distrust which pervades the Old World is not without its effect upon our own country. How to combat this disintegrating tendency is a problem worthy of the most serious thought. Perhaps one of the best methods is the promotion of a better understanding of other nations through wisely directed educational effort.
>
> The purpose of the Foundation shall be the promotion of a better understanding on the part of American citizens of the other peoples of the world, thus establishing a basis for improved international relations and a more enlightened world-order. The aim shall always be to give accurate information, not to propagate opinion.

In fulfilment of this object a First Institute was held at the University of Chicago in the summer of 1924, and the public lectures delivered by

the foreign scholars invited to the Institute were published: *Germany in Transition*, by Herbert Kraus; *The Stabilization of Europe*, by Charles De Visscher; and *The Occident and the Orient*, by Sir Valentine Chirol.

For the Second Institute, held in the summer of 1925, the topic selected for discussion was the Far East, and again the public lectures delivered as part of the work of the Institute are published in essentially their original form. This volume, entitled *Occidental Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problem*, gives the lectures of Mr. H. G. W. Woodhead, C.B.E., an Englishman of twenty years' residence in China where he was editor of the *Peking and Tientsin Times* and of the *China Year Book;* of Mr. Julean Arnold, American Consul or Commercial Attaché in China since 1902, and editor of the *Commercial Year Book of China;* and of Mr. H. K. Norton, author of *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia*. A second volume, *Oriental Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problem*, contains the lectures of Count Michimasa Soyeshima, graduate of Cambridge University, England, and former member of the House of Peers of Japan; and of Dr. P. W. Kuo, President of Southeastern University, Nanking, China.

August 1, 1925

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PROBLEMS OF PRESENT-DAY CHINA

By H. G. W. Woodhead

I

THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

I have been asked to give you in my first lecture a survey of the history of the Chinese Republic. It must, if compressed into a single lecture, necessarily be brief, and in some respects inadequate.

The Revolution as a result of which China was transformed from an absolute monarchy to a nominal republic broke out in the autumn of 1911, but to understand why it occurred, and why it was successful, it is necessary to refer briefly to the events of the previous thirteen years.

The Emperor Kwang Hsu succeeded to the throne on the death of T'ung Chih, in January, 1875, at the age of five. For the first few years of his reign the regency was in the hands of the late Emperor's mother, and the Dowager Empress Tzu An. The latter died in 1881, leaving the sole regency in the masterful hands of Tzu Hsi, thenceforward known as the Empress Dowager. She ruled autocratically until 1889 when she, nominally at any rate, went into retirement, though actually retaining by roundabout methods the power of appointing and dismissing the highest officials in the government. The war with Japan

(1894–95), resulting in disaster and humiliation for China, aroused widespread discontent, which was intensified by Russia's occupation of Port Arthur and the grant of territorial leases to Germany, Great Britain, and France, in 1897–98.

Some of the ablest officials of the empire recognized the necessity of wholesale reform if China was to retain her national independence. The Emperor himself was converted to this point of view. His tutor, Weng Tung-ho, and other progressive officials around him were responsible for bringing to his attention a Cantonese reformer, K'ang Yu-wei, who was born in 1858, and who, though he had never left China, had been deeply impressed by the achievements of Peter the Great and the awakening of Japan. K'ang Yu-wei, according to his own statements of what occurred, was only once received in audience by the Emperor.[1] But he made a deep impression, and between June 11 and September 16, 1898, at his instigation the Emperor promulgated some scores of reform decrees, aiming at the reorganization of the administration, finances, education, army, public justice, and the development of railways and mines.[2] The first reform decrees caused alarm among the conservative

[1] *China Mail*, Oct. 7, 1898.

[2] J. O. P. Bland and E. Backhouse, *China under the Empress Dowager*, chap. xiii.

elements, Chinese and Manchu, and the Empress Dowager, though at first not openly opposing the Emperor, adopted precautions which were later to frustrate all his efforts. As early as June 12 she arranged for the appointment of Jung Lu, a Manchu and a staunch adherent of hers, to the viceroyalty of Chihli, thus securing control over the modern-trained troops in that province.

K'ang Yu-wei was convinced that the only hope for China was the introduction of a constitutional monarchy. It is noteworthy that it was at this—the reform period—that Chang Chih-tung, one of the ablest and most influential of China's viceroys, published a work entitled *Learn*, which sold by the millions, and the object of which was to bring about reforms from above also, instead of awaiting a revolution from below. He did not believe that a republic was practicable, prophetically stating that, with unrestrained liberty

> the scholar would always sit at meat, the farmer would pay no taxes, the merchant would garner unbounded wealth, the workman would strike for higher wages, the proletariat would plunder and rob, the son would disobey the father, the student would not follow the teacher, the wife would not obey the husband, the low would not defer to the high, the strong would oppress the weak, and mankind would soon be annihilated.[1]

[1] Morse, *International Relations*, III, 136–37.

In regard to the Emperor's reform decrees Morse states:

> Provided that reform was to begin at the top and not at the foundation, no fault can be found with this list of reforms. Every one was sound, every one struck at a manifest evil, and every one was capable of being carried into effect; but the whole structure of reform by Decree was a pyramid standing on its apex.[1]

The opposition of the conservative elements convinced the Emperor that the success of his program must depend upon military support. It is alleged that he sought the assistance of Yuan Shih-kai, then judicial commissioner of Chihli, who had in 1895 been appointed director general of army reorganization, and directed him to assassinate Jung Lu at Tientsin, lead the modern army to the capital, and imprison the Empress Dowager. According to this version, Yuan Shih-kai immediately proceeded to Tientsin and revealed the Emperor's plans to Jung Lu, who hurried to the capital and told the Empress Dowager what was afoot, with the result that a countercoup was arranged, and the Emperor, while on the way to perform some sacrificial rites, was suddenly seized and carried off to the ocean palace, where he remained a close prisoner for the greater part of the rest of

[1] Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

his life.[1] Yuan's own version of the incident is that he was requested by certain reformers to assassinate Jung Lu, but that they were unable to produce the Emperor's authority, nor did His Majesty even refer to the matter at a subsequent private audience. When he arrived in Tientsin, however, he was immediately taxed by Jung Lu with having come down for the purpose of assassinating him.[2] The fact remains that the Emperor attributed the humiliations of his later years to Yuan Shih-kai, and is reported, on his deathbed, to have ordered his execution.[3]

The reform movement was temporarily crushed, the reformers were scattered or executed, and reaction won the day, with its aftermath of the Boxer madness of 1900. The drastic action of the foreign powers, however, convinced even the Empress Dowager that reform or a semblance of reform was necessary if the dynasty was to retain its position, and between 1901 and 1905 attempts were made to introduce many of the reforms promulgated in 1898. A commission to study constitutional methods was sent abroad in 1905, and reported in 1907. In 1908 a nine-year program of

[1] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 202 ff.

[2] Percy H. B. Kent, *The Passing of the Manchus*, p. 19.

[3] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

constitutional preparation was promulgated, to culminate, in 1916–17, in the issue of constitutional laws and elections to the upper and lower houses of the legislature. It is noteworthy that it was estimated that during the seventh year (1914–15) 1 per cent and during the ninth year (1916–17) 5 per cent of the population should be able to read and write.[1]

The Empress Dowager and the Emperor Kwang Hsu both died in November, 1908, and the Emperor's nephew, P'u Yi, ascended the throne under the title of Hsuan Tung, with his father as regent. He was then a boy of three years of age.

Although the regent had been abroad—he was sent to Berlin to apologize for the murder of the German minister in Peking, after the Boxer outbreak—he failed completely to appreciate the signs of the times, and instead of pushing forward the program of reform made concessions to public opinion only when public clamor assumed dangerous proportions. He dismissed, and but for foreign representations, would probably have executed, Yuan Shih-kai. He affronted public opinion by appointing his own relatives and other Manchus—many of them notoriously corrupt—to the highest offices in the government. And such concessions as

[1] *China Year Book* (1912), chap. xxi; *ibid.* (1925), pp. 615 ff.

he made under pressure from the people were generally stultified by the manner in which they were granted. The new provincial assemblies, which met for the first time in 1909, gave a tremendous impetus to the agitation for an earlier grant of constitutional government, and eventually resulted in an acceleration of the reform program, it being announced that the national Parliament would be convened in 1913 instead of in 1917. The demand that the Grand Council should be replaced by a cabinet was also conceded, but Prince Ching, an elderly Manchu clansman, with an unsavory reputation, was appointed the first premier, and the presidents of the boards of interior, navy, finance, agriculture, industries and commerce, war, justice, colonies, and the general staff and advisory council were all Manchus.[1]

In so far, however, as the Revolution can be attributed to a single cause, it was due to the government's attempts at centralization. Although the Manchu emperor was an absolute monarch, in whose hands rested the appointment of officials throughout the country, in actual practice the provinces enjoyed a large measure of independence. In 1911 the central government concluded two large gold loans with foreign-banking groups, the

[1] Li Un-bing, *Outlines of Chinese History*, p. 631.

first of which was to be used for the reorganization of China's currency and the second for railway construction. The Hukuang Railway loan of six million pounds sterling was to be expended on the construction of trunk railways from Hankow to Szechwan and Hankow to Canton. Both in Szechwan and Kwangtung, however, provincial companies had been spasmodically engaged in railway construction. They had raised, and for the most part wasted, enormous sums, but this did not prevent them from opposing bitterly a transaction which aimed at nationalizing China's trunk railways and bringing them all under the control of the central government. What was unquestionably, from the national point of view, a sound project led to open defiance of the government, and eventually to revolution.

There had been revolutionary outbreaks in Canton in April, 1911. The signature of the Hukuang Railway contract was followed by a general strike, which developed into a revolt, in Szechwan. The viceroy's *yamen* at Chengtu was attacked on September 7, and the entire province may be said to have been in revolt when, on October 9, a bomb explosion in the Russian concession at Hankow, in Hupeh province, became the signal for a general uprising. This bomb explosion was accidental. The

premises were raided, and found to contain revolutionary flags and literature (including, it is said, a list of disaffected officers and men in the local military forces) and explosives. Knowing the fate that awaited them if they remained inactive, the revolutionaries took immediate action. A number of troops mutinied, and occupied the gates of Wuchang on the night of October 10. The Manchu viceroy and the local military commander had to take refuge on a warship. The revolution which was to result in the overthrow of the dynasty had begun. None of the local revolutionaries, however, was anxious to assume the leadership, which was forced upon Li Yuan-hung, a cavalry colonel on the viceroy's staff. He had not been a member of the revolutionary party, but accepted command, and retained it until the actual control of the movement passed into the hands of the revolutionary committee at Shanghai. Hanyang and Hankow were occupied on the eleventh and twelfth of October, respectively.

It is unnecessary to dwell at length upon the course of the Revolution, and I propose here only to mention its salient features. When it broke out, some thirty thousand of China's modern-trained troops had just been assembled at Yungpingfu in Chihli for the autumn maneuvers. The maneuvers

were immediately canceled, and most of the troops were dispatched to Hankow by rail. On October 14, the Prince Regent, by this time thoroughly alarmed at the course of events, recalled Yuan Shih-kai, who was still in retirement in his native province, and appointed him viceroy of the Hukuang provinces (Hupeh and Hunan) and generalissimo of the naval and military forces. Yuan Shih-kai was by no means eager to accept this appointment, pleading that his leg—an affection which had been the pretext for his dismissal in 1909—had not yet healed, and it was only after he had been given more extensive powers, and peremptorily urged to disregard his illness, that he accepted the appointment. Had he really had his heart in the cause, and been adequately financed, there is little doubt that he could have suppressed the revolt before it attained serious proportions. For Hankow and Hanyang were reoccupied without great difficulty by the end of November, rendering Wuchang, the revolutionary headquarters, untenable, and inducing the revolutionaries to sue for peace. Yuan Shih-kai showed no eagerness to exploit these successes, and agreed to an armistice on December 3. He had returned to Peking as premier on November 13, to find that the regent had agreed to a new constitution adopted by the national assembly at

the end of October.[1] On December 6 his old enemy, the Prince Regent, resigned, and Yuan Shih-kai was supreme. The issue then became one of whether China should retain the monarchy in any form or become a republic. Yuan Shih-kai personally favored a constitutional monarchy, but, as events proved, was not prepared to fight for this solution if another could be found which left him in supreme control, and made reasonable provision for the imperial family.

At the beginning of December the revolutionists were divided roughly into two camps—the Wuchang group, led by Li Yuan-hung, and the Shanghai Committee, whose spokesmen were Wu Ting-fang and Wen Tsung-yao, and which issued a flood of plausible manifestoes, compiled by foreign sympathizers. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who has been described as the "Father of the Revolution," was in Europe when the Wuchang outbreak occurred, and did not reach Shanghai until December 25, a week after the Peace Conference had opened in that city. Three days later he was "elected" president of the republic by the revolutionary council at Nanking. He assumed office on January 1, 1912.

The part that Dr. Sun played in the Revolution has formed a subject of considerable contro-

[1] *China Year Book* (1925), p. 628.

versy ever since. He had been a notorious revolutionary agitator during the greater part of his life, having organized and participated in a number of abortive attacks upon the Canton authorities in his earlier years. But he would probably have remained unknown to foreigners but for the notoriety he gained by being kidnapped outside the Chinese legation in London, by orders of the Chinese minister, in October, 1896. It had been intended to ship him to China as a lunatic, and once there he would have been put to death. But he managed to communicate with Dr. (now Sir) James Cantlie, his old teacher, who informed the British Foreign Office, which secured his release. He remained abroad, constantly agitating, until the outbreak of the Revolution, and arrived in China when all the fighting was over. One of the men most competent to speak about his rôle in the Revolution is General (now Former President) Li Yuan-hung, who had this to say to a foreign-newspaper correspondent in July, 1913:

The world has a false idea about Sun Yat-sen. He had nothing to do with the actual work of overthrowing the monarchy. The Revolution was finished when he reached China. I hardly heard of him except in a vague and general way, and did not know his political views, except that I had heard of his agitation. So far as I had thought about him at all, I had regarded him as a visionary. He arrived at Shanghai

at a moment when the Southern, or Republican, party had decided that some kind of government should nominally be formed with the capital at Nanking. This was done for moral effect in China and abroad. None of the real leaders of the Revolution, for various reasons, desired to take the position of provisional president, which we felt would be of short duration. Sun Yat-sen, from being out of China for so long, was not associated with any faction here, his name was known abroad, and he seemed to suit the occasion. If he ever provided any tangible aid to the real Revolution I did not know of it. His repute is largely founded on fiction.[1]

When the Republican cabinet was formed at Nanking, Li Yuan-hung was ignored. The revolutionaries were uncompromising in their insistence upon the abdication of the Manchus, whose difficulties were increasing, owing to their lack of funds and the lukewarmness of their supporters. The Gordian knot was cut by Yuan Shih-kai, who, when he found that Sun Yat-sen was prepared to resign in his favor, and that the Republicans were willing to grant liberal terms to the imperial house, prompted his military subordinates, headed by Tuan Chi-jui, to address telegraphic memorials to the throne urging abdication.[2] The abdication edicts, drafted on February 3, were actually promulgated on February 13, 1912,[3] simultaneously

[1] *China Press*, July 22, 1913.

[2] *China Year Book* (1913), p. 480.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 481–83.

with the terms of favorable treatment, under which the Emperor was to retain his title, his property, and the privileges of a foreign sovereign, and receive a pension of four million *taels* per annum.[1] It was intended that he should remove from Peking to the summer palace, a few miles outside the city, but for one reason or another this plan was never carried out. It is noteworthy that the abdication edicts invested Yuan Shih-kai with full powers to organize a provisional Republican government.

Dr. Sun resigned from the presidency on February 14, and Yuan Shih-kai was unanimously elected president by the Nanking National Council on February 15, but that body at the same time voted in favor of transferring the capital from Peking to Nanking. Li Yuan-hung was unanimously elected vice-president on February 20. A deputation proceeded to Peking to invite Yuan Shih-kai to visit Nanking to take the oath of office, but a mutiny of the Third Division, possibly instigated for this very purpose, resulted in the abandonment of the project of transferring the capital. The Nanking delegates themselves had to seek refuge in the legation quarter during the mutiny. Though unanimously elected provisional president, Yuan Shih-kai was by no means unanimously trusted by

[1] *China Year Book* (1913), p. 484, and *ibid.* (1925), p. 632.

the Nanking Council, which was composed of delegates appointed by the various Republican military governors, or *tutuhs*, and it proceeded, early in March, to draft and adopt a provisional constitution,[1] the main purpose of which was to limit the president's powers. Even before the transfer of the Council to Peking toward the end of April, friction had occurred between it and the president over the allocation of cabinet posts, the Tungmenghui, or revolutionary party, desiring that their nominees should receive the portfolios of war and finance. To this arrangement President Yuan absolutely refused to agree, nominating his trusted lieutenant, Tuan Chi-jui, to the ministry of war, and Hsiung Hsi-ling, a Hunanese Republican, who was not, however, a member of the Tungmenghui, as minister of finance.

The transformation of China from an absolute monarchy to a nominal republic was effected with remarkably little bloodshed and material damage. There were local massacres of Manchus—notably at Sianfu in Shensi—and a few foreigners were killed in various centers. But both sides manifested an earnest desire to avoid giving the foreign powers any pretext for interference. Most of Hankow was burned down by the imperialist forces, and there

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 633.

was, of course, a great deal of incendiarism and looting in various centers in which there was fighting or rioting.

China became a republic two years before the date on which, according to the nine-year program of constitutional reform, 1 per cent of the population should have been able to read and write. In other words, the percentage of illiteracy was about 99.[1] And it should be emphasized that the republic came into being, not as a result of an overwhelming military victory of the revolutionary forces, but rather as the result of a compromise which left the executive power in the hands of one who had little sympathy with, or understanding of, the principles of modern democratic government, but who had a strong military following.

Yuan Shih-kai assumed office as provisional president with certain manifest advantages. He had the reputation of being a capable and progressive official. He stood high in the estimation of foreigners—with the possible exception of the Japanese, with whom he had come into conflict in Korea—as a result of his friendly attitude during the Boxer upheaval. He had the loyal support of the generals and most of the officers of the modern

[1] *China Year Book* (1925), pp. 616–17.

army, whose organization and training had been carried out under his personal supervision. He knew his countrymen and how to deal with them. And he had, as it proved, a loyal colleague in General Li Yuan-hung, who remained at Wuchang and did his utmost to maintain order in the Yangtze. On the other hand, he was from the outset distrusted by the Republicans, whose main strength came from the south.

The two problems requiring most urgent attention were disbandment and finance. Mushroom armies which had sprung up all over the country during the Revolution, for the most part undisciplined and unpaid, constituted a serious danger to public peace. Excepting the customs administration which, being under foreign control, remained intact throughout the upheaval, all sources of revenue had been appropriated by the provinces. The central government was unable to meet its foreign obligations, or to raise the revenue necessary for its own maintenance. The Republican government approached the Peking representatives of the quadruple group (composed of American, British, French, and German financiers) within a few days of abdication, and as early as February 28 the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,

on behalf of the group, advanced two million *taels* to the government at Nanking.[1] Negotiations then proceeded for a comprehensive reorganization loan, which were making some headway when it was discovered that, notwithstanding the fact that the option to make further advances had been granted to the quadruple group, a loan for one million sterling with the option of taking up another nine millions had been concluded with a Belgian syndicate on March 15. Negotiations with the quadruple group were thereupon broken off, to be renewed in May, interrupted again in June, and not to be consummated until April 26, 1913, by which time the American bankers had withdrawn and Japanese and Russian interests were admitted.

The stumbling-block was the demand of the bankers, with the support of their respective governments, for foreign supervision of the expenditure of the proceeds, and of the collection of the revenues pledged as security. Supervision in any form was repulsive to Yuan Shih-kai who would have liked to expend the money as he thought fit, and equally repugnant to the Republicans, who regarded it as an infringement of China's sovereign rights. The loan amounted to twenty-five millions

[1] For details of Loan Negotiations, see *China Year Book* (1913), pp. 348 ff., and *ibid.* (1914), pp. 379 ff.

sterling, of which three millions were earmarked for disbandment expenses. The loan agreement[1] further stipulated that a foreign associate chief inspector, with a number of foreign district inspectors, was to be appointed to the salt administration, whose revenues were pledged as security, and that foreign advisers were to be employed in the Audit Department and the Bureau of National Loans.

Meanwhile there had been frequent collisions between Yuan Shih-kai and the National Council, since the removal of the latter to Peking, as well as a number of cabinet changes. Sun Yat-sen, who had propounded a visionary scheme for the construction of seventy-five thousand miles of railways within ten years, at a cost of six hundred millions sterling,[2] was placated for the moment with the post of director of the National Railway Corporation, with headquarters at Shanghai, whose duty was to be the negotiation of railway loans with foreign financiers. Other fantastic proposals he put forward about this time included a project for raising an army of five million men to conquer Russia, who had availed herself of China's difficulties to initiate an aggressive policy in outer Mongolia. He also proposed the issue of unlimited,

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 387 ff. [2] *Ibid.* (1913), p. 187.

unsecured, and inconvertible paper currency, to meet China's financial difficulties.

Elections for the new bicameral legislature took place in December, 1912, and January, 1913. Ten senators were to be elected by each provisional assembly, in addition to fifty-four representing the outer dependencies, the Central Education Society, and Chinese residing abroad. The country was to return one member for each eight hundred thousand of the population to the House of Representatives, by means of a complicated system of double election, for which the necessary organization did not exist. The result was that the House of Representatives contained a number of professional agitators and demagogues, who had bribed or bluffed their way into the legislature. The Tung-menghui had, in 1912, combined with four other Republican parties to form the Kuomintang, which was the strongest individual party in both houses, claiming 123 out of 274 senators and 269 out of 596 representatives. Sung Chiao-jen, the parliamentary leader of the party, was murdered, in circumstances which threw suspicion on the Minister of the Interior, on the eve of his departure from Shanghai, on March 21, 1913, and Parliament therefore met in an electrical atmosphere on April 8, intimating that the presence of Yuan Shih-kai to

perform the opening ceremony would be unwelcome, and refusing to permit the reading of his inaugural message.

The conclusion of the reorganization loan, without referring it to Parliament—a course which Yuan Shih-kai maintained was justified by the fact that its main provisions had been approved by the National Council in the preceding December[1]— led to a fresh crisis, and relations between the President and legislature grew steadily worse. Parliament discredited itself to a very large extent by the numerous disorderly scenes which occurred in both houses. By July the attitude of some of the Kuomintang *tutuhs* in the southern provinces had become so defiant that Yuan Shih-kai felt compelled to order their removal, a step which was the signal for a rising which spread down the Yangtze Valley and to Canton, and became known as the Second Revolution. Chang Hsun, the doughty old warrior who had defended Nanking in 1911, and subsequently withdrawn his army virtually intact across the river to Pukow, was intrusted with the recapture of Nanking, which he effected without much difficulty. And elsewhere the northern forces were uniformly victorious. The rebellion was crushed, Sun Yat-sen and other Kuomintang lead-

[1] *China Year Book* (1914), p. 379.

ers were stripped of all their offices, proscribed, and fled abroad. And Parliament, chastened by this manifestation of Yuan Shih-kai's strength, meekly adopted the new presidential election law,[1] and elected him formal president in time to be inaugurated on the second anniversary of the Revolution, October 10, 1913, by which date recognition of the republic had been accorded by all the powers. Li Yuan-hung was elected vice-president.

The Kuomintang hoped to regain by the new constitution what they had lost as the result of the summer revolt. Yuan Shih-kai, however, was determined not to submit to parliamentary control, and invited the opinions of the provincial militarists on the completed draft. They, of course, supported him, and in some cases demanded the dissolution of Parliament. On November 4 the Kuomintang was proscribed as a seditious organization, and all members of the party in the legislature were unseated, and ordered to be sent away from the capital. Parliament, unable to secure a quorum in their absence, languished, inactive, until its formal dissolution in January, 1914. Legislative functions were thereupon intrusted to a nominated council of state, which drafted a constitution more in accordance with Yuan Shih-kai's ideas,[2]

[1] *China Year Book* (1925), p. 657. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 665 ff.

increasing the presidential term from five to ten years, and virtually leaving it to the President to secure his own re-election or the election of his own nominee.

The Great War, which broke out in August, 1914, for the time being absorbed attention in Europe and America. China was brought into its orbit by the joint Anglo-Japanese attack upon Tsingtao, which, with the Shantung Railway, remained in Japanese hands until after the Washington Conference. Except America, which for the moment was not prepared to go farther than protesting, and issuing warnings, none of the powers was willing to incur Japanese hostility by interfering with her activities in China which, early in 1915, assumed a most menacing form. The notorious Twenty-one Demands,[1] delivered in January, if acceded to *in toto*, would have had the effect of converting China into a Japanese protectorate. Yuan Shih-kai was powerless in face of the Japanese ultimatum of May 7, 1915,[2] by means of which all but Group 5 of Japan's demands were enforced.

It had been obvious for some time that Yuan Shih-kai was working for a monarchical restoration. He had revived the state worship of heaven and

[1] *Ibid.* (1921). [2] *Ibid.*

Confucius in 1914, at the ceremonies connected with which he attired himself in robes similar to those worn by former emperors. And in the summer of 1915 a movement was started for the conversion of the republic into a monarchy, with Yuan Shih-kai as emperor. The campaign was arranged from Peking, the various provincial authorities receiving secret instructions to petition the President to ascend the throne. Arrangements were also made for a packed citizens' conference, which was to memoralize to the same effect. The Japanese, however, had not forgotten their old grudge against Yuan Shih-kai, and at the instance of the Japanese government joint representations against the proposed change were made by the British, Russian, and Japanese ministers. Yuan's campaign managers responded by staging demonstrations in favor of the monarchy in the provinces. The date for the coronation and the ceremonies to be employed in connection therewith were actually promulgated when on December 25, Tsai Ao, a Republican leader, hoisted the standard of revolt in Yunnan. The movement rapidly spread, until practically the whole of Southern and Western China was in rebellion. Moreover, Yuan's military lieutenants, who had given him unflinching support as president, were not prepared to fight to make

him emperor. The situation became so grave that the coronation was postponed, and, eventually, the monarchical project was abandoned. But the south was not to be placated by this *volte face*, and the crisis was only solved by Yuan Shih-kai's death on June 6, 1916.

He was succeeded as president, as provided by the Nanking constitution and the Presidential Election Law of 1913, by General Li Yuan-hung, the vice-president, who at once reconvened the old Parliament. Feng Kuo-chang, one of Yuan's lieutenants, was elected vice-president, but remained at Nanking. Tuan Chi-jui, who had also been associated with Yuan Shih-kai in the training of the new army, and was minister of war in the first Republican cabinet, became premier. Thus the domination of the Peiyang party (so called since it was composed of officers of the Peiyang army) was assured, although its chief was dead. Dissensions, however, soon occurred which were to produce serious consequences in later years. The Peiyang party split into two factions, one of which, led by the vice-president, General Feng Kuo-chang (and after his death by Tsao Kun), became known as the Chihli party, and the other, led by Tuan Chi-jui, as the Anhwei, and subsequently, the Anfu party.

America early in 1917 broke off diplomatic relations with the Central Powers, and invited China to follow suit, which she did. The same invitation was repeated when the United States declared war. President Li Yuan-hung was opposed to war, fearing that it would strengthen the hands of the militarists. Japan, who had formerly vetoed China's intervention on the side of the Allies, supported it on this occasion after extracting from Britain, France, Italy, and Russia a secret undertaking to support her claims in Shantung and the North Pacific at the Peace Conference.[1] Tuan Chi-jui, the premier, favored war, as also did the majority of the northern Tuchuns. Parliament was not averse from hostilities but wished to take the entire credit for declaring war. Friction between President and Premier increased until the latter was dismissed, whereupon his military supporters rallied to his aid, and united in denouncing Parliament and demanding its dissolution, the draft of the constitution being made the pretext for this action. At this juncture, General Chang Hsun, of Nanking fame, offered to mediate, and was invited to Peking by the President. He came up to the capital with his pigtailed army, and immediately insisted upon the dissolution of Parliament, to which President

[1] *China Year Book* (1921).

Li Yuan-hung had to agree. In August, 1917, General Chang Hsun effected a sudden coup, replacing the Manchu emperor, who was still in residence in the imperial palace, on the throne, and proclaiming the overthrow of the republic. Chang Hsun maintained to the end of his life that this coup was effected with the knowledge and approval of his fellow-militarists.

Tuan Chi-jui immediately took the field against the monarchist leader, and after some hesitation Tsao Kun and the other northern Tuchuns rallied to his aid. The monarchy was overthrown within a fortnight, and General Chang Hsun had to seek refuge in the Dutch legation.

As soon as news of the restoration reached the south, preparations were made for a so-called "punitive expedition." The southerners were not placated by Tuan Chi-jui's prompt action, but remained sullen and defiant. President Li Yuan-hung, who had also taken refuge in the legation quarter, refused to reassume the presidency after Chang Hsun's discomfiture, and was succeeded by General Feng Kuo-chang, the vice-president. Tuan Chi-jui once more became premier, but it was the dissensions between him and his following and the new president that led to a split in the Peiyang party. During 1918, Tuan, as leader of the Anfu

party, attained the height of his power, and his subordinates abused it to indulge in an orgy of borrowing from Japan, participation in the Great War being used as the pretext for large arms deals (on credit) with, and loans from, the Japanese. Between January and December, 1918, about 250,000,000 *yen* were borrowed from Japan. Tuan Chi-jui and his fellow-Tuchuns organized a so-called "Tuchuns' parliament," composed of their own nominees, many of whom would never have dared to show their faces in the provinces they professed to represent, and this body was induced to elect Hsu Shih-ch'ang, a sworn brother of Yuan Shih-kai and his Secretary of State, as president of the republic, in place of Feng Kuo-chang. The southerners refused to recognize the Tuchuns' parliament or the new President, and attempted to organize a so-called "constitutional government" in Canton, with the support of two or three hundred members of the old Parliament.

The new President was in favor of reunification by peaceful means, but his peace mandates were ignored. In December the principal powers joined in making strong representations to China against perpetuating internal strife, as a result of which a domestic peace conference was convened in Shanghai, early in 1919. It proved fruitless, however, and

the Chinese delegation at Versailles contained delegates from the Canton as well as the Peking government. Japan's pretensions at Versailles aroused a wave of indignation throughout the country. The Peking students got out of hand, attacked and assaulted the most notorious of the so-called "national traitors" or pro-Japanese officials, and drove them into retirement. Public opinion in China compelled the Chinese delegation to refuse to sign a treaty recognizing Japan's claims in Shantung. The intervention of students of all ages and both sexes in domestic politics and foreign affairs dates from this time, and has since manifested itself in many undesirable ways.

The quarrel between the Anfu and the Chihli leaders came to a head in 1920. To consolidate their position in the north, the Anfu leaders endeavored to dislodge all militarists who were not in sympathy with them, and especially Tsao Kun, the Chihli Tuchun. Wu Pei-fu, his subordinate, brought his troops north from Hunan to aid his chief, and after a futile attempt at mediation by the Manchurian Tuchun, Chang Tso-lin, there was no alternative to war. The Chihli leaders unquestionably had public opinion behind them when they demanded the dismissal of "Little Hsu," commander of the Anfu forces, and one of the

most notorious of the pro-Japanese officials. "Little Hsu" (Hsu Shu-tseng) was dismissed by the President, whereupon Tuan Chi-jui retaliated by demanding the censure of Tsao Kun and the dismissal of Wu Pei-fu. To this, also, the President weakly agreed. Thereupon Tsao Kun, egged on by his strong-willed subordinate, accepted the challenge. War broke out around the capital, and Wu Pei-fu's army emerged victorious. The Anfu party went to pieces. All of its leaders except Tuan Chi-jui, to whom none of the Chihli party and its allies displayed any particular animosity, sought refuge in the Japanese legation. Chang Tso-lin brought an army inside the great wall, arriving after the real fighting was over, and at once conferred with Tsao Kun in regard to the exploitation of their victory.

From this period dates the animosity between Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu which was to produce two more civil wars. I saw Chang Tso-lin shortly after his arrival in Tienstin, and although all the fighting had been done by troops under Wu Pei-fu's leadership and the victory was his, the Manchurian Tuchun spoke slightingly of him, and declared that as a subordinate military commander General Wu had no right to interfere in politics. A marriage between the families of Tsao Kun and Chang Tso-lin was supposed to set a seal upon their

friendship, and the two war-lords proceeded to Peking together to instal a government of their own selection. Meanwhile, as the result of a civil war in the south, Sun Yat-sen, who had been living and intriguing in the French concession in Shanghai, returned to Canton to organize another revolutionary government. He denounced Chang Tso-lin and Tsao Kun, repudiated the authority of Peking, and had himself elected president of the republic by a parliamentary rump, in April, 1921. There was constant friction over cabinet appointments in Peking during this year, and in December Chang Tso-lin revisited Peking, and in complete disregard of the wishes of Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu installed Liang Shih-yi, who had been responsible for financing Yuan Shih-kai's monarchical campaign, as premier. Tsao Kun ostensibly remained indifferent, but Wu Pei-fu publicly denounced Liang Shih-yi and demanded his dismissal. The Premier then went upon sick-leave, refusing to resign his post unless he were publicly whitewashed by the President.

In April, 1922, Chang Tso-lin announced his intention of suppressing Wu Pei-fu. His armies in and around Peking were heavily reinforced, and General Wu advanced to the attack at the end of that month. Tsao Kun sat on the fence but allowed

General Wu Pei-fu to use his troops, and the Christian general (Feng Yu-hsiang) also came to his assistance from Shensi, suppressing a revolt in Honan on the way, and reaching the vicinity of Peking with his Eleventh Division in time for the decisive battle. After a number of reverses, General Wu Pei-fu won a decisive victory by an outflanking movement south of Peking, and the Manchurian army retreated down the railway, with considerable loss, eventually making a stand at Shanhaikuan, on the Chihli-Manchurian frontier, whence the Chihli forces were unable to dislodge it. After several weeks of indecisive fighting a truce was arranged, by which each army withdrew some distance from its side of the great wall. Chang Tso-lin returned to Mukden, where he proclaimed his independence of the central government, and concentrated his efforts upon reorganizing his army.

President Hsu Shih-chang, whose conduct throughout the crisis had been contemptible, resigned on June 2, 1922, and the victors then applied pressure to General Li Yuan-hung, to induce him to reassume the presidency. This he did with the utmost reluctance, and only after receiving unconditional pledges of support from Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu, and issuing a flaming denunciation of the

Tuchun system. He endeavored to induce Wu Pei-fu to accept office as minister of war, but the latter absolutely declined this post, professing that he was a military man who could not participate in politics, and returning to his headquarters at Loyang, in Honan, to reorganize his army. From Loyang, however, he bombarded the central government with protests and advice.

President Li Yuan-hung reconvened the old Parliament on August 1. A few days later Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whose rule in Canton had been becoming more unpopular daily, escaped from that city in a British gunboat, and returned to Shanghai. The new cabinet was composed mainly of American and British-educated Chinese, who it was expected, would thus be given a chance of showing what they could do. But a conspiracy was already in the making to dislodge President Li and to secure the elevation of Tsao Kun to the presidency. The first blow was struck toward the end of the year by the arrest, on what proved to be trumped-up charges, of the Minister of Finance, a distinguished lawyer who had been educated in England. He was kept in custody for several months, and his colleagues in the cabinet naturally refused to remain in office. General Chang Shao-tseng, who had been minister of war, was thereupon appointed premier, over a

cabinet composed, for the most part, of Tsao Kun's adherents.

Parliament was regularly subsidized from Paotingfu, Tsao Kun's headquarters, to agitate against President Li, whose downfall was eventually brought about by the action of the Christian general. This militarist had been transferred from Honan to Peking. He insisted, early in June, 1923, upon the appointment of his own nominee to the post of chief of the Peking *Octroi*, the receipts from which were earmarked for the expenses of the President's palace, and when the President refused to make this appointment, General Feng's troops and bodies of police and gendarmes demonstrated before his palace and demanded their arrears of pay. The cabinet resigned, ostensibly because of the President's refusal to appoint General Feng's nominee, and it was impossible for the President to secure the services of another ministry. His telegrams and correspondence were held up by the ministry of communications, and, on June 12, the Christian general and General Wang Huai-ching, who between them controlled all the troops in and around Peking, submitted their resignations. Numerous highly placed officials called upon the President, and urged him to resign. He was powerless under the circumstances. His valedictory man-

dates were held up by the government printing-office. President Li left for Tientsin on June 13, 1923, but on his arrival there his train was surrounded by the Chihli governor's troops, and he was held a prisoner until he had handed over the presidential seals. The way was now open for the election of Tsao Kun.

Parliament accepted President Li's resignation by a standing vote, not daring to put it to the ballot, and in the absence of a legal quorum. During the next few weeks Tsao Kun's campaign managers were busy bargaining with the parliamentarians for their votes, and eventually it was arranged that those who supported his candidature were to receive five thousand dollars apiece, double that sum being paid to the "whips" and certain favored legislators. The election took place on October 5, and President Tsao Kun assumed office on the tenth of that month, securing the recognition of the foreign ministers in Peking by a piece of barefaced trickery in connection with the Lincheng outrage. A struggle for the premiership ensued between the speaker of the House of Representatives, who had been one of the most active of Tsao Kun's supporters, and Kao Ling-wei, who had been minister of interior in the Chang Shao-tseng cabinet. It was not until January, 1924, that

a new premier, Mr. Sun Pao-ch'i, an elderly official with no political affiliations, who had been minister to France in 1902, was appointed. During the six months he was in office Mr. Sun found the situation hopeless, owing to cabinet dissensions on the gold-franc controversy with France. His colleagues had been selected for him by the clique surrounding the President, and were neither loyal nor helpful. On his resignation on July 2, Dr. W. W. Yen was nominated premier, but no action was taken on this nomination until September 11, 1924, when the country was once more in the throes of civil war.

The conflict on this occasion started in mid-China. To understand its origin it is necessary to retrace our steps for a few minutes and describe the military situation. While Tsao Kun had been scheming for and securing the presidency, Wu Pei-fu had been endeavoring to consolidate the military position of the Chihli party. His own or allied armies had gained control over the provinces of Szechwan, Hunan, and Fukien. Thus the Chihli party dominated all the provinces north of the Yangtze, except Manchuria, as well as Fukien, Kiangsi, Hupeh, and portions of Kwangsi and Kweichow. After the civil war of 1920 all the Anfu officials in the provinces were driven out of office with the exception of the Tuchun of Chekiang,

who not only retained control over that province but also over Shanghai, the commercial metropolis of China, which is situated in the province of Kiangsu. Although Shanghai owes its prosperity mainly to the existence of the international settlement and the French concession, which are under foreign control, it and its vicinity are the center of opium-smuggling at the mouth of the Yangtze, huge sums being made annually by the Chinese officials who connive at this traffic. The Kiangsu Tuchun, who was an adherent of Wu Pei-fu's, had several times been on the verge of attempting to reoccupy Shanghai, but had previously desisted, owing to popular opposition to civil war in this neighborhood. On this occasion the admission of troops defeated by Wu Pei-fu's subordinate in Fukien into Chekiang was made the pretext for hostilities. Every well-informed person in China knew that if hostilities started in Kiangsu they must spread to the north. The Chekiang Tuchun was eventually defeated, Shanghai being occupied by the Kiangsu forces in the middle of October.

In the meantime, Chang Tso-lin had thrown down the gauntlet to President Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu, denouncing the "wicked régime" for which they were responsible, and declaring that he felt it his bounden duty to "rid the country of the peo-

ple's traitors." The rival armies were concentrated over a wide front, extending from Jehol to the sea, near Shanhaikuan. On the Chihli side, Wu Pei-fu was in supreme command, the third army under the Christian general being stationed on the extreme left of the line, and Wu Pei-fu himself superintending operations on the coast. The Manchurian army gained some initial successes in the center, and made some progress on the coast, but the issue still hung in the balance when, on October 23, Feng Yu-hsiang suddenly occupied the capital with his army, imprisoned the President, proscribed several of the cabinet ministers, and proclaimed his desire for peace. Wu Pei-fu was quite unprepared for this betrayal. He was making desperate efforts to consolidate his front on the coast when the news reached him, but immediately returned to Tientsin with a few hundred men, intending there to await reinforcements from Kiangsu and Shantung for an attempt to recover the capital. The Shantung Tu-chun, however, cut the railway on the northern and southern boundaries of the province, rendering the movement of troops by rail impossible, and Wu Pei-fu, on hearing that his army at Shanhaikuan had gone to pieces, had to escape by sea, making his way back to Honan via the Yangtze, and, when compelled to leave there by an attack from Shensi,

withdrawing to Hupeh, and eventually to Yochow, in Hunan, where he at present remains.

The Christian general formed a provisional government in Peking, which proceeded summarily to eject the Manchu Emperor from his palace, and to take over its contents under the pretense of inventorying them, and deciding which was national and which was Manchu property. There is reason to fear that much of the palace treasure has since been removed and surreptitiously disposed of. The former Emperor himself told me that this was so, and that he had refused even to be represented on the so-called "inventory commission." His ejection from the palace, and the substitution for the favorable treatment of 1912 of a new agreement[1] under which the Emperor's status and privileges were abolished, was, of course, a gross breach of faith, and was so described by Tang Shao-yi, who had been the imperial delegate at the 1912 Peace Conference, and first premier of the republic. The Emperor took refuge in the Japanese legation, and eventually escaped to the Japanese concession in Tientsin.

At the outset of the civil war in the north, Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian war-lord, had announced his intention of installing Tuan Chi-jui,

[1] *China Year Book* (1925), p. 844.

the former leader of the Anfu party who had since been living in retirement at Tientsin as chief executive. And after a conference at Tientsin, whither Chang Tso-lin had hurried with a large force after Wu Pei-fu's army had been defeated, attended by Tuan Chi-jui, Chang Tso-lin, and the Christian general, Marshal Tuan proceeded to Peking to assume office as the provisional chief executive. He convened a so-called "reorganization conference," which sat for several months, and accomplished nothing. He reinstated a number of the former Anfu politicians, and gave the defeated Chekiang Tuchun his revenge by sending him down to Kiangsu at the head of a Manchurian army, to eject his former adversary and to assume office as *tupan*, or "director of military affairs." It is noteworthy that on this occasion Shanghai was included in the Kiangsu, and not the Chekiang, administration.

While the rival war-lords had been settling their quarrels in the field in the north, Sun Yat-sen's hold upon Canton was rapidly weakening. He had entered into close relations with the bolsheviks during the year, and initiated a reign of terror over the merchant classes, who resented his arbitrary measures of taxation and confiscation. A cadet academy, staffed by bolshevik instructors, was

founded at Canton, and a so-called Red Army was organized to overawe the merchants, who had a volunteer organization for their own protection. Matters came to a head in October when Sun Yat-sen ordered the suppression of the Merchant volunteers by force, and loosed his Red Army upon the city. Heavy artillery was used in the most thickly populated part of the city, some four hundred buildings were burned down, many others were looted, and the volunteers were defeated and dispersed, with heavy loss of life.

On the outbreak of the civil war in the north, Dr. Sun had joined in the chorus of denunciation of the Chihli party, and announced his intention of leading a punitive army against it. Like his previous punitive expeditions, this one also fizzled out. And toward the end of the year Dr. Sun's own position in Canton was so precarious that he welcomed the invitation to proceed north to confer with the triumvirate in control of Peking. He proceeded by steamer to Shanghai, and thence, via Japan, to Tientsin, taking advantage of every opportunity en route to denounce the imperialistic powers and to demand the cancellation of the so-called "unequal treaties" and the abolition of the foreign concessions. At Tientsin he remained for several weeks in the Japanese concession, and it became known that

he was seriously ill, supposedly from an abscess on the liver. However, he proceeded to Peking on December 31, and inspired the Kuomintang to boycott the Reorganization Conference, demanding in its stead a people's conference. An exploratory operation on January 26 revealed that the disease from which he was suffering was malignant cancer, and he lingered on in the Rockefeller Hospital until a few days before his death, when he was removed to a private residence, in order, apparently, that the Kuomintang extremists might insure the issue of a political testament in accordance with their own views. He died on March 12, leaving, it is alleged, directions that he was to be embalmed like his friend Lenin, and a message of affection to the Moscow government.

Since Dr. Sun's death there has been a quiet but persistent struggle between Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang (the Christian general) for the mastery of North China. Though the latter has received arms and other assistance from the bolsheviks, he has had, gradually, to yield to the pressure continuously applied by the Manchurian war-lord. His troops have evacuated the Chihli province, and are now removing from Peking to Kalgan, leaving Chang Tso-lin supreme in the metropolitan province, Shantung, Anhwei, and

Kiangsu, in addition to Manchuria. With his army at Peking and astride the northern sector of the Peking-Hankow Railway, Chang Tso-lin also isolates General Feng from his former allies in Honan. It seems inevitable that there will be a conflict, sooner or later, between Chang Tso-lin and the Christian general, though the latter has so far avoided hostilities by yielding to all of Chang's demands.

In the middle Yangtze province the actual power is still retained by Wu Pei-fu's former supporters, who, though they profess allegiance to the chief executive, may at any time find themselves strong enough to defy Peking, unless Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu come to terms. In Western China (Szechwan), another of Wu Pei-fu's allies is fighting, with hopeful prospects, for control. In South China a Yunnanese expedition is advancing on Canton, where fighting has already broken out between Dr. Sun's Yunnanese forces and the Kwangtung troops.

I have dealt only with the political history of China, and with that mainly in so far as the central government has been concerned. It would be impossible here to list all of the provincial and interprovincial civil wars that have occurred since the establishment of the republic. I may, however,

summarize what has occurred by saying that during the first phase of the republic (1912–16) Yuan Shih-kai was in control of a more or less united country, with the Kuomintang in opposition. During the second phase (1916–20), the north was controlled by a pro-Japanese military faction led by Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, while the southern and southwestern provinces were intermittently in revolt. The next phase (1920–22) saw North China under the domination of the Chihli and Fengtien (or Manchurian) militarists, and the south still defiant. From 1922–24, Manchuria, as well as certain of the Southern provinces, was independent, while the Chihli party, under Wu Pei-fu's leadership, was attempting to reunite the country by force. Finally, today we have Chang Tso-lin supreme in Manchuria and the northern-coast provinces, and dominating the capital, with Japanese approval, if not actual support; Feng Yu-hsiang, in spite of bolshevik assistance, rapidly losing his hold; the middle Yangtze and Szechwan controlled by Wu Pei-fu's associates; and a struggle proceeding in South China between the Kuomintang extremists of bolshevik affiliations, on the one hand, and Tang Chi-yao, who claims the position of, but is not recognized as, the Kuomintang generalissimo, on the other. Only one province has escaped the

miseries and vicissitudes of civil war since 1912, and that is Shansi, which has become known as the "model province," under the administration of Yen Hsi-shan. He has managed to keep out of all the civil wars that have raged around him, to keep his province more or less free from opium and morphia, and to maintain order, develop education, construct roads, and give the people over whom he rules the blessings of peace.

In conclusion, I must emphasize that no real question of principle has been involved in any of the numerous civil wars with which China has been afflicted since the overthrow of the monarchy. They have all been sordid struggles for power by militarists and politicians. On each occasion, of course, the rivals have issued high-sounding manifestoes, none of them being more vociferous in his noble protestations than Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Yet the latter, during his last term in power in Canton maintained himself by fomenting class-warfare, and by the support of Hunanese and Yunnanese mercenaries and local troops who were permitted to finance themselves by gambling, brothel, and opium monopolies. China is not and never has been a republic. I doubt whether she will be one in the generally accepted sense of the word during this or the next generation.

II

PRESENT STATE OF CHINA

China is today attracting world-wide attention, in consequence of the disorders which have been taking place throughout the country during the past month. To understand these disorders—foreseen and predicted by many of us who make a study of conditions in that country on the spot—it is necessary to have a clear idea of what has happened since in February, 1912, China became, in name at any rate, a republic. In my first lecture I gave an outline of the history of the so-called Republic. You will also doubtless hear from other speakers in the course of these meetings of the progress that China has been making during the past thirteen or fourteen years. I shall, for the moment, introduce you to the darker side of the picture. In doing so I should like to disclaim any hostility toward China or the Chinese. What I shall tell you is told merely in the interests of truth, and in the belief that the truth must be known if the present troubles are to be clearly understood.

In the first place China has never been—and

during the next thirty or forty years is unlikely to be—a republic, in the generally accepted sense of the word. That is to say, she is not a state in which the sovereign power rests in the whole body of the people and is exercised by representatives elected by them. Why this is so will be easier to understand when I tell you that the program of constitutional reform adopted by the Manchu dynasty in 1908 did not anticipate that more than 1 per cent of the population would be able to read and write by 1914–15, or more than 5 per cent by 1917. It is true that the number of schools and colleges, and of students attending them, has increased from about one-and-a-half millions in 1912 to over six-and-a-half millions in 1923. But it is estimated today that from 80 to 90 per cent of the Chinese are illiterate. Mr. James Yen, who has devoted his life to the mass-education movement, in a recent pamphlet, states:

> Eighty per cent of China's 400,000,000 cannot read or write. Millions upon millions have not the least idea whether their country is a monarchy or a democracy. Can such people form intelligent public opinion, or exercise any real control over the affairs of the nation? Do we have to go far to find out why the corrupt practices of the officials and militarists go unchecked? Or why the suffering, poverty, and lawlessness among the people steadily increase before our very eyes?

The late president, Tsao Kun, was elected to office by the expenditure of about fifteen million dollars, extorted from the people, upon bribing the parliamentarians. The present government is of a provisional character only, presided over by a notoriously pro-Japanese militarist, who has been put into office as provisional chief executive by the northern militarists. The latter do not even pretend to obey his orders now that he has accepted the empty title.

Ever since the death of Yuan Shih-kai in 1916 China has been in a ferment. There has hardly been a week when a civil war has not been in progress in some part of the country. At no time has the nation possessed a government capable of enforcing obedience outside of the walls of Peking. The actual power has remained in the hands of rival militarists, who have raised enormous armies which owe allegiance to them, and not to the government, and are supported by wholesale extortions from the people. In 1912 China had 240,000 soldiers in modern formations and about 280,000 old-style troops, a total of more than 500,000. Today she is afflicted with some twenty-five independent armies, totaling nearly one-and-a-half million men, not one of which is under the orders of the central government. The strongest militarist at

the moment is Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian war-lord, who has upward of 270,000 troops spread over Manchuria, Chihli, Shantung, Anhwei and Kiangsu. In one province alone—Szechwan—there are 114,000 men under arms. Wars are constantly being fought to establish the mastery of this or that militarist over a certain province, or over the central government. The administration is completely overridden by the militarists, who impose whatever taxes they fancy, and occupy and ruin the railways. In many cases it is difficult to distinguish between troops and brigands. The people often prefer the latter.

Financially, China is bankrupt at the moment. In 1912 her total national debt was about fifteen hundred million dollars; today it is about twenty-four hundred million. That in itself would not be a very serious matter as it amounts only to a per capita debt of about three dollars gold per head. But whereas, in 1912, revenue and expenditure approximately balanced at four hundred and fifty million dollars, today it is estimated that the annual deficit amounts to that sum. All revenues other than the customs revenues, which are administered by a foreign staff, are liable to seizure by the militarists and provincial authorities. Nearly 50 per cent of the salt revenues, which are also under

foreign supervision, were misappropriated last year, and only a minute percentage of other national revenues, such as the wine and tobacco taxes and the stamp taxes, ever reaches the national treasury. Numerous foreign loans are now in default. The administration leads a hand-to-mouth existence, raising loans on the estimated customs and salt surpluses years ahead.

I shall deal with the administration of justice in a subsequent lecture. It will suffice here to mention that China is far and away the largest opium-producer in the world, her output being estimated at about eight times that of the whole of the rest of the world, although the law prohibits the cultivation, transportation, smoking, or sale of opium. That will show the extent to which the laws of the country are enforced.

Optimistic views are sometimes based upon China's trade returns. If one takes the figures for 1903, 1913, and 1923, it certainly appears that the volume of trade doubled in the first decade, and was nearly doubled again in the second, the figures being:

	Taels
1903	561,319,602
1913	1,005,723,851
1923	1,726,782,369

It is a mistake, however, to assume that the volume of China's foreign trade has shown a substantial increase of late. The most recent customs returns show that if the values of China's imports and exports in 1923 are recalculated at the 1913 values, the increase in the volume of trade during the past decade amounts to less than 15 per cent. It is surprising that there should have been any increase at all, when one remembers the difficulties and risks under which trade has been conducted.

It is generally admitted that China's most pressing need is the development of her communications, especially railways. In 1912, 5,822 miles had been completed, and 2,205 were under construction. In 1924, only 7,691 miles had been completed, and construction was at a standstill, except on the Lunghai line. Railways would, if properly managed, be a golden investment in China. Under favorable conditions they have been operated at a ratio of expenditure to revenue of a little over 30 per cent. But the railways are rapidly being reduced to ruin by the militarists, who seize locomotives and rolling stock indiscriminately, and appropriate practically all the railway revenues to their own use. The Tientsin-Pukow Railway, which connects North China with the Yangtze, some years ago

ordered and obtained, but has not yet paid for, a number of sumptuous cars for the daily Blue Express. During the civil war of last autumn, these cars were seized and carried off to other lines by various military commanders who took a fancy to them, and some of them have since been seen in Honan, with chimneys projecting from the roofs, in use as portable military barracks.

When I left Tientsin at the end of May, before the present trouble had begun, the railway was only able to run a train on alternate days, and it was frequently from twenty-four to forty hours late, on a twenty-four-hour journey, owing to military interference with the operation of the line. The only railways now in a satisfactory condition are those owned by foreigners—the South Manchurian Railway in Manchuria, under Japanese control, and the Yunnan Railway, which is under French control. It seems to be only a question of time before the entire railway system of China breaks down.

The currency situation today is amazing. The attempt to issue standard subsidiary coinage, exchangeable at face value, has failed, owing to the use of the mints in the provinces, by the militarists, for revenue purposes. Copper coins have depreciated from 123 to the dollar in December, 1912,

to 206.4 to the dollar in December, 1924, and these are still the coins of the masses.

I will now turn to the present disturbances and the events immediately leading up to them. The present disturbances in China are to be attributed mainly to the universal discontent caused by nearly ten years of misrule and civil war. China has never been united, administratively or politically, since the death of Yuan Shih-kai. She has been preyed upon by rival militarists and self-seeking politicians, who have cared nothing for the welfare of the people, and regarded commerce as permissible only in so far as it yields them the revenues required to maintain their ill-disciplined armies. It is not surprising that a people whose territory has been ravaged by civil wars, the sufferings from which have been aggravated by flood and drought, and by the oppression of the militarists in power, should be seething with discontent, and ready, without analysis or discrimination, to accept any propaganda, however pernicious, that pretends to reveal the cause of these evils. The Chinese are an easily excitable but generally docile people. They will tolerate from their own officials oppression and misrule which would make any Westerner see red. But it is easy today, as it has been in the past, to divert attention from the shortcomings of their

own oppressors to fancied grievances against foreign nations. They appear to have no political discrimination where foreigners are concerned. The Boxer outbreak was a manifestation of discontent against the Manchu régime which was diverted into an anti-foreign movement. And the present trouble is similar in that respect, though fresh elements have been introduced since 1900.

I was at home in England when the students first became really active in Peking during the Versailles conference, attacked the residences of the pro-Japanese ministers, and so humiliated them that they had to resign. At first I was tempted to regard it as a good sign that public opinion in China had found some champions to challenge the subservience of the Peking government to Japan. But I had reason to change this view when I returned to Tientsin and found what the students, flushed with their initial success, were actually doing. They had decreed an anti-Japanese boycott in Tientsin and other cities which they were enforcing by methods which would not be tolerated by any self-respecting government. They forced their way into Chinese shops and offices to search for goods of Japanese manufacture, which they confiscated or burnt if discovered, in addition to fining the merchants, and in some cases parading them under

humiliating conditions through the streets and even arresting and detaining them at their headquarters. The Chinese officials seldom interfered unless attacks were made upon their residences or *yamens*. Then police or soldiers would be employed to disperse the rioters, and I have had a young Chinese in my office quivering with indignation at what he called "a massacre," when the Chihli governor's bodyguard had forcibly repelled an attempt to break into the civil governor's *yamen*.

Since 1919 the students have become more and more insubordinate and lawless. They have formed their own unions, which include in their membership boys and girls in their early teens; they have persistently engaged in demonstrations, some of a political, others of an anti-foreign character. They have terrorized their teachers, who are generally driven out of office if they attempt to maintain discipline or even the recognized standard of examinations, and have browbeaten whole communities into submission to their orders, however absurd. Only a few months ago a handful of students in Foochow, a city of nearly seven hundred and fifty thousand, decreed that no imported fish might be consumed, for fear it might come from Japan, and applied this restriction to American and Canadian herrings, for which there was a large

local demand, actually visiting and in some cases seriously assaulting dealers who handled these herrings. Five dealers were stabbed. When the local American Consul protested the movement became anti-foreign. Students attending mission schools were threatened with assault, and their parents were bombarded with threatening letters. As usual, the local authorities did nothing for several weeks, though the identity of the ringleaders of this agitation was well known, and they were a mere handful, a dozen or so immature youths.

It is to be regretted that some missionary schools and colleges, instead of putting their foot down on student lawlessness and insubordination, have actually encouraged these activities, and permitted their students to join the unions, hold meetings on the premises, and forsake their studies in order to participate in parades and riots whenever they fancied. It is true that the Roman Catholic institutions, and a number of British and American colleges, refused to allow their students to join the unions, and dealt severely with all outbreaks of insubordination, but their efforts were offset to a considerable extent by the laxity in other missionary institutions. The government universities, colleges, and schools have become hotbeds of sedition and bolshevism, and I shall later give you details of

the kind of thing that is tolerated even in the capital of China.

The students have been encouraged in lawlessness by the soviet envoys in Peking, and by their subordinates. A. A. Joffe, the first bolshevik envoy to reach Peking—whither he came from Berlin, after being expelled for participation in the Spartacist outbreak—immediately got in touch with the faculty of the Peking Government University, whose Chancellor gave a reception in his honor in August, 1922, in the course of which he stated: "Russia furnished a good example to China, which thinks it advisable to learn the lessons of the Russian Revolution, which started also as a political movement, but later assumed the nature of a social revolution." Encouraged by his reception, Joffe made a number of speeches at various functions given by him, or arranged in his honor, at which he denounced the other powers as aggressive, imperialistic, and capitalistic. It is much easier to attribute the sufferings of the Chinese people during the past ten years to these causes than to admit the truth, which is that most of their misery has been due to the action of a noisy minority in foisting upon China a system of government for which she was not ready, which the vast majority of her people do not yet understand, and which,

as long as the hearts of the people remain unchanged, could only have the effect of leaving them at the mercy of men more unscrupulous, more corrupt, and more intolerant of criticism or opposition than the worst officials of the Manchu régime. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was one of the noisiest and most mischievous of this minority.

When Joffe reached China, Sun Yat-sen was suffering one of his periodical eclipses, and was residing in the French concession at Shanghai, under foreign-police protection. He had escaped from Canton in a British gunboat the same month that Joffe reached Peking, and was visited by the latter in January, 1923, this probably being the first occasion on which he got into direct touch with the bolsheviks. They subsequently issued a joint statement, in which they professed to share the view that "the Communistic order, or even the Soviet system, cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism."

Joffe failed in his mission, and was supplanted by a bigger man in the soviet hierarchy, Karahan, who reached Peking in September, 1923. Sun Yat-sen had returned to Canton, to head another revolutionary administration, earlier in the year. At the

first public function in his honor Karahan made a deliberate attack upon the United States, whose conduct his host Dr. C. T. Wang, who had been appointed to negotiate with him, had extolled, denouncing America's signature of the Lincheng note, which claimed an indemnity for and precautions against a repetition of a serious bandit outrage. Since than Karahan has hardly allowed a week to pass without some attack upon America, Britain, France, or Japan, individually or jointly; while the official Russian news agency, which deluges the Chinese press with bolshevik propaganda, has cooperated in sowing poison in Chinese minds, in spite of the recognition of the soviet government by Great Britain, and the former's solemn undertaking to abstain from propaganda hostile to British interests in the Far East. When there was a hitch in negotiations, a few weeks before the actual signature Karahan appealed to the Chinese educationalists and students to support him, while his emissary in Canton, then in open revolt against Peking, invited Sun Yat-sen, and through him the Kuomintang, "to take notice of the seriousness of the situation," and to judge for himself whether the cabinet was justified in rejecting the agreement as drafted. Karahan redoubled his efforts after the signature of the Sino-Russian Treaty of May 31, 1924.

I cannot here do more than refer very briefly to Karahan's attempts to incite the Chinese to repudiate their treaties, and to rise against the foreigners. Within a few days of the signature of the May agreement, at a demonstration organized to celebrate its conclusion, Karahan was inviting his audience, composed mainly of students and political agitators, "to take by force from all the imperialistic powers" what the soviet government "gave you of its own free will," assuring them that the soviet government would "fight for a further development of our relations, and the national liberation of the people of China, which must become as free as the Russian people." A day or two later, at the national university, he was telling his audience:

> The greatest woe and misfortune of the Chinese people, that which makes it suffer and keeps your great nation in a position almost of a semi-colonial country—let me be frank with you—are the treaties which exist between China and the imperialistic foreign powers. These treaties have fettered your national liberty, happiness and welfare.

And he proceeded to urge his audience to engage in "the bloody struggle for national freedom and liberation from imperialism."

At a banquet given by Karahan on November 7 and attended by the members of the provisional

government, a number of prominent militarists and officials, and numerous parliamentarians, professors, and journalists, he said:

> I was glad when I saw this morning the statement of the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs who spoke—quite naturally in careful terms—of the revision of Treaties with foreign powers as being in the order of the day. Now, as I am not the Foreign Minister of the Republic of China, I may be permitted to say more definitely that those Treaties should not only be revised; they ought to be torn asunder, abolished, because they strangle China and because China cannot live under them.

But ridiculous though it may appear to intelligent people, the most glaring example of soviet support of the spirit of Boxerism is to be found in an incident which occurred in Peking in April of last year. On April 7 a Chinese soldier, belonging to the bodyguard of the Minister of War, was found wandering about on the southern section of the city wall, which is within the legation quarter, and from which Chinese are excluded. He was taken to the police station in the quarter where this was explained to him, and would immediately have been released had he not boasted that he intended to return to the wall forthwith. Accordingly he was sent to the nearest Chinese police station, which notified the legation authorities next day that he had been given four hundred blows, and confined to bar-

racks. Three days later he was at large again, and committed three successive assaults upon foreigners—an American, an Italian, and a Briton. The first two were assaulted on a Chinese thoroughfare in full view of the Chinese police, who made no attempt to interfere. The British subject was savagely attacked on the wall, retaliated with his fists, and after a fierce struggle with the police, who had to obtain assistance, the man was again lodged in the legation-quarter police station. He was probably deranged, and had assurances been given that precautions would be taken to prevent a repetition of these assaults, nothing more would have been heard of the matter. But the soviet leaders chose to exploit this wretched soldier as a champion of anti-imperialism. Mass meetings were held in Peking at which the trial of the Briton who had been assaulted was demanded, and Trotzky devoted his May Day speech in Moscow to championing the cause of this soldier. He addressed a message to the soldier telling him "in the name of us all" that "the proletariat of Moscow is with you heart and soul. . . . . The brotherhood of nations is no vain principle with us." And he returned to the charge in another oration, a month or two later. The incident is so ridiculous that it would be unworthy of mention except as showing the un-

scrupulous exploitation by the bolsheviks even of unprovoked assaults upon innocent foreigners.

How far is the present trouble in China due to bolshevik instigation? We have certain facts which throw considerable light upon this question. In the first place, soon after his return to Canton in 1923 Sun Yat-sen seems to have gone over body and soul to the bolsheviks, though, as I have mentioned, the joint statement which he issued with Joffe in January of that year expressed the view that bolshevism was unsuited to China. He became beside himself with rage with the treaty powers because, at the end of 1923, they refused to allow him, while retaining a precarious hold upon Canton, to seize the customs house, disintegrate the customs service, and use at his own sweet will revenues which form the security of foreign loans and indemnity payments. He maintained himself in power by mercenary troops imported from Hunan and Yunnan and supported by gambling, opium, and brothel monopolies which he granted to them to exploit. He incited the proletariat against the merchant and capitalist classes, and after taxing the latter beyond endurance, ordered their bloody repression for attempting to organize in self-defense, some hundreds being killed and numbers of buildings looted or burnt. The only for-

eigners with whom he maintained cordial relations were bolsheviks. A special soviet envoy was constantly at his side, and participated in the meetings of the Kuomintang Committee. A cadet academy, staffed by bolshevik instructors, was established near Canton. A local Red Army was organized and used to overawe the merchants; and the arrival of a soviet sloop and the anniversary of the soviet revolution were the occasions for elaborate official celebrations. Before leaving Canton for the north he announced his intention of securing the abolition of unequal treaties, and extraterritoriality. A Shanghai paper, which suggested that his presence in the foreign settlement would be unwelcome, roused him to fury. All foreign settlements and concessions must forthwith be abolished, although he had been glad enough to seek shelter in them in previous years. In Japan, which he visited en route, he concentrated his hatred upon the British, to whom he had twice owed his life. In Peking, his only conspicuous callers were Karahan and Borodin. He cut himself off completely from the moderate elements of the Kuomintang during his last weeks. What purported to be his last message was addressed to his "dear comrades" in Moscow, with whom he instructed the Kuomintang to "keep in constant touch," and he is said to have ex-

pressed a wish to be embalmed like his friend, Lenin.

Was the Kuomintang subsidized by the soviet? Of this there is no direct proof, but very strong suspicion. Ma Soo, formerly Sun Yat-sen's agent in the United States, in an address at Shanghai on December 12, shortly after his return from the States and following the submission of his resignation, stated:

> Since returning to China I have become aware of the communistic propaganda which the soviet has been and is spreading in this country, and as a result I felt it incumbent upon me to warn the students of the dangers which lurk in the new and strange "isms" of Moscow. The worst phase of soviet propaganda in China is the use of Russian gold for the accomplishment of its purposes. I have positive proof of the use of soviet money in the Chinese schools among the students and teachers, and, probably worse to relate, I also have proof of its being used to influence the Chinese Press.

Mr. Feng Shih-yu, another old member of the Kuomintang, in an interview on January 3 stated:

> If the Moscow bolsheviks stop their subsidy today, all the so-called Chinese communists will discard their communist label tomorrow. . . . . The so-called Chinese communists are in a decided minority, although well-organized as compared with other parties. They are principally drawn from the ranks of students, university professors, and disgruntled politicians, and their principal object is to obtain money from the Russians. I have no knowledge of the exact amount which

the bolsheviks spend annually on propaganda in this country, but it must be a tremendously large one, as in Canton alone they have already spent $2,000,000.

Police raids upon Shanghai University early this year revealed the fact that it was a hotbed of bolshevism, and considerable seditious literature was confiscated; more, however, was found during a raid which took place at the beginning of June.

The extent to which the students have got out of hand may be best realized if I give you a brief account of what occurred in Peking in May. May 7 is the anniversary of the Japanese ultimatum of 1915, and the students make a habit of observing it as a national humiliation day, parading the streets and making anti-Japanese speeches. The Minister of Education on this occasion gave orders that government schools and colleges were not to have a holiday on that date, but were to remain at work. Student demonstrations, however, were held in defiance of his orders, and the demonstrators made the Minister of Education the object of their animosity. Failing to find him at the ministry of education, they proceeded to his private residence, which they broke into, smashing up or destroying everything it contained. There was a scuffle with the police, as a result of which several students were reported to have been injured, and one was

alleged to have died. During the following week the students continued to demonstrate, parading the streets and demanding the execution of the Minister of Justice and the Superintendent of Police. A mandate was issued in strong terms denouncing their interference in politics, but in spite of this negotiations were opened between the police and the educationalists, as a result of which it was announced that a compromise had been effected under which the police authorities would apologize for inflicting injuries upon the students, and consider claims for compensation, while the students would express regret for the destruction of the Minister's private property. Not unnaturally, the Minister immediately tendered his resignation.

But this was not by any means the only example of insubordination. There was about the same time an agitation at the Russian Language School, which is managed by the Chinese Foreign Office, the students deciding to rid themselves of the gentleman who had been their principal for four years, because they did not consider him sufficiently influential to secure them lucrative positions. He was compelled to resign, and a new principal was appointed, who suspended studies for ten days in order to reorganize the school. When it reassembled the students found that with the approval

of the ministry for foreign affairs he had issued a series of regulations which, among other things, prohibited students from participating in political demonstrations. The students thereupon decided that he, too, must go. He was driven off the school premises, and the students proceeded in a body to the *Waichiaopu*, to demand his immediate dismissal.

The Higher Normal School for Girls, also distinguished itself. On May 7, the principal, an American-educated woman, Miss Yang, had unwisely granted permission to the students to hold a meeting in the school auditorium to discuss the Twenty-one Demands, and to invite a number of radical speakers to address them. When she rose to open the meeting she was howled down. The students then met and decreed her expulsion, and have since locked her out of the building. In the Franco-Chinese school in the western hills, near Peking, there has also been trouble. The principal, a well-known Chinese scholar who was educated in France, incurred the animosity of the students by refusing to accede to their demand for the abolition of monthly examinations. Thereupon they denounced him as a poor administrator, and have since been agitating for his dismissal.

I have told you these facts about student activi-

ties because they throw considerable light upon what has recently occurred in Shanghai, where the trouble really started with the shooting of several riotous students by the police. But I must, before coming to that, briefly refer to what had preceded this incident. In February last there was a series of strikes in the Japanese cotton mills in Shanghai. The circumstances under which they occurred were extremely suspicious. In the first place, the mills first affected were those belonging to the Naigai Wata Kaisha. This company has ten mills in Shanghai, and three in Tsingtao. The general manager, Mr. Okada, has the reputation of being one of the most advanced of the large employers of labor in Shanghai. He served on the recent Child Labor Commission in that city, which recommended local legislation to prevent the exploitation of child labor under inhuman or insanitary conditions. But even before this Commission met he had taken the lead in welfare work, providing elementary schools for the children of his employees, as well as hospital and other facilities. His record makes it difficult to believe that the alleged grievances of the strikers—ill treatment by Japanese foreman—were well founded, or, if well founded, would not have been redressed immediately if brought to his notice. Attacks were made upon the Naigai Wata

mills, resulting in considerable damage to their plant and serious injury to a number of Japanese. Students of both sexes participated in these demonstrations, and were active in circulating inflammatory literature but the real leadership of the strike never appears to have been revealed. It spread to other Japanese mills in Shanghai, and then to Tsingtao, where, during May, the strikers actually occupied some of the mills and were only dislodged by Chinese gendarmes after a regular battle, in which two workers were killed and about a dozen wounded.

The Shanghai strike appeared to have been settled without any concession on the part of the employers, other than an undertaking to see that there was no ill treatment of the workers, at the end of February. But more trouble broke out in the middle of May, in the course of which a number of strikers made an attack upon a Japanese mill, broke through the cordon of Japanese employees that had been drawn up to protect the property, and, it is alleged, started breaking up the machinery. Firearms were used by the Japanese, resulting in the death of one of the assailants. Police and volunteers had to be called out, and the mob dispersed only after the former had fired over their heads. The students then assumed control of the

situation, organizing demonstrations against the Japanese, demanding punishment of the Japanese who had shot the worker, and arranging processions through the settlement. Shanghai is a foreign settlement, governed by an International Municipal Council, of which an American attorney is chairman today. It has been the consistent policy of the Council during the past years of unrest to exclude Shanghai from the vortex of Chinese militarism and politics. Armed Chinese are not permitted within the settlement, nor are political demonstrations of any kind permitted. A few weeks before the shooting incident at the Japanese mill, permission for a women's political demonstration in the settlement had been refused. During the civil wars of this and last year, police, volunteers, and landing parties from foreign warships have kept armed Chinese troops, no matter to what faction they belonged, outside the settlement. On December 16 last, a deputation from the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and the Chinese Ratepayers' Association visited the municipal offices to present the volunteers with mementos of Chinese gratitude for the services rendered in maintaining order during the fighting round Shanghai in September and October.

The students, however, have become accus-

tomed to defying their own authorities, and doubtless thought they could to the same in Shanghai, and on Saturday, May 30, arranged for simultaneous meetings in the streets to protest against the killing of a Chinese workman by the Japanese. That afternoon they occupied the main thoroughfare of the settlement, waving anti-foreign flags, and making anti-Japanese speeches. Some of the speakers were arrested, and the crowds were repeatedly ordered to disperse but took no notice. Large crowds of demonstrators followed the arrested men to the police station. The demonstrators later attacked the police, and attempted to disarm them. The arrest of these assailants led to further disturbance and more assaults on the police, culminating in an attack upon the police station, accompanied by shouts of "Kill the foreigners!" and attempts to wrench away the arms of the police on duty. Eventually, the inspector in charge gave the order to fire, which was obeyed, resulting in the killing of four men outright and the wounding of a number of others. This affray became the pretext for a general strike in Shanghai and anti-foreign demonstrations throughout the country. The central government, instead of attempting to repress these disorders, took the side of the students, and, without awaiting detailed reports, demanded the

release of the arrested students and the punishment of the police.

If one cannot adduce definite proof that the mill strikes in Shanghai and Tsingtao were instigated by soviet agents, one can fairly assume that they have since been exploited to foment anti-foreign feeling, by Karahan and his agents. The shooting of riotous students has been represented as another act of oppression by the imperialistic powers. It is not, perhaps, surprising that a nation seething with discontent should credit the statements incessantly dinned into its ears by soviet agents and their Chinese hirelings, that their woes are due to "imperialism." I do not think that communism has made much headway among the merchant and farming class in China, or even that the immature students who give it lip-service fully understand what it means. But other features of bolshevism such as class warfare, anarchy, and xenophobia have taken root, and it is difficult to say where the mischief will end. The secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council has publicly stated that as the result of police raids it has been definitely established that the Russian bolshevik authorities in Shanghai have been supplying funds, and in other ways encouraging the activities of the Chinese students. Quantities of communistic and anti-for-

eign literature, as well as correspondence with foreign communist organizations, were seized in a raid on Shanghai University. Karahan, the soviet envoy, sent an official expression of sympathy to the Chinese government in connection with the Shanghai incidents.

A deplorable feature of the whole business is the contemptible attitude of a considerable section of the Japanese press. The whole trouble originated, as I have shown, in an anti-Japanese movement. The police acted only in the interests of order, and the fact that the inspector in charge and the European constables involved were British was accidental. The bulk of the foreign police in Shanghai are and always have been British, since the establishment of the municipality. The Japanese papers I have referred to, however, are endeavoring to incite the Chinese against the British, and the British only, as responsible for the present trouble. It was against the British that Sun Yat-sen directed most of his venom. And there is no doubt that the soviet regard British influence as the most important factor in the maintenance of order in the Far East, and are therefore concentrating upon undermining it. The soviet press, which has been propagating in favor of American recognition, has commended America's attitude toward the recent

disturbances, and denounced that of Great Britain. And the anti-foreign movement in China, for the time being seems to be directed mainly against Great Britain and Japan.

I do not think that you will resent my being quite frank on this occasion, and drawing attention to the criminal recklessness displayed by certain missionary institutions in connection with the present disturbances. Yenching University, in Peking, within a day or two of the news of the first Shanghai disturbances reaching the capital, and several days before the official police version of what had occurred could possibly have been received, issued a statement in the name of the university deploring the action of the police in killing unarmed students. As an English paper printed in Peking said at the time: "What the student body just at the present moment needs is not encouragement to prejudge issues or to adopt inflammatory methods, but wise restraint and guidance."

Even more deplorable, in my opinion, was what happened at Canton, after the attack upon Shameen by the Chinese, instigated by the Russian-trained cadets. This attack took place on June 23, by which time every well-informed foreigner in China must have been aware that the life of every white man and white woman in China who was not

under armed protection was in peril. Yet on the evening of the affray, and admittedly without any investigation and relying upon the statements of students who were not in a position to see what occurred, a so-called report was issued over the signatures of the vice-president of the Canton Christian College, and signed by the Chinese members of the faculty, stating that the trouble had been started by foreigners in Shameen firing upon a Chinese procession. Dr. Baxter, the vice-president, three days later retracted this allegation, admitting that his signature had been appended without his having any knowledge of the correctness of the report, other than the statements of Chinese members of the staff who were not in a position to see how the trouble started. I am not, I think, exaggerating in describing such reckless and irresponsible statements as criminal, under present conditions. I may add that forty of the leading American business men at Hongkong have publicly denounced the action of the faculty and students of this college in publishing erroneous statements about the Shameen incident. But it is unlikely that Dr. Baxter's belated retraction will ever be reproduced by the Chinese press.

I may say in conclusion that the situation that has arisen in connection with the Shanghai riots is

one which demands close co-operation on the part of all the treaty powers, and especially of America and Great Britain. It is the traditional Chinese policy to work for dissensions among the powers, and this is also the aim of the soviets. If British influence in China can be undermined, it means goodbye to all rights now enjoyed by the foreign communities in that country. And the interests of all powers which simply seek to develop their commerce in China by legitimate methods are identical. If one suffers all will suffer. This is not an issue between Britain and China, or Japan and China, but between Western civilization and anarchy. And it must depend on the outcome of this crisis whether foreigners can continue to pursue their legitimate avocations in China, in the enjoyment of reasonable security for their persons, their property, and their trade.

III

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

I shall not deter you very long today with the history of extraterritoriality, but shall pass on as rapidly as possible to the practical aspects of a problem which is now exercising the minds of so many Chinese and foreigners who reside in Chinese territory. Extraterritoriality has been defined as "an exemption from the operation of local law, granted either by usage or by treaty, on account of the differences in law, custom, and social habits of civilized nations from those of uncivilized nations."[1] In Europe and the Near East it has been known for many centuries, but has arisen from usage rather than treaty rights. In China it is based entirely upon treaties. You will find in Morse's *International Relations of the Chinese Empire* and in Wellington Koo's *The Status of Aliens in China* accounts of its origin from the foreign and the Chinese points of view, respectively. You will be convinced by the former that it was an essential condition of foreign residence and trade in China. You will be asked to believe by the latter that it

[1] Moore, *International Law*, XI, 593.

originated in the contumacy and lawlessness of British and other foreign adventurers, who "early began to withdraw themselves, by open defiance, from the operation of local laws." The reasons given by foreign authorities for its introduction in China are numerous, but I will confine myself to a few.

First, I would place the attitude of the Chinese official toward foreigners during the early days of foreign intercourse. To the Chinese the foreigner was a barbarian, to be treated "like beasts, and not ruled on the same principles as citizens. . . . . Therefore to rule barbarians by misrule is the true and best way of ruling them."[1] Foreigners, therefore, were restricted to trading at a single port, Canton, and with an officially recognized monopoly, known as the "co-Hong." In Canton they were permitted to reside only in the factory district, a confined space on the river front. They were not permitted to engage Chinese servants (though this rule was generally relaxed), to bring women or arms into the factories, to use sedan chairs, or to enter into any direct relations with the local Chinese officials. They were not allowed to row for pleasure on the river, or to enter the city, and only on three days per month were they per-

[1] Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, I, 111–12.

mitted, under the escort of an interpreter, to take the air at the flower gardens on the other side of the river. They had to return to Macao after each trading season.[1] They were held collectively responsible for the misdeeds of individuals. And the local Chinese authorities would not recognize, or have any dealings with, foreign officials intrusted with the protection of their interests.

Secondly, I would place the difference between Chinese and foreign law, especially in relation to homicide. Except that decapitation was the punishment for murder and strangulation for manslaughter, there was no distinction between the two offenses. A typical instance is that of the gunner of the country ship "Lady Hughes," who was accused of causing the death of a Chinese by firing a saluting gun, in November, 1784.[2] His surrender to the local authorities was immediately demanded, and when it was refused the supercargo of the ship was arrested and carried off into the city as a hostage. Eventually the gunner was surrendered, and on January 8, 1875, was strangled under orders from Peking, which must have been sent before there had been a semblance of a trial. When Chinese writers refer to British contumacy and lawlessness, it seems pertinent to point out that in

[1] Morse, *op. cit.*, I, 69–71. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

the century preceding 1833 not more than a half-dozen cases have been recorded in which homicide was alleged against British subjects,[1] including several which were obviously accidental.

Third, there was the Chinese doctrine of collective responsibility. Again and again all commerce was stopped, and foreigners were subjected to all kinds of restraints and indignities, because of the alleged misconduct of one or more of their number. As the East India Company's Select Committee recorded in one case, in which an attempt was made to hold it responsible for a fracas between British Bluejackets and Chinese villagers:

> Thus we see our situation clearly made responsible for the acts of between two and three thousand individuals who are daily coming in contact with the lowest of the Chinese, and are exposed to assaults so wanton, and often so barbarous, as well as to robberies so extensive, that self-defence imposes upon them the necessity of attacking their assailants in a manner from whence death must ensue. A great and important commerce is instantly suspended, whole fleets at times detained, ourselves liable to seizure, and to be the medium of surrendering a man to death whose crime is only self-defence or obedience to orders, or else to lend ourselves to the most detestable falsehoods, in order to support a fabricated statement which may save the credit of the officers of the Chinese Government.[2]

[1] C. L. Hsia, *Studies in Chinese Diplomatic History*, p. 6.

[2] Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 106 n.

As early as 1833 the British Parliament passed an Act to Regulate the Trade to China and India,[1] which included provision for the establishment of a court of justice with criminal and admiralty jurisdiction, but it was not until the conclusion of the so-called Opium War that Britain's extraterritorial rights were recognized by China. I say so-called Opium War because, as a matter of fact, from the British point of view it was no more an opium war than the American Revolution was a tea war.[2] To the Chinese it appeared that the seizure of opium was the *casus belli*. To the British, however, it was essentially a war over questions of the status of British subjects and officers. Lord Palmerston's dispatches make it clear that the British government would not have complained, if the

> Government of China, after giving due notice of its altered intentions [regarding opium] had proceeded to exclude the law of the Empire, and had seized and confiscated all the opium they could find within Chinese territory. . . . . But it determined to seize peaceable British merchants, instead of seizing the contraband opium; to punish the innocent for the guilty, and to make the sufferings of the former the means of compulsion upon the latter; and it also resolved to force the British Superintendent, who is an officer of the British Crown,

[1] Koo, *Status of Aliens in China*, pp. 95, 599.

[2] John Quincy Adams, quoted by Morse, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 254 n., 177.

to become an instrument in the hands of the Chinese Authorities, for carrying into execution the Laws of China, with which he had nothing to do.[1]

I might add, in passing, that in those days American vessels enjoyed the monopoly of transporting Turkish opium to China,[2] that among the seizures at Canton in 1839 were fifteen hundred chests from Russell and Company,[3] an American firm; that although the British government considered legalization of the opium trade the only practical measure, it did not force this upon the Chinese government after the victorious war of 1840–42; and that when the opium trade was eventually legalized in 1858,[4] it was with the support if not at the instance of the American plenipotentiary.

The Treaty of Nanking of 1842 did not itself concede extraterritorial rights, but the general regulations attached to that treaty provided:

> Regarding the punishment of English criminals, the English Government will enact the laws necessary to attain that end, and the Consul will be empowered to put them into force; and regarding the punishment of Chinese criminals, these will be tried and punished by their own laws, in the way provided for by the correspondence which took place at Nanking after the concluding of peace.[5]

[1] Morse, *op. cit.*, I, 623.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 207.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 218.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 554.
[5] Koo, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

The treaty did, however, provide for the cession of Hongkong, and the opening of five ports —Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai —to British trade. It is noteworthy that Sir Henry Pottinger, the British envoy who negotiated that treaty, was instructed constantly to bear in mind that "we seek for no exclusive advantages, and demand nothing that we shall not willingly see enjoyed by the subjects of all other states."[1]

The American envoy, Caleb Cushing, who reached China in March, 1844, with instructions to negotiate a treaty that was just, with no unfair advantage on either side, learning what the British had done, and having actual proof of what submission to Chinese jurisdiction might involve as the result of some American citizens firing on a mob in self-defense,[2] secured a definite grant of criminal jurisdiction over American citizens in Article XXI of the Treaty of Wanghia. The extraterritorial rights of the treaty powers were more clearly defined in subsequent treaties, from only one of which, the Chefoo agreement of September, 1876, between Britain and China, need I quote here:

SECTION II.—(ii) The British Treaty of 1858, Article XVI, lays down that "Chinese subjects who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects shall be arrested

[1] Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 663. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 327.

and punished by the Chinese authorities, according to the laws of China.

"British subjects who may commit any crime in China shall be tried and punished by the Consul, or any other public functionary authorised thereto, according to the laws of Great Britain.

"Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides."

The words "functionary authorised thereto" are translated in the Chinese text "British Government."

In order to secure the fulfilment of its treaty obligations, the British Government has established a Supreme Court at Shanghai, with a special code of rules, which it is now about to revise. The Chinese Government has established at Shanghai, a Mixed Court; but the officer presiding over it, either from lack of power or dread of unpopularity, constantly fails to enforce his judgments.

It is now understood that the Tsungli *yamen* will write a circular to the Legations, inviting Foreign Representatives at once to consider with the Tsungli *yamen*, the measures needed for the more effective administration of justice at the ports open to foreign trade.

(iii) It is agreed that, whenever a crime is committed affecting the person or property of a British subject, whether in the interior or at the open ports, the British Minister shall be free to send officers to the spot to be present at the investigation.

To the prevention of misunderstanding, on this point, Sir Thomas Wade will write a note to the above effect, to which the Tsungli *yamen* will reply, affirming that this is the course of proceeding to be adhered to for the time to come.

It is further understood that so long as the laws of the two countries differ from each other, there can be but one principle to guide judicial proceedings in mixed cases in China, namely, that the case is to be tried by the official of the defendant's nationality, the official of the plaintiff's nationality merely attending to watch the proceedings in the interests of justice. If the officer so attending be dissatisfied with the proceedings, it will be in his power to protest against them in detail. The law administered will be the law of the nationality of the officer trying the case. This is the meaning of the words *hui t'ung*, indicating combined action in judicial proceedings in Article XVI of the Treaty of Tientsin; and this is the course to be respectively followed by the officers of either nationality.

As a consequence of extraterritoriality, therefore, a Chinese or American or any other national who charges a British subject with any crime, or wishes to sue him for any civil cause, must institute proceedings before a British court. The latter, however, cannot, in a civil suit, entertain a counterclaim against a national of another state; nor has it any authority, other than that accorded by courtesy, over non-British witnesses. It is easy to understand that complications may arise in which three or more parties of different nationalities may be involved, requiring decision by three or more different tribunals. Moreover, it not infrequently happens that persons of different nationalities are implicated in the same crime, in which case sepa-

rate trials must take place under their respective laws in the courts exercising jurisdiction.

I shall now briefly describe the situation today. The so-called "treaty powers," either under definite treaty stipulations or by virtue of "most-favoured nation treatment," still enjoy extraterritorial privileges to the exclusion of Chinese jurisdiction. These governments are Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Austria-Hungary and Germany[1] lost their extraterritorial rights as a result of the abrogation of their treaties with China, following the latter's participation in the Great War. Russians were deprived of extraterritorial rights by a presidential mandate suspending recognition of the tsarist minister and consuls, promulgated on September 23, 1920.[2]

British jurisdiction is exercised, in minor criminal and civil cases in the outports, by consular officers, and in Shanghai by an assistant judge and police magistrate. Serious criminal charges, and civil cases in which serious issues are involved, are

[1] *China Year Book* (1921–22), p. 739, and *ibid.* (1925), pp. 783, 785.

[2] *Ibid.* (1921–22), p. 626.

heard by the Supreme Court sitting in Shanghai or elsewhere with appeal to the full court and eventually to the Privy Council. American jurisdiction is exercised locally by American consular officers, and in important cases, civil and criminal, by the United States Court for China, which was established by an act of Congress on June 30, 1906. The French and Japanese have judicial officials in China. In the case of other treaty powers, jurisdiction is exercised by their consular officials, usually with right of appeal to some home tribunal.

A curious feature is the Shanghai mixed court.[1] The international settlement at Shanghai was an area set apart for foreign residence and trade, and consists to-day of the former British and American settlements and an extension thereto, administered by the International Foreign Municipal Council. There was an influx of Chinese refugees during the Taiping rebellion, and the Chinese population has since increased until it numbers nearly one million. There were obvious difficulties in the way of permitting a purely Chinese court to function in a foreign-administered settlement, and at first jurisdiction was exercised by the British consul-general. In 1864 a so-called "mixed court" was established,

[1] For fuller information on the mixed court, see Kotener, *Shanghai, Its Mixed Court and Council*, 1925.

presided over by a deputy of the Shanghai magistrate, with a foreign assessor on the bench in cases in which foreign or municipal interests were involved. The history of the development of the mixed court would take too long in the telling, and I can only say here that its authority gradually increased, in spite of Chinese opposition and obstruction, until 1911, when the outbreak of the Revolution compelled the treaty-power consuls to take over control of the tribunal. It is today staffed by magistrates whose appointment is subject to the approval of the foreign consuls, and who sit in rotation with foreign assessors, the records being kept by the municipal police. Prisoners sentenced to imprisonment serve their term in jails controlled by the Municipal Council. Criminals sentenced to capital punishment are sent to the Chinese city authorities to be executed. The mixed court probably handles a greater volume of business, civil and criminal, than any other tribunal in the world. Its jurisdiction now extends to Germans, Russians, and other non-treaty-power nationals in Shanghai. The Chinese now claim that the mixed court should become a purely Chinese institution, instead of, as today, remaining under consular and municipal control.

Before dealing in some detail with the objec-

tions to the abolition of extraterritoriality, I propose to refer briefly to some of the arguments against its perpetuation. In the first place, it is argued, and quite correctly, that it constitutes an infringement of China's sovereign rights and independence. Second, it leads to a multiplicity of jurisdictions, as I have already mentioned; the application of different laws, even where the same issues are involved; and uncertainty as to the issue of any particular case. But the main objection to its perpetuation, and the one most difficult to answer, is its abuse—chiefly by governments which have infinitesimal or at least insignificant interests in China. The worst offenders have been the Spanish, Cuban, Brazilian, and other South American consulates. The Spanish consulate of recent years appears to have made a specialty of extending its protection, on the flimsiest of pretexts, to Chinese who desire to evade the jurisdiction of their own authorities. Its latest performance has been to claim jurisdiction over a Jew born of Turkish parents in India, who repudiated his British nationality some years ago, sought French protection as a Turk, and now claims that he has become entitled to Spanish protection as the result of an ordinance restoring Spanish nationality to Sephardic Jews who like to avail themselves of it. The

Brazilian consulate seems to exist solely for the purpose of extending its protection over public gaming establishments, which are at present functioning under Brazilian protection in Shanghai and Tientsin. The Cuban consulate used to exist for the same end. The scandal of foreign protection of Chinese attained such proportions that at the Annual Conference of British Chambers of Commerce in 1921 a resolution was adopted unanimously which read:

> That this Conference deprecates the growing tendency of certain foreign Consulates in China to afford protection to Chinese by process of naturalization or other means, as it is notorious that in the majority of cases the applicants for naturalization are not actuated by any desire to leave their own country to take up their residence in a foreign state, but take this simple means of evading their just obligations and liabilities and escaping from the jurisdiction to which they would otherwise be amenable.

It is only fair to say that the Spanish Consul, who was the most notorious offender, was dismissed, and the naturalization certificates issued by him were cancelled. But other consuls, notably those of Portugal, and more recently, of Chile, have also been offenders.

Finally, there is the objection that as long as extraterritoriality prevails it is impossible for the Chinese government to throw open the whole

country to foreign trade. The necessity of sending for trial every foreigner entitled to extraterritoriality who commits the most trivial offense to the nearest treaty port at which one of his consular officers functions is cited as an insuperable obstacle to permitting foreign residence trade outside the fifty treaty and open ports. To this day foreigners are not entitled by treaty to reside in Peking for business purposes, or to own or lease business premises elsewhere than in the open ports.

I now turn to the problem of abolishing extraterritoriality, and to the objections of such abolition. Grand Secretary Wensiang in 1869 said to the British minister, Sir R. Alcock: "Do away with your extraterritoriality clause, and merchant and missionary may settle anywhere and everywhere; but retain it, and we must do our best to confine you and our trouble to the treaty ports." Extraterritoriality has always been resented by patriotic Chinese, but it was not until the signature of the Anglo-Chinese Commerical Treaty of 1902 that any definite stipulation was made regarding its abolition. Article XIII reads:

> China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her

extraterritorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations, warrant her in so doing.

Great Britain had relinquished extraterritorial rights in Japan three years previously; similar provisions appeared in the American and Japanese commercial treaties of 1903, while Sweden, in the Commercial Treaty of 1908, agreed to relinquish consular jurisdiction "as soon as all other powers have agreed to relinquish their extraterritorial rights." The last treaty signed by China in which extraterritorial rights were conceded was that with Switzerland, signed in Tokio, in June, 1918. In treaties since signed with Bolivia, Persia, Germany, and soviet Russia, China has retained jurisdiction over their nationals.

China's first formal claim for the abolition of extraterritoriality was presented in 1919 at the Peace Conference at Versailles. It was included in the "Questions for Readjustment Submitted by China to the Peace Conference,"[1] which, among other things, demanded the renunciation of spheres of influence or of interest, the withdrawal of foreign troops from China and of foreign wireless stations and post-offices, the relinquishments of leased territories, the restoration of foreign settlements and

[1] For full text, see *China Year Book* (1921–22), pp. 719 ff.

concessions, and tariff autonomy. Some of the objections I have already mentioned were set forth, and it was urged that China now had a national constitution, prescribing, among other things, the separation of government powers, and assuring to the people their inviolable fundamental rights of life and property, and guaranteeing the complete independence and ample protection of judicial officers and their entire freedom from interference on the part of the executive or legislative powers; that China had prepared a number of codes, some of which were provisionally enforced, and which had been carefully adapted from those of the most advanced nations; that new courts and procuratorates of various kinds had been established, and that in view of the "satisfactory result China has already obtained, and the progress she has been making from day to day in the domain of legislative and judicial reforms, consular jurisdiction should be abolished by the end of 1924." This question was not taken up at Versailles but was again raised at the Washington Conference, and supported by much the same arguments, in 1921. In this instance the Chinese delegation had not the audacity to name a date for its abolition, but asked the powers to agree to relinquish their extraterritorial rights in China at the end of a definite period.

The Washington Conference adopted a resolution[1] which, after reciting the provisions of the commercial treaties of 1902 and 1903 and expressing sympathy with China's aspirations, provided for the establishment of an International Commission, to which each of the signatories should appoint one member

> to inquire into the present practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, and into the laws and the judicial system and the methods of judicial administration of China, with a view to reporting to the governments of the several powers above named their findings in fact in regard to these matters, and their recommendations as to such means as they may find suitable to improve the existing conditions of the administration of justice in China, and to assist and further the efforts of the Chinese government to effect such legislation and judicial reforms as would warrant the several powers in relinquishing either progressively or otherwise, their respective rights of extraterritoriality.

This Commission was to be constituted within three months after the adjournment of the Conference, and to submit its findings and recommendations within one year from its first meeting. Each of the powers reserved the right to accept all or any portion of its recommendations, and China reserved the right to a seat on the Commission, and undertook to afford it every possible facility for the

[1] *China Year Book* (1924), p. 1164.

successful accomplishment of its tasks. The Commission should have met on or before May 6, 1922, but in the meantime China was involved in another civil war, and since then she has made repeated requests for a postponement.

It will be remembered that Great Britain, America, and Japan, in 1902 and 1903, undertook to relinquish their extraterritorial rights when satisfied that (1) the state of the Chinese laws, (2) the arrangements for their administration, and (3) "other considerations" warranted them in so doing.

Now a Law Codification Commission has been at work since 1914, in collaboration with the ministry of justice, and since the Washington Conference a Commission on Extraterritoriality has also been organized to prepare for a visit to the International Commission. With the assistance of French and Japanese experts a number of new codes have been drafted, of which the Criminal Code,[1] the Code of Criminal Procedure,[2] and the Civil Procedure Code have, after several revisions, been promulgated. English translations of these codes are now available. A number of other new laws—criminal; commercial; mining; trade-mark[3] and copyright; labor; and regulations relating to courts, procedure, and

[1] *China Year Book* (1921–22), pp. 372 ff.

[2] *Ibid.* (1924), pp. 267 ff. [3] *Ibid.* (1925), p. 816.

prisons—have also been promulgated. Mr. Escarra, French adviser to the ministry of justice, is my authority for the statement that

> apart from a few special texts, the provisions of which are often very poor from the technical point of view, the civil codification remains in its infancy. Several years, at least, are required to provide China with a body of civil and commercial laws exhaustive enough to meet the needs of the foreigners. Till then, should the training and good will of the judges be out of discussion, nothing can be said about a proper administration of justice.[1]

He mentions that in 1920, when a crisis in the piece-goods trade occurred at Shanghai, resulting in numerous bankruptcies among the Chinese, it was impossible for the mixed court "to deal with the Chinese law on the matter, because the latter had been regarded as repealed by a decision of the Supreme Court" and "a special procedure of winding up" had to be devised.[2]

M. Georges Padoux, a distinguished Frenchman, who is a member of the Commission on Extraterritoriality, more recently wrote:

> The present administration of civil and penal justice in China affords a striking illustration of the difficulties attending the application of legislative provisions which are not in harmony with the customs and prevalent ideas of the popula-

[1] Escarra, *The Extraterritoriality Problem*, p. 20.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

tion. In civil matters, the law in force is mostly the Ta Ching Lu Li, many parts of which have become practically obsolete. The Judges of the Supreme Court have to display a great deal of ingenuity in order to adapt these old rules to the needs of contemporary China, and to the evolution which takes place now in the organization of the Chinese family. The adaptation sometimes goes so far as almost entirely to set aside the old rule (see the recently published summaries of Judgments of the Supreme Court). In penal matters a new Code has been enacted in 1912, but it is far ahead of the social conditions of a large part of the territory. It is not applied in the remote corners of most of the Provinces, and it is sometimes ignored even in Peking. During the last few years, for instance, it has been a common practice to order by Presidential mandate the confiscation of the property of overthrown political leaders, although general confiscation has been expressly abolished by the Penal Code.[1]

The fundamental law of the republic is, or should be, the constitution. No one knows which of the various constitutions which have been promulgated from time to time is at present supposed to be in force, though that, perhaps, is not a matter of very great importance, as at no time during the history of the republic has any constitution been more than a scrap of paper.

There are two other features of China's laws to which I must direct your attention. The first is the immunity of the civil officials from the ordinary

[1] *Chinese Social and Political Science Review* (April, 1925), p. 360.

courts of the land. There is a special court, known as the "administrative court," whose duties are "to try all illegal acts of public officials with the exception of cases expressly placed by law under the jurisdiction of other organs."[1] An attempt is thus made to apply the French system of *droit administratif*, but without the safeguard of the tribunal of conflicts, whose duty it is to decide which cases come within the scope of the administrative court. Moreover, the administrative court is expressly prohibited from entertaining claims for damages.[2] The plaintiff can only ask for rescission of the ruling of an official, or such modification thereof as the court may consider equitable. It is not the custom to accept oral testimony, but to try each case on written arguments. A civil official charged with a criminal offense is supposed to be brought before the ordinary court, but this is seldom done if he is a man of any status, immunity being conferred by extending the definition of what constitutes an "administrative act." It is not, therefore, possible to secure redress in the usual way for the wrongdoings of civil officials. Second, there is the peculiar status of the military man in China. Soldiers, from

[1] *China Year Book* (1925), pp. 609 ff.

[2] Law on Administrative Cases, Art. 3. (*China Year Book* [1925], p. 611.)

the lowest to the highest ranks, who commit offenses against the Military Penal Ordinance, the Criminal Code, the Police Regulations, or any other law for which punishment is provided, are tried, not by the ordinary courts, but by a court-martial. Any claim against them for damages must also be tried by a court-martial. There are at present nearly one-and-a-half million men under arms in China, and they are the most notorious breakers of the laws of the republic. Yet a civilian plaintiff or complainant can only secure the trial of a military man as an act of grace on the part of his superior or commanding officer. The proceedings, if allowed, are heard *in camera*, no lawyer being allowed to the plaintiff, no access to the record of testimony being permitted, and the decision of the court being subject to confirmation or annulment by the officer who authorizes the convening of the court-martial. Many Chinese officials, occupying what we should regard as civil posts, have military titles, and are thus removed from the jurisdiction of the civil courts and the administrative court.

I now turn to the actual administration of the law in China. It is a sweeping but nevertheless accurate statement, that under existing conditions no attempt is, or can be made, to enforce the laws of the republic. The Law Codification Commission

may work overtime compiling new codes, some of which are not altogether unsatisfactory, but even in Peking itself the courts are unable to enforce them. China has had three constitutions since the establishment of the republic. No one can say definitely which of them is supposed to be in force at the moment, as the present government does not even claim to be constitutional. But at no time have the rights and privileges which these constitutions are supposed to guarantee to her citizens been aught but a myth. The most glaring example of the wholesale violation of the law is to be found in the present position of opium. The Criminal Code promulgated in March, 1910, and amended in December, 1914, contains a whole chapter[1] devoted to penalties for cultivating, smoking, trafficking in, or transporting opium. Yet it is conservatively estimated that in 1923 China produced between thirteen and fourteen thousand tons of opium, more than twelve times as much as India, and nearly eight times as much as the whole of the rest of the world (India included).[2] And in most provinces this opium was produced, sold, and smoked, not against, but in accordance with, the orders of the local officials, chiefly the militarists,

[1] *China Year Book* (1921–22), p. 404.

[2] *Ibid.* (1924), chap. xix.

who derived the bulk of the revenues for the support of their overgrown armies from this source.

I shall now give you a series of cases, a few among those which have come to my notice, in order that you may have some idea of the manner in which Chinese laws are actually administered. The first is the Tientsin land case. There lives in Tientsin a wealthy family, known as the Chang family, which had inherited a quantity of property from the father, the late Chang Yen-mao. This property had been acquired by purchase between the years 1898 and 1904. Last year the Chang brothers were told by the Police Commissioner of the province, a most powerful official, that he would like to acquire a large tract of their land, at a nominal price. This land happened to be mortgaged to a French bank, and the brothers refused to sell it below the ordinary market price. A few days later the elder brother was practically kidnapped from a restaurant in the ex-German concession, in Tientsin, taken down to the police headquarters in the city, and there detained until he had, under duress, signed a document, a facsimile of which is in my possession, to the effect that "with the desire to assist and promote the development of the municipality in the city" he would sell

his land "at a price which the police authorities might consider reasonable." This undertaking he repudiated after his release, and the Police Commissioner thereupon took possession of his land, and charged him with claiming ownership on forged title deeds. The Chang brothers then had to leave Tientsin to escape arrest. What is their remedy? They cannot sue the Police Commissioner in an ordinary court, as he is an official and not amenable to its jurisdiction. They cannot take proceedings in the administrative court, because he holds the rank of a general in the Chinese army. And if they were able to induce the higher military authorities to convene a court-martial—which is extremely unlikely—they would not be permitted to be represented by a lawyer, to examine or cross-examine witnesses, or to see the record, while all the proceedings would be held *in camera*. They have therefore been unable to obtain any redress for what, on the face of it, appears a most glaring outrage on the part of a high official.

Another very interesting case was the Tientsin cotton case. Tientsin is the center of a large export trade in raw cotton. It has been the custom locally for years past to contract forward in July and August, when some idea of the extent of the crops can be obtained, for cotton to be delivered in

October, November, and December. There were good cotton crops in 1923, and forward contracts at 23–28 *taels* per picul were made by foreign exporters for some 250,000 piculs. Then came the Japanese earthquake, with the destruction of large quantities of cotton and cotton goods in Japan, with the result that there was a sudden and unexpected demand for cotton in that country. The price soared from 23 to 28 *taels* to 43 *taels*. The dealers repudiated nearly all their forward contracts in order to take advantage of the Japanese demand, and resorted to every conceivable form of trickery to get their cotton through Tientsin without delivering it to the original buyers. The Civil Governor, Police Commissioner, and Chinese Chamber of Commerce were appealed to for aid in preventing this wholesale fraud. But the Police Commissioner maintained that the best he could do would be to secure 50 per cent of the cotton contracted for. The Civil Governor declared that forward purchase of cotton was an illegal gambling transaction. The foreign buyers, who naturally sustained heavy loss from their failure to meet their own obligations in Japan and America, then endeavored to sue the defaulting dealers. Writs were applied for, through the foreign consulates, in the ordinary way, but the Chinese courts refused even to serve them, and to

this day no proceedings have been permitted against the defaulters.

The case of Colonel Chen is another good example. On February 1, 1924, when the afternoon express train from Peking was about to leave Feng-tai, about seven miles from the capital, a passenger car, which had come through from the Peking-Hankow Railway, carrying one of the President's concubines with a military escort, suddenly appeared, and it was demanded that it should be coupled on to the express. The latter was already carrying its full load, and the couplings of the special car were not of the type required by the regulations for a passenger express, so the demand was refused by the British traffic inspector. Thereupon one of the military escort drew a pistol and pointed it at his head, and the inspector had to agree to couple on the car. There was some misunderstanding at this point, the train moving farther up the platform, presumably to make room for shunting the car into position. Thereupon, under instructions from their superior officer, the military escort set upon Mr. Bessell, knocked him down, struck him with a pistol, and brutally kicked him. The train then went on its way with the car attached, and Colonel Chen, the concubine's brother, who was in charge of the escort, proceeded

to Taku. Mr. Bessell was seriously injured, and had to undergo two operations. A strong protest, with a demand for the trial of the officer in charge of the escort, was made by the British legation. Mr. Bessell was a servant of the Chinese government who had been assaulted in the execution of his duty, and while endeavoring to carry out the government's railway regulations, and one would naturally have expected the government to take prompt action. Instead, it resorted to every form of mendacity and procrastination to shield the culprits. It was pretended, at first, that Colonel Chen was at Wuchang, in mid-China, and that the Hupeh Tuchun had been instructed to deal with him. Although the fact that he was at Taku, within a few miles of Tientsin, could no longer be concealed, it was not until February 25, after repeated evasions, that action was taken. On that date the chief judge of the military court of the ministry of war, the chief of the medical department of the same ministry, and a personal representative of the President proceeded to Taku, where they interviewed Colonel Chen without the presence of any of the witnesses to the assault, reported that he was too ill to be moved, and subsequently announced that he had been sentenced to "twenty-eight days detention in his own quarter." This farcical deci-

sion the British government refused to recognize, demanding the formal trial of Colonel Chen, in the presence of a British official, in accordance with the treaties. The Chinese argued that the treaties did not provide for the presence of a foreign official at a court-martial upon a military offender, and delayed and prevaricated, and it was not until June 3, 123 days after the assault, that Colonel Chen was actually brought up for trial. I heard some details of that trial subsequently from Mr. Bessell. He was, of course, not permitted to be represented legally. He was still suffering from the injuries he had received, and was unable to stand for more than a few minutes. But the military court announced that it could not accept testimony unless the witness stood up to give it, and Mr. Bessell therefore had to give his evidence fragmentarily, retiring to rest whenever the pain of standing became unendurable. The officer who ordered his assault on February 1 was in uniform, and wore a mustache. The officer who appeared as Colonel Chen on this occasion was in *mufti*, and without a mustache. Mr. Bessell had seen him only for a few moments in the twilight, four months previously, and was therefore unable to make positive identification. So Colonel Chen, who had been found guilty at the farcical inquiry of February 25, was

acquitted on this occasion, scapegoats being made of the soldiers and a subordinate officer who were alleged to have participated in the assault.

I wish to mention here again the case of the soldier on the wall. The legation quarter in Peking is surrounded on three sides by loopholed walls, and on the south by a section of the main wall of the city, which has been repaired, fortified, and incorporated in the defenses of the quarter, and is not permitted to be used by Chinese. On April 10, 1924, the legation-quarter police found a Chinese soldier belonging to the bodyguard of the Minister of War wandering about on the wall, told him he was not permitted there, and asked him to come to the police station. There he would have been discharged without further trouble had he not announced his intention of returning to the wall as soon as released. Accordingly, he was sent to the nearest Chinese police station, whence a report was subsequently received that he had been given four hundred blows (although corporal punishment is supposed to be illegal) and confined to barracks for several weeks. Three days later he reappeared in the streets of Peking, and committed a series of assaults upon foreigners. He assaulted in succession, and without provocation, an American, an Italian, and a British subject. The American was

assaulted in one of the main streets of the city, but as the assailant was a soldier, the Chinese police, who witnessed the occurrence, made no attempt to interfere. After assaulting the Italian, also without molestation, he again mounted the legation section of the wall, and committed a savage assault upon a British subject who was walking there. He was arrested, after a violent struggle, by the legation police, assisted by a number of coolies whom they summoned to their assistance, and taken to the legation-quarter police station, where he was detained, the Chinese authorities being notified of what had occurred. On this occasion the apparently demented soldier found himself a national hero. The wildest stories regarding his treatment appeared in the Chinese press, and it was actually demanded that the British subject, who had struck back when attacked, should be charged with assault. Mass meetings were held in Peking at which the recall of the British Minister was demanded, and Trotzky sent messages of sympathy to the victim of "foreign imperialism," and addressed noisy meetings at Moscow which passed resolutions of sympathy with the soldier. Eventually, under pressure from the legations concerned, the man was brought up for trial, but to avoid the presence of foreign officials at another court-mar-

tial, he was first dismissed from the army, and handed over to a civil magistrate, who sentenced him to a term of imprisonment. He should probably have been sent to a lunatic asylum, and I only cite this case as throwing light on Chinese mentality where foreigners are victims of outrages.

As a final instance of the immunity of the militarist from the law of the land, I may refer briefly to the case of the Christian general, Feng Yu-hsiang. He had been invited, on February 16, 1924, to dine with the American minister, Dr. Schurman. The regulations of the legation quarter, which is administered and policed under the orders of the diplomatic body, prohibit motor cars from entering the quarter at excessive speed, with blinding headlights, or with armed escorts on the footboards. All these regulations were violated by the Christian general on the night in question, and after wild blowing of police whistles his car was eventually compelled to pull up by a policeman who stood directly in its path. The Christian general thereupon alighted in a fury, struck the policeman, took away his baton, and, according to the statements of the police and an eyewitness, ordered his escort to kill the policeman, and he would be responsible. Fortunately, this order, if actually given, was disobeyed. The car then proceeded on

its way to the American legation, two more policeman being struck with the captured baton, en route. Needless to say, no redress was given, nor apology offered, by the perpetrator of this assault.

I have in my possession notes of two cases in which German doctors in Tientsin were defendants in criminal charges, which throw considerable light upon the treatment to which foreigners deprived of their extraterritorial rights are now subjected. In the first case, the doctor was charged, under Article 326 of the Chinese Criminal Code, with causing the death of a boy-patient upon whom he had performed an operation. The article in question reads:

> Whoever fails to give the necessary attention to his occupation and in consequence causes death or injury to any person shall be punished with imprisonment for a period not severer than the fourth degree (i.e., more than one year, but less than three years] or detention, or fine of not more than two thousand *yuan* [dollars].

The operation which was the basis of this charge was performed on the neck of the patient, under an anesthetic, on June 3, 1922. The patient died during the operation, and the doctor testified that the amount of chloroform used was very small; that it was quite fresh, having been purchased the day before; and that the heart of the patient was probably too weak to support an anesthetic, though this

weakness was not apparent in the examination that took place previous to its administration. He ascribed the death to one of those rare cases of inability to support chloroform, which should be considered a misfortune for which no one was to blame. On the death being reported, the Chinese coroner made an examination. This functionary was a barber—who in China comes from the lowest class—without any scientific training. He made a superficial examination of the body, declared that the boy was dead, and that he had died not from the operation, but from the anesthetic—which was what the doctor had told him. The doctor was then charged before the local court, which gave judgment on July 6, condemning the accused to a fine of two thousand *yuan* (the maximum) for a violation of Article 326.

An appeal was taken to the higher provincial court, which on September 28, 1922, gave a judgment upholding the decision of the local court. The case was then carried to the *Taliyuano*, or Supreme Court, in Peking, which, on December 14, ordered a retrial. This took place in the higher provincial court, which on April 3 again found the accused guilty, but lowered the fine to one thousand *yuan*. The case was again appealed to the Supreme Court, which, on August 9, 1923, dismissed the second

judgment of the provincial court, and ordered yet another trial. The third judgment of the provincial court was delivered on May 12, 1924, the accused once more being condemned to a fine of one thousand *yuan*. The Supreme Court on October 27 ordered yet another trial, and on January 21 of this year the case against the accused was withdrawn by virtue of the general amnesty proclaimed by the provisional chief executive. It is understood, however, that a civil action for damages is still pending. During the trials of this case, facts, the opinions of the complainants, and arguments were inextricably mixed up by the court. Much of the evidence offered by the defendant was refused. The report of the coroner, who as already stated had no scientific experience, and made no attempt to perform an autopsy, was accepted as definite evidence, although it contained a quantity of superstitious nonsense. Expert evidence from competent medical men was rejected. In the higher court the cause of the death and the blame for bringing it about were treated as one and the same thing, the onus of proving that there had been no negligence being placed on the accused. In the sixth judgment (May, 1924), the court refused to take into consideration evidence favorable to the accused, and the coroner's report was again made use of,

though its introduction had been one of the reasons of the Supreme Court for ordering a retrial. As further evidence of the accused's guilt, the relatives on this occasion stated that they had not been willing that chloroform should be used. The Supreme Court in its final judgment held that there was no proof of the lack of consent of the relatives.

The other case was similar in the course it ran, but even more glaring in its continuous miscarriages of justice. For in this case the woman who died had been successfully operated upon and had made satisfactory progress for seven days, when a friend called upon her and violently upbraided her for undergoing the operation. There was, according to the evidence, a heated quarrel, as a result of which the patient's heart collapsed, and though every effort was made to undo the mischief, she became weaker and weaker, and died the following afternoon. In this instance the original penalty of two thousand *yuan* was imposed at successive retrials, until the case was terminated by the amnesty. And it is alleged that the accused was found guilty mainly as a result of a mistranslation of the evidence of a foreign medical practitioner. The evidence of the quarrel which caused the patient's collapse was ignored.

It is not surprising, I think, that one of these

German doctors, who was in attendance on Dr. Sun Yat-sen during his stay in Tientsin, told me that under no circumstances would he undertake a serious operation on any prominent Chinese. These cases are also of interest as revealing the reluctance or inability of the Supreme Court finally to quash a case in which injustice has been done, and the manner in which provincial courts ignore the rulings of the Supreme Court as to what evidence can be admitted.

I might go on here to quote some ridiculous instances which followed the assumption of jurisdiction over the Russians in Manchuria, where a man charged with breaking a window found that he had been tried for murdering "Mr. Window"; where complainants sometimes found that they had been mistaken for the accused, and sentenced accordingly, and on one occasion, at least, judgment was given in a civil case against one of the witnesses, the judge remarking, when this was brought to his attention, that "the court knew what it was doing." I have time, however, only to cite one case in which Russians are involved, which will show how hollow are China's pretensions that the judiciary is independent and free from all interference on the part of the executive or legislative powers.

After the failure of the Koltchak régime in Siberia, the Chinese government reached an agreement with the Russo-Asiatic Bank regarding the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, then virtually bankrupt, as a result of which it was to be controlled by a board consisting of five Chinese and three Russian members. Following this agreement, B. V. Ostroumov, an engineer of considerable experience, who had been concerned in the construction of the Siberian, South Siberian, and Bokhara railways, was appointed general manager. With the approval and authority of the board, he introduced reforms which had the result of converting the railway from a virtually bankrupt concern into a paying enterprise, with trains and rolling stock excelled by few other railways in any part of the world. Ostroumov was no politician, and was not in sympathy with bolshevism, and accordingly incurred the animosity of the soviets, who were only biding their time to revenge themselves upon him. On May 31, 1924, China signed an agreement with soviet Russia, under which she recognized the Russian government, and agreed to the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway by a Board of Directors, composed of five Chinese and five Russians, nominated by their respective governments. This agreement Chang Tso-lin refused to recognize, with

the result that it was inoperative in Manchuria, and over the Chinese Eastern Railway. During the civil war of the autumn of 1924, however, Chang Tso-lin realized that the soviets might make themselves troublesome in his rear, and accordingly he entered into a separate agreement, on much the same terms as that signed in Peking. This agreement was signed at Mukden, on September 20. On October 3, Ostroumov was summarily dismissed from his position, arrested, and placed in solitary confinement; the same treatment was meted out to Gondatti, chief of the land department of the railway. No charge whatsoever was preferred against either of them, although the Chinese Criminal Procedure Code prescribes that no person may be arrested without a charge being formulated. Ostroumov was questioned from time to time by the public prosecutor, who pretended that he had been arrested to save his extradition to Russia. I cannot enter into the numerous violations of the Code of Criminal Procedure that have been perpetrated since his arrest. It was not until December 20 that he was summoned before the examining magistrate and told the nature of the charges against him. These charges related to transactions which had been inquired into, and sanctioned by, the old Board of Directors (which

had a majority of Chinese), and their refutation required access to numerous documents in the railway company's archives. This access Ostroumov has been consistently denied, though on several occasions the Judge has undertaken to secure and produce the documents required—a promise he has never fulfilled. Ostroumov, a man certified to be in a dangerous state of health, has been kept in solitary confinement, and treated little differently from a condemned criminal, ever since October 3. The general amnesty which, as promulgated, unquestionably applied to his and Gondatti's cases—although they asked not for pardon but for justice—has been overruled by the Manchurian authorities, who calmly altered it to suit their own ends. Successive judges have been intrusted with the conduct of the case, and have pleaded illness, obtained a transfer elsewhere, or resigned. Bail, which would have been forthcoming to the extent of hundreds of thousands of dollars, if necessary, has been refused. And I understand that an appeal to the soviet Ambassador, who is unquestionably responsible for this travesty of justice, met with the curt response that he would intercede for Ostroumov only if he undertook to stand his trial in Moscow—for offenses, be it noted, which are alleged to have been committed outside of Russian

jurisdiction, during a period when the soviet government was not recognized by China, and under orders of a Sino-Russian directorate. At the first public hearing of the Ostroumov case, on June 4, a telegram was introduced by the accused, purporting to have been sent by the Chinese president of the railway board, ordering his colleagues to see that evidence incriminating Ostroumov was procured "so as not to cause protests from diplomatic circles."

I may sum up the present condition of the administration of justice in China by saying that if the rule of law is understood to mean, as Dicey says, that "no man can be lawfully made to suffer, except for a distinct breach of a law established in the ordinary manner, before the ordinary courts," and that "no man is above the law," it is nonexistent in China. The provincial courts are, for the most part, under the control of the militarists in power in the particular locality. Peking will issue a trade-mark law, prescribing the levy of substantial fees for the protection of trade-marks throughout China; Canton will retort with a trade-mark law of its own, which prescribes local registration and payment of fees to secure protection within its jurisdiction. Peking will order the establishment of certain courts of justice, which the Gover-

nor of Chekiang will abolish a few months later because he does not approve of them.[1] All the leading authorities agree that far from the state of Chinese laws, and the arrangements for their administration having improved of late, there has been serious retrogression.

Indeed, so far as the control by the central government of China of the courts in the provinces is concerned, the situation is not as satisfactory under the Republic as it was under the Empire.[2]

Although circumstances have not altered except for the worse, the extraterritoriality problem enters upon a new phase with the decision now reached. . . . . Now and for a remote future, abolition of extraterritorial jurisdiction is out of the question.[3]

Save that the necessity to the Chinese people of European and American commodities has immeasurably increased, there is little, if any, improvement in the situation at the present time [compared with that in 1840].[4]

The law to the contrary notwithstanding, torture is still in general use in Chinese tribunals. As a Chinese official put it, in attempting to justify the

[1] Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, p. 69.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 69. (Dr. Willoughby was legal adviser to the republic, 1916–17.)

[3] Escarra, *op. cit.*, pp. 1 and 18. (Mr. Escarra is legal adviser to the Chinese government.)

[4] Sir Havilland de Sausmarez, chief judge, British Supreme Court, Shanghai, 1905–21, in a lecture at King's College, April, 1925.

use of torture in a case in which it had admittedly been employed:

> If you are going to adopt foreign methods, you will never recover the stolen property, you can never get evidence, and you can never depend on it. We have got a code of regulations, but underneath the surface we have to carry on in our own old way.[1]

Summary executions are still frequent. A dispatch from Shanghai dated May 18, 1925, records the execution of a newspaper editor there, after a summary trial by court-martial, because the local general was enraged at the publication of an article alleging extortion on the part of the Army. The unfortunate man offered to bring evidence in support of this allegation, but permission to do so was refused, and he was shot.[2]

I have here a photograph of the scene following a roundup of alleged bandits in Lintsing County, not more than a day's journey from Tientsin, early in 1924. It is too harrowing to show around, but the fact is that over one hundred men, women, and children were butchered in cold blood, and subsequently mutilitated by the troops, who were so proud of their work that they suspended the butchering for an hour or two while a half-dozen

[1] Quoted at the British Chambers of Commerce Conference, 1923.

[2] *Shanghai Evening News*, May 19, 1925.

of the victims were still living, in order to have them photographed. A missionary familiar with the details writes further (February, 1924):

> As if this were not enough, four days ago a memorial service was held for the soldiers killed in the campaign, at which time three of the bandits held for the purpose were tortured for over three hours, an immense crowd of Chinese watching the while. From these living victims the torturers cut the ears, the nose, and then slices of flesh from different parts of the body. These things seem hard to believe in this day and age, but they have taken place within a week in our own city, and members of our force of workers were present and witnessed them.

I come, finally, to the "other considerations" which must be taken into account when discussing the question of the abolition of extraterritoriality. I shall do no more than mention the fact that it is to extraterritoriality that the foreigner in China owes his immunity from the arbitrary and haphazard taxation imposed by the local Chinese authorities upon their own countrymen, and from the exactions and levies of the militarists. It is to extraterritoriality that he owes the existence of foreign settlements and concessions, where he can reside under hygienic regulations and in conditions of reasonable safety, free, as a rule, from incursions of Chinese troops and bandits, and enjoy a measure of self-government. These are privileges not lightly

to be sacrificed. But I shall urge, in conclusion, that the most important of those other considerations are not foreign but Chinese interests. Irresponsible Chinese may clamor for the abolition of extraterritoriality, but they flock into the concessions for safety whenever a civil war is in progress. And it is, after all, not unreasonable that the treaty powers should demand that certain standards of justice should be applied to the Chinese themselves before their courts are permitted to experiment upon foreigners. The only foreign advocates of the abolition of extraterritoriality that I know of are small groups of missionaries, who are actuated more by the spirit of martyrs than by practical considerations in advocating this step. Their view is not shared by the majority of the missionary body. I cannot, perhaps, do better than conclude this lecture with a quotation from an address given by a veteran missionary in a lecture at Kuling, in August, 1910:

But the thought which I am anxious to emphasize in closing this lecture is this—that China cannot come to deal fairly, rightly, and humanely, with *foreigners alone*. Every guarantee given to *foreigners* for their proper treatment as dwellers in China must soon become a guarantee, also, to the people of China, that they too shall henceforth receive for themselves a like justice and consideration to that which the superior power of the Western nations has *demanded as a right* in the case of

every citizen coming from Western lands . . . .: Let every patriotic Chinaman . . . . think with himself:

"This state of liberty, this security for life and property in China, this immunity from torture and from official oppression, corruption and injustice which foreign governments today *demand* from China for their respective countries, enforcing the demand where necessary through foreign consuls and by diplomatic pressure—this, and nothing less than this, is what *we Chinese* have to seek to obtain as a matter of course from our rulers for ourselves. We shall *not* get it, however, by first depriving the foreigner of it, or by subjecting him to all the injustice to which our own nationals subject us."[1]

[1] Rev. Arnold Foster, B.A., *Extraterritoriality in China.*

IV

CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

The countries that have the greatest commercial interests in China today are Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, in the order named. France and Russia have important political interests, though for the moment Russia's trade is negligible. Until recent years the common rights of the so-called treaty powers were exercised through the diplomatic body at Peking, which acted as a unit in matters of general foreign interest, though the policital aspirations of the powers were not always identical. Since 1914, however, there has been a complete change in the situation. The diplomatic body has ceased to act as a unit. In most cases in which there have been deliberate violations of the treaties the treaty powers, that is, those powers which still exercise extraterritorial rights, act together. The non-treaty powers, those like Austria and Germany which have lost their extraterritorial rights, the new European states which have never acquired them, and some of the Central and South American republics which are in the same position, form another diplomatic group.

And last of all comes soviet Russia, whose Ambassador, ever since the recognition of the Moscow government by China, has deliberately ranged himself in opposition to the treaty powers, and has publicly incited, and secretly intrigued with, the Chinese to oppose the so-called "unequal treaties."

I propose, first of all, to deal as briefly as possible with those questions in which all of the treaty powers are interested, and then refer in detail to the interests and policies of individual states. The treaty powers have a common interest in the enforcement, until such time as the Chinese have shown themselves capable of assuming greater responsibilities, of extraterritorial rights, with which I have dealt in a separate lecture. Their next most important common interest is the Chinese customs tariff.

Until the conclusion of the so-called Opium War, which, as I have previously pointed out, was in reality a war to establish the right of foreign traders to pursue their avocations under conditions comparable to those prevailing in all civilized countries, China had no regular customs tariff. Foreign merchants were permitted to trade only at Canton, where they were subjected to all kinds of indignities and restrictions, and to any imposts that the local Chinese authorities cared to exact. The Treaty of

Nanking, signed in 1842, in addition to providing for the cession of Hongkong and the opening of five Chinese ports to foreign residence and trade, stipulated that "a fair and regular tariff of export and import customs and other dues" should be drawn up, and that on payment of a further fixed percentage as transit duty, foreign imports might be transported to any province or city in the interior of China without further taxation. A tariff of duties, calculated on a 5 per cent ad valorem basis, was subsequently agreed upon, and it was arranged that the transit duty should not exceed "the present rates, which are upon a moderate scale." Since the Tientsin Treaty of 1860, the import and export duties of China have been fixed at 5 per cent ad valorem, and the transit duty, which is supposed to confer immunity from all other taxation in transit on imports, and on commodities brought from the interior to the coast for export, has been fixed at 2½ per cent.

The customs administration came under foreign supervision—first, that of Mr. Lay, and a few years later, that of Sir Robert Hart—as a result of the situation created in Shanghai by the capture of that city by rebels in 1853, and worked so satisfactorily that it has ever since been maintained. Under the direction of the late Sir Robert Hart,

who became the trusted adviser of the imperial Chinese government, the whole system of collecting import and export duties was systematized, the central government for the first time in its history receiving an exact account of all duties collected which, after payment of the expenses of collection, were entirely at its disposal. The customs administration also assumed responsibility for the buoying and lighting of the coast, and inaugurated the Chinese postal service. In 1898 the Chinese government gave an undertaking that the inspector-general of customs should be a British subject as long as British trade predominated.

Following the Taiping rebellion the provincial authorities began to impose a new tax, known as "likin," on goods in transit. It was at first a trifling impost, though as time went on it became a serious handicap to the movement of commodities in the interior, not so much because the tax levied by any individual likin station was very heavy, but because of the multiplication of such tax offices. According to Morse, along the Grand Canal between Hangchow and Chinkiang, "likin stations, alternately collecting and preventive, are established at distances averaging ten miles one from the other; and in that part of Kiangsu lying south of the Yangtze, there are over 250 stations, collecting and

preventive." Even where the immunity conferred by the transit pass is recognized, goods in transit are subjected to heavy delay, which can often only be overcome by submission to official blackmail. Likin is recognized, by Chinese and foreign merchants alike, as a serious obstacle to trade in the interior, and both are in favor of its abolition.

The first serious attempt to secure its abolition was made in the Anglo-Chinese commercial treaty of 1902, in which Great Britain agreed to an increase of the import duty from 5 per cent to not more than 12½ per cent, and of the export duty from 5 to not more than 7½ per cent, in the event of the complete abolition of likin. The American and Japanese commercial treaties of the following year contained similar provisions. At Versailles, and again at Washington, the Chinese delegation put forward a demand for tariff autonomy. At Washington, while disclaiming any immediate intention of interfering with the present system of administration of the customs, the Chinese argued that the present tariff was unfair and unscientific, as it imposed a uniform rate on necessaries and luxuries, and there was no reciprocity, certain articles, such as tobacco and spirits, on which very heavy duties were imposed in other countries, entering China on the 5 per cent basis. They argued,

further, that with the present tariff China did not secure a revenue commensurate with her requirements. They asked for an immediate increase of the import tariff to $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent (irrespective of the abolition of likin) and the right to impose duties not exceeding 25 per cent ad valorem at their discretion, at the end of a five-year period. As a matter of fact, certain of the arguments advanced by the Chinese delegates would not bear very close examination, for they overlooked the fact that everything entering China pays duty at the rate of 5 per cent except foreign rice, cereals, and flour; gold and silver, both bullion and coin; printed books, charts, maps, periodicals, and newspapers. Taking the 1922 trade figures as a basis, one will find that on the total volume of trade (import and exports) the average percentages of customs revenue in the countries mentioned worked out as follows:

	Percentage
China	$3\frac{1}{2}$
Japan	2
Great Britain	6
America	$5\frac{1}{2}$
France	$4\frac{1}{2}$

Had the $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent import duty and the $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent export duty been in force at that date, the average percentage of duties on China's trade

would have worked out at 7.2, which is considerably higher than that of any of the countries mentioned above.

The Washington Conference was not disposed, for various reasons, chief among which were apprehensions that tariff autonomy would result in the exploitation of foreign trade for the subsidizing of China's militarists, to accede to China's demands. But the subcommittee was greatly impressed with certain evidence which was placed before it tending to show that in the event of a reasonable compromise with the central government on the subject of taxation, the illegal imposts which are being levied in the provinces would be abandoned. The British American Tobacco Company and various other foreign tobacco interests, a few months previous to the Conference, had entered into an agreement with the National Tobacco and Wine Administration under which payment of certain taxes to that administration were to free their cigarettes from all other taxation in the interior, any illegal taxes imposed being refunded out of the taxes paid at the factories. This agreement was reported to be working smoothly, and offered some hope that a settlement of the likin question, on the basis of the 1902 treaty, might really prove feasible. The Conference, therefore, agreed to the assembling of a

special conference in China, within three months of the ratification of the Customs Tariff Treaty, signed at Washington on February 6, 1922, which was to "prepare the way for the speedy abolition of likin," and also to

> consider the interim provisions to be applied prior to the abolition of likin . . . . and it shall authorize the levying of a surtax on dutiable imports as from such date, for such purposes, and subject to such conditions, as it may determine. The surtax shall be at a uniform rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per centum ad valorem, provided that in the case of certain articles of luxury which, in the opinion of the special conference, can bear a greater increase without unduly impeding trade, the total surtax may be increased, but may not exceed 5 per centum ad valorem.

The special conference has not yet assembled, owing to a protracted dispute with France over the resumption of payments of the annual Boxer-indemnity instalments, which had been suspended for five years from December 1, 1917, when China entered the war. The French claimed that such payments must be made in gold francs, and the Chinese government, after twice recognizing this obligation, was influenced by political agitation to repudiate it, and to insist that payment be made in paper francs. The controversy was only settled in April, 1925, and in a characteristic manner, the government being bribed with the release of the

two years' accumulated indemnity instalments, and agreeing to meet the indemnity payments in gold dollars!

In the meantime, events can hardly have been said to have strengthened China's claims to tariff autonomy. The tobacco agreement, to which I have referred, has been violated in nearly every province, the militarists imposing an additional tax of 20 per cent ad valorem. In Canton, Shansi, and other centers, attempts have been made and are still being made to impose additional taxation on kerosene, piece goods, and other foreign imports. In the latter part of 1923, an international naval demonstration at Canton was necessary to prevent Dr. Sun Yat-sen from carrying out this threat to seize the Canton customs, thus disintegrating the only fiscal service which has been maintained intact throughout the troubles of the past thirteen years.

The likin collection was estimated in 1911, the last year of the Manchu dynasty, at just over forty-four million *taels*, or sixty-six million dollars. The latest estimate places it at thirty-nine million dollars. Neither of these estimates can be considered reliable. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of parasites live on the likin collectorate, the gross total of which probably exceeds the total maritime-

customs revenues—one hundred and four million dollars in 1924. The militarists now in control in various parts of the country are taxing trade indiscriminately and in complete disregard of China's treaty obligations. It is, at present, inconceivable that this huge vested interest—likin—can be got rid of by any scheme devised by the Chinese government or the powers. And foreign trade, already seriously handicapped by the numerous illegal taxes now imposed, would probably be completely strangled if, in addition to the levy of these taxes, the central government—which is also under militarist domination—were permitted to impose any import duties it thought fit.

The special conference, if it should assemble this year, will be confronted with a series of most complicated problems, for China's foreign creditors, especially the Japanese, are clamoring for the payment of some, at least, of her long-overdue obligations, and the proposed $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent surtax—which is only to be permitted conditionally—would be a mere drop in the bucket if it had to be applied to the discharge of foreign debts.

The maintenance of American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese garrisons in Peking and Tientsin, and along the railway between Peking and Shanhaikuan (on the seashore), is the outcome of the

Boxer Rising of 1900. The peace protocol signed in 1901 provided for the establishment of a legation quarter in Peking, which the powers concerned had the right to put in a state of defense, and to administer, and from which they had the right to exclude all Chinese. The Chinese government also recognized the right of the treaty powers to occupy certain points along the railway between Peking and Shanhaikuan "in order to maintain free communication between the capital and the sea," and agreed to raze the forts at Taku. When the peace protocol was signed, the Chinese city of Tientsin was still under foreign military control, and the so-called Tientsin provincial government was only abolished after China had accepted further conditions, which included the exercise of foreign military jurisdiction over the railway and a zone extending to two miles each side of it—to be exercised only for the protection of the railway—and the obligation not to station Chinese troops within twenty *li* (about seven miles) of Tientsin. By the exercise of the powers then conceded the foreign military commanders could have prevented the use of the railway by Chinese troops engaged in military operations, but unfortunately an undesirable precedent was created in 1911, when it was agreed that imperialistic and republican forces should be

permitted the use of the railway as long as they refrained from damaging the bridges or track. Consequently, in every civil war that has since occurred in North China, the Peking-Mukden line has been overrun by Chinese troops belonging to the rival armies, with the result that on each occasion the operation of the line has been completely disorganized, and serious damage has been done to track and equipment, especially the latter.

The combined foreign garrisons in North China number less than five thousand officers and men, and with this force it is obviously impracticable to guard two hundred and sixty miles of railway, swarming with Chinese troops, as well as garrisoning Peking and Tientsin. In practice, what is usually done is to station small detachments at various points along the line to guard the bridges, while as soon as the railway is completely blocked by Chinese military incompetence—which invariably happens—so-called "international trains," with an armed escort of fifty to eighty men of various nationalities, are run between Peking and Tientsin, and Tientsin and Shanhaikuan, to maintain communication "between the capital and the sea."

At Versailles, and again at Washington, the Chinese maintained that the necessity for the presence of foreign garrisons in North China had

ceased to exist (the conditions which led to their being stationed in North China having disappeared), and requested their removal. The powers represented at Washington were skeptical, but agreed, when so requested by the Chinese government, to appoint delegates to an impartial Commission of Inquiry into this question. China has not since attempted to convene this Commission, and recent events scarcely support her boast that she is capable of assuring the protection of foreign lives and property within her territory. In 1920, 1922, and again in 1924, Tientsin owed its immunity from molestation by Chinese military rabble to the presence and watchfulness of the foreign garrisons.

Britain still claims the largest volume of trade with China, though her political influence today can hardly be considered as important as that of Japan. In addition to her commercial interests, she has other important interests which raise serious issues between the British and Chinese governments. I need not dwell here upon China's obligations to Great Britain in respect to opium suppression, merely mentioning that the cessation of the export of Indian opium to China, at a substantial cost to India, was conditional upon the suppression of the cultivation of home-grown opium. China

today produces at least twelve times as much opium as India.

The Peking-Mukden, Shanghai-Nanking, Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo, Canton-Kowloon, Tientsin-Pukow (southern section), and Taokow-Chinghua railways have been constructed with British capital, and in addition to the capital obligations arising out of their construction and equipment, the Chinese government owes British concerns large sums for railway equipment supplied but not yet paid for. She has defaulted again and again, also, upon the loans raised from the Marconi Company for the erection of wireless stations, and from the Vickers Company for the supply of a number of aeroplanes designed exclusively for commercial use, but actually seized and utilized by the militarists within a few months of delivery.

Great Britain has concessions, over which she exercises municipal control, usually through an elected council, in Amoy, Canton, Hankow, Kiukiang, Chinkiang, Tientsin, and Newchwang. The central and most important district in Shanghai was originally set apart for British residence and trade, but was amalgamated with the American concession to form the international settlement in 1863. In general, the policy enunciated by Lord Aberdeen in 1841, that "we seek no exclusive advantages, and

demand nothing that we shall not willingly see enjoyed by the subjects of all other nations," has been consistently followed. Indeed, it may reasonably be claimed that to Great Britain is mainly due the credit of breaking down the barriers to foreign trade in China, and of opening the way for foreigners of all nationalities to reside and do business in China under conditions approximating those prevailing in Western lands. In her concessions, for instance, permission has, as a rule, been readily given to individuals and firms of other nationalities (Chinese in some instances excepted) to lease or purchase property for residence or trade, providing they will agree to abide by the local municipal regulations. The Tientsin land regulations provide for the election of at least one American to the Municipal Council, annually, in recognition, I take it, of the fact that a small strip of territory originally granted to America has been turned over to the British municipality for administrative purposes.

In addition to her concessions, Great Britain owns the island of Hongkong and a portion of the mainland opposite, and, in 1898, in the interests of security—the port being exposed to attack from the surrounding hills—obtained a ninety-nine-year lease of a further area on the mainland, in the

vicinity of what is known as Kowloon. She also holds on lease two hundred and eighty-eight square miles of territory surrounding Weihaiwei, in Shantung. It was at the instance of the Chinese themselves that Great Britain applied for the lease of this territory—then in Japanese military occupation—as an offset to Russian's occupation of the Liaotung peninsula, with Port Arthur and Dairen. The original lease was to remain in effect "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia." But the Chinese government never suggested the restoration of Weihaiwei when Russia was supplanted by Japan in the Liaotung peninsula, it apparently being assumed on both sides that the lease would be prolonged for so so long as Port Arthur was in alien hands. At the Washington Conference, however, with a view to promoting a settlement of the Shantung question, the British delegation announced its government's willingness to restore Weihaiwei to China, subject to satisfactory arrangements being made for its continued use as a sanatorium and summer health resort for the British far eastern squadron. There are no other ports suitable for this purpose in North China except Chefoo and Tsingtao. The American fleet always spends the summer at Chefoo, where there is no room for any more

vessels, and Tsingtao is developing into an important commercial port, where the presence of a number of foreign warships would not be welcome. An Anglo-Chinese Commission to negotiate the rendition of Weihaiwei met there in September, 1922, and an agreement was actually signed in May, 1923. But the Peking government then demanded modifications which the British government would not accept in their entirety, and negotiations have since been indefinitely suspended. I may mention that a suggestion for which I may claim to have been responsible was embodied in the draft agreement, by which the Chinese government should undertake, instead of repaying the money spent by the British government on the development of Weihaiwei, to set aside a fixed sum annually for a period of ten years, for the construction of roads linking up the territory with the hinterland.

Another Sino-British problem that has defied solution so far is the status of Tibet. Tibet is contiguous to India, and India regards it as a matter of vital importance that her Tibetan frontier should remain secure, and free from the frequent disturbances which have been caused by Chinese efforts to conquer the Tibetans, and keep them in subjection by force. Several times British agents

have intervened to extricate Chinese troops from their difficulties, or to secure a truce between the Tibetans and the Chinese. For years past, relations between the British and Tibetan governments have been most cordial; indeed, had Great Britain entertained the desire to do so, she could unquestionably have proclaimed a protectorate over Tibet without encountering any serious opposition from the governing class. But her desire is to see Tibet preserve her autonomy under Chinese suzerainty, and the stumbling-block, hitherto, has been the definition of the Chinese-Tibetan frontier. The state of Szechwan and Yunnan, the Chinese provinces contiguous to Tibet, racked by successive civil wars during the past few years, has rendered it impossible for the Chinese government, even it if were willing, to enter into any agreement worth the paper it is written upon, in respect to Tibet.

As long ago as December, 1922, the British government notified the Chinese government of its intention to remit the balance of the British share of the Boxer indemnity, amounting to between twelve and fourteen million pounds sterling, in order that it might be devoted to purposes mutually beneficial to China and Great Britain. The necessary legislation to fulfil this promise was passed a month or two ago, the money to be expended

on educational or other purposes, as decided by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was to be advised by a Statutory Committee. Originally, the British communities in China were in favor of employing the entire amount for educational purposes, but the events of the past three years, the growing insubordination of the student class, and the hostility of Chinese educationalists to any form of foreign supervision or control have raised serious doubts as to the wisdom of earmarking so large a sum for educational ends. The British Chamber of Commerce in Tientsin early this year adopted a resolution which advocated reasonable support of educational institutions, and the expenditure of the balance on conservancy and flood-prevention measures—which would insure the livelihood of many millions of Chinese who are periodically reduced to starvation by famine and floods—and, if conditions permit, upon railways and other means of communication so necessary for the development of the country.

I may, I think, fairly sum up British policy in China today as aiming at the maintenance of the open door and equality of opportunity, the extension of commercial and industrial facilities in China, the maintenance of existing treaty rights until such time as China proves her fitness to as-

sume greater administrative responsibilities, and peace on the Indian-Tibetan frontier. The British government willingly abandoned its former claim to a sphere of influence in the Yangtze Valley, and, to the best of my belief, there has been no serious difference of opinion between the British and American governments as to the policy to be pursued in China for some years past. Great Britain was the first power to agree, conditionally, to the abolition of extraterritoriality and the revision of the customs-import tariff.

Japanese political influence has been steadily increasing in China since the establishment of the republic, in spite of the bitter and persistent hostility aroused by her aggressive action during the Great War period. Her actual or financial control of the South Manchuria, Antung-Mukden, Kirin-Changchun, and Ssupingkai-Taonan railways, together with her occupation of the Liaotung peninsula, gives her a dominating position in South Manchuria, won as a result of a costly war with Russia, and whatever assurances she may give regarding her respect for Chinese territorial or administrative integrity she is unlikely for many years to come to relax her grip—political and economic—on this part of China. Soon after the outbreak of the Great War, Japan's assistance was

invoked by Great Britain, under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, for the reduction of Tsingtao. This action of the British government has been severely criticized, even by some Britons in China, but was unavoidable. Tsingtao was a strongly fortified naval harbor, garrisoned by German troops, and though the larger German ships had left for the Southern Pacific before the outbreak of hostilities, it would, while war lasted, have constituted a constant menace to British and allied shipping in Northern Chinese waters. With what forces were available, Great Britain attempted a naval blockade of Tsingtao. She had only three or four batallions of infantry in North China and Hongkong, and no siege artillery nearer than India.

Japan immediately sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding the surrender of Tsingtao, and followed it up by a naval blockade and the landing of a large expeditionary force, two British battalions participating to give the operations an allied character. Tsingtao was systematically reduced, and then "for the purpose of fundamentally weakening the influence of Germany in the said region"—which had been recognized as a German sphere of influence—the Japanese advanced and occupied the Shantung Railway, which, with the

former German leased territory, remained in their possession until the end of 1922. The British forces in North China, with the exception of a single Indian battalion divided between Peking and Tientsin, were then withdrawn, and with Europe, and to a great extent America, also, preoccupied with the European war, Japan was left with a virtually free hand to do what she liked in China. She was not slow in moving. While the Chinese government was still protesting against the extension of Japanese activities beyond the former German leased territory, the Japanese Minister, on January 18, 1915, secretly and menacingly presented President Yuan Shih-kai himself with a series of twenty-one demands, the acceptance of which, *in toto*, would have virtually converted China into a Japanese protectorate. Negotiations followed in which China stubbornly contested every demand, only yielding or compromising under extreme pressure, and on May 7, 1915, the Japanese government presented China with an ultimatum demanding compliance with all of her demands (except Group 5, which contained the most objectionable) within forty-eight hours. China had no option but to submit. She had to agree to recognize whatever disposition Japan might think fit to make of Germany's interests in Shantung; to extend the

leases of the Liaotung peninsula, and of the South Manchuria and Antung-Mukden railways, for a further ninety-nine years; to give Japan special and extended privileges in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia; and to concede to Japan the exclusive right of financing the Hanyehping Corporation in the Yangtze Valley, thus giving her control of the bulk of China's output of iron and iron ore.

The original Liaotung lease was to Russia, for a period of twenty-five years, expiring in 1923, with provision for extension by mutual agreement. In 1938, according to the Chinese Eastern Railway concessions agreement, China should have had the right to repurchase that railway from Russia, whose interests had been transferred—on the Dairen-Changchun sector—to Japan. No one familiar with the situation can, I think, have imagined that Japan would have restored the Liaotung leased territory or sold back the South Manchuria Railway on the dates mentioned, and there is little doubt that the extension of these leases could have been secured in 1915, or later, by more tactful negotiation. Japan has since paid heavily for her bludgeoning of China in 1915, which has caused successive boycotts and embittered relations between the two countries ever since. It is

noteworthy, as a side light on Chinese psychology, that the restoration of the former German leased territory and the Shantung Railway has in no way abated anti-Japanese feeling. On the contrary, it seems to have given the impression that it is only necessary for the Chinese to continue to agitate to extort anything they want from Japan. In spite of the clamor that arose over the restoration of the Shantung Railway, and the agitation for a national subscription to repurchase it direct from Japan, only a few hundred thousand of the forty million *yen* that will eventually be required for its redemption have actually been raised.

In the Yangtze Valley, Japan has substantial interests in two important enterprises—the Hanyang Ironworks, whose ouput she virtually controls, and the Kiangsi Railway, which has gone deeper and deeper in debt to Japanese financiers, as a result of incompetent management, and has been compelled to appoint a Japanese adviser and a Japanese superintending engineer in order to stave off insolvency.

Japan has concessions at Amoy, Hankow, Chungking, Tientsin, Hangchow, and Soochow. Her nationals also have the right under the 1915 treaties to lease land and engage in agricultural enterprises, and to reside, travel, and engage in

business and manufacturing enterprises of every kind throughout south Manchuria. These rights should also accrue to other nationalities whose governments have signed treaties with China containing the "most favoured nations" clause.

Japan has obtained a financial hold over China, and on many public undertakings, including "all the property and revenue of the telegraph lines throughout the Republic of China," by means of the enormous loans concluded with the Peking government during 1918, most of which are now in default. These loans were concluded by Japanese financiers with the approval of the Japanese government, which, it is understood, is about to make itself responsible for those that are in default. Recognition of the so-called Nishihara loans, and arrangements to meet interest and amortization charges, are likely to cause considerable trouble in the near future, probably at the special Customs Conference.

A Japanese firm has erected a high-power, long-distance wireless station in the vicinity of Peking, which, according to the terms of the original agreements, is to enjoy a monopoly of long-distance communication for a period of thirty years. This monopoly has been challenged by the British government on the ground that it conflicts with prior

engagements entered into with the Marconi Company, and by the American government, which supports the Federal Wireless Company, on the ground that the Mitsui contract contravenes the treaty rights of American citizens in China and the principle of the open door. Chinese duplicity in entering into contracts, each of which conflicts with the terms of the other, is responsible for the friction that has arisen over the wireless question.

The aggressive policy inaugurated by Japan in 1915 has been abandoned—superficially, at any rate—during the past few years, and replaced by a more conciliatory attitude. There is little doubt, however, that Japan plays a more active part than any other power in China's internal affairs. It was notorious that she was assisting Chang Tso-lin by every means in her power during the civil war of 1924, the result of which was to restore the pro-Japanese Anfu leader, Tuan Chi-jui, to power. And I have it on the highest authority that on the eve of the collapse of the Chihli party a strong protest was addressed to the Chinese legations abroad, to be presented to the governments to which they were accredited, definitely charging Japan with breaches of neutrality during the conflict. That it was not presented was due to the sudden change in the situation produced by the capture of Peking

and the control of the government by the Christian general.[1] At the moment Japan seems less inclined to assert her treaty rights than any other of the Great Powers, and allows incidents which a few years ago would have been followed by drastic demands for redress, coupled with a threat of military coercion, to pass with nothing more than a mild protest. America and Great Britain can no longer rely upon her sincere co-operation and support in the maintenance of treaty rights—a fact which I attribute to the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as a result of the Washington Conference, followed up by the passage of the new American Immigration Law. One cannot avoid the conviction that there is now an undercurrent of hostility to Anglo-Saxon interests on the part of Japanese officials in China. A year ago, when the Japanese government protested against the new immigration bill, I wrote:

> The very real danger of Japanese retaliation taking the form of refusal to co-operate with the other treaty powers in the protection of rights which they regard as vital at the present time has not, presumably, been reckoned with by Congress. The deliberate affront to Japanese susceptibilities offered by the passage of the new immigration bill in its present

[1] The accuracy of the statements made in this and the preceding sentences of the paragraph was challenged after the lecture by Count Soyeshima.

form, against the advice of the President and the Secretary of State, may have consequences far graver than a temporary outbreak of indignation in Japan. It may well imperil the position of all the white races in the East, and render nugatory the efforts of America and the powers who associated themselves with her at Washington, to "stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and other powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity."

American interests in China are chiefly commercial, financial, and educational. Her political influence has been consistently exerted for the purpose of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Republic, and equal opportunity. Unlike other powers with substantial commercial interests, America, as I have already stated, has no settlements or concessions in China. Those of us who live in the Far East, however, are tempted to retort to boasts upon this point that in the case of America it is not difficult to be virtuous as she enjoys to the full the advantages accruing to other peoples from the possession of such concessions. You do not in Shanghai, Tientsin, or Hankow find American business concerns showing their independence by seeking offices and residences outside the concessions or settlements, in Chinese territory. What was known as the American settlement in Shanghai was amalgamated with the British settle-

ment in 1863, to form the present international settlement, in which British interests still predominate, but which on several previous occasions has had—and today has—an American as chairman of the Municipal Council. The strip of land in Tientsin granted to the Americans as a concession has been incorporated for administrative purposes in the British municipal area, whose Council always contains at least one American. The American concession at Amoy was known by that name until 1899, and is now embodied in the British concession.

No existing railway in China has been constructed or financed by Americans. Americans were the first to interest themselves in the project of constructing a railway between Peking and Hankow, but the contract eventually went to the Belgians. Americans also secured the concessions for the Canton-Hankow Railway, which, it was stipulated, must remain an American enterprise. But the bulk of the concessionaire's stock was acquired in the open market, by Belgian interests, and after attempting to cancel the concession on the ground that there had been a violation of its terms, the Chinese government, in 1905, had to buy out the concessionaires for the exorbitant sum of $6,750,000. The Canton-Hankow Railway, there-

fore, has never yet been constructed. Under the terms of the Hukuang loan agreement, to which America was a party, the construction of the northern (Hupeh-Hunan) section of this railway is placed under British supervision. The southern (Kwangtung) section remains in the hands of a provincial company, which has been unable to complete its task. Funds being exhausted for the northern section, work is now at a complete standstill both in Hunan and Kwangtung; work has also been suspended on the American (Szechwan) section of the Hukuang railways.

Railway contracts were signed with the Siems Carey Company in 1916 for the construction of fifteen hundred miles of railway in Hunan and Kwangsi, Honan and Hupeh, and Hupeh and Shansi, but have never been carried out, partly owing to opposition from other powers who claimed that these contracts violated pre-existing agreements, partly because of the difficulty of raising sufficient capital during the Great War. Americans also obtained contracts for the Hwai River and Grand Canal Conservancy works, which have also remained inoperative, and for the erection of one high-power, one medium, and four small wireless stations, construction of which has yet to be begun.

America has taken the lead in educational work

in China, and her missions, and mission and educational institutions, are the wealthiest and best equipped in China. The Rockefeller Institute in Peking not only furnishes opportunities for advanced postgraduate work in medicine and surgery, but supports scientific investigations in many parts of China, and subsidizes many mission hospitals of high grade, including several union (Anglo-American) institutions. Tsinghua College, near Peking, which is under the control of the Chinese Foreign Office, is supported from American indemnity funds, and staffed mainly with American teachers and professors. Its object is to prepare students for study in American colleges and universities. Some doubts have recently been expressed whether this institution and the scheme for sending Chinese to America to continue their studies have fulfilled expectations, and a very bad impression was created a few months ago by the issue and acceptance of an invitation to the soviet Ambassador to give a lecture at Tsinghua. He is reported to have received an enthusiastic welcome, and to have made a characteristic address inciting the students against Western "imperialism" and "oppression."

Other American educational institutions, notably Yenching University at Peking, have also come in for considerable criticism of late, owing to the

participation of their students, apparently with the knowledge and at least tacit approval of the faculty, in anti-Japanese and other political demonstrations. Japanese papers in Peking alleged that the anti-Japanese and anti-government student demonstrations in Peking in May, 1925, were organized in the Peking Academy and participated in by students from Yenching University, the Y.M.C.A. School of Finance, and the Academy. And just before leaving Shanghai I saw a telegram from Peking stating that Yenching University, with the approval of the staff, and without awaiting reliable details of what had occurred in Shanghai, had issued a manifesto deploring the action of the Shanghai municipal police. It might reasonably have been expected that the riotous conduct of the students would also be deplored. It is only fair to add that other American educational institutions, notably Boone University at Wuchang, and St. John's University at Shanghai, deservedly enjoy a high reputation for the maintenance of discipline among their students.

American trade is rapidly increasing in China, and it is noteworthy that the percentage of American shipping entering and leaving Chinese ports rose from 0.96 per cent in 1913 to 4.55 per cent in

1923, the tonnage under the American flag increasing more than sixfold during that period.

No one, I think, doubts the sincerity of America's desire to aid China during the troublous times through which she has been passing since 1911, but as an Englishman I feel that a great deal more might have been accomplished had America, Great Britain, and Japan made a firm and united stand on certain questions of vital interest to their nationals, such, for instance, as the registration of trade-marks and the progressive destruction of China's railways by her militarists.

French commercial interests are insignificant compared with those of Britain, Japan, and the United States; but her political interests are important. Her Indo-China frontier is contiguous to the provinces of Yunnan and Kwangsi, and the Yunnan Railway, which is owned and operated by French interests, is the only rapid means of access to Yunnan. France has a lease of the port and about two hundred square miles of territory around Kwangchouwan, in Kwangtung province, which she expressed her willingness to restore to China only when all other powers holding leased territories in China came into line. In addition to the Yunnan Railway, which is French owned, France

has financed and constructed, in whole or in part, the Peking-Hankow and the Shansi railways. She owns concessions in Shanghai, Canton, Hankow and Tientsin, in the administration of which the French Consul plays a larger rôle than does his British colleague in the British concessions. France also has substantial financial interests in China, having participated in the Russo-French loan of four million francs floated in 1895, to pay off part of the Japanese indemnity, as well as in the Hukuang and reorganization loans. A Frenchman is at the head of the Chinese postal service, which fact does infinite credit to his organizing capacity. The Chinese Government in 1898 undertook to consult the French Government regarding the selection of the staff of the postal service, and the director-general has since always been a Frenchman.

The outstanding issue between France and China for the past three years has been the gold-franc controversy. The Allied Powers, Russia excepted, agreed, on China's entry into the war, to the suspension for five years of China's Boxer indemnity payments. Before they had to be resumed, on December 1, 1922, a large French bank in the East, the Banque Industrielle de Chine, collapsed, and although it was not an official enter-

prise, the disaster had so serious an effect upon French credit in the Far East that the French legislature sanctioned a scheme by which the Boxer indemnity annuities would be utilized for the rehabilitation of the bank. This scheme, which involved resumption of indemnity payments in gold francs, and was devised in such a manner that the money would eventually be repaid to China for educational and other cultural purposes, was submitted to, and approved by, successive Chinese ministers of foreign affairs, in July, 1922, and February, 1923. Subsequently, however, a political agitation was started in Peking, the contention being put forward that the French indemnity was payable in paper francs, and not gold. It seems probable that the motive behind the agitation was blackmail, and the Chinese parliamentarians have for years past been on the lookout for bribes and subsidies. The Chinese government weakly repudiated its undertaking, and the controversy remained unsettled until April, 1925. As a result of China's attitude on this question, the French government refused to recommend the ratification of the Nine-Power Customs Tariff Treaty of Washington, without which the convening of the special conference therein provided for could not take place. The settlement in April provided for the re-

lease of the accumulated indemnity annuities for two years to the central government, whence, of course, most of it was filched by the militarists, and resumption of payment in gold dollars. France, just previous to the settlement, the details of which had been arranged, recognized that the gold-franc issue and the tariff question were not interrelated, and undertook to ratify the treaty at the earliest opportunity.

Although a party to the arms-embargo agreement, under which the principal powers engaged to restrain their nationals from "exporting to, or importing into, China, arms and munitions of war, and material destined exclusively for their manufacture," France has been supplying Chang Tso-lin with quantities of aeroplanes, with machine-gun mountings, without any undertaking that they would not be used for warlike purposes, and a French mail steamer was actually diverted to Manchuria, after the outbreak of hostilities in 1924, in order to deliver a large consignment of aeroplanes which the Manchurian war-lord had ordered.

French policy in the Far East seems to me to be opportunist. France clings tenaciously to her rights—as evidenced by the gold-franc question, in which, by the way, she enlisted and obtained the

support of the other treaty powers. But during the recent trouble in Shanghai the French cruiser in port was the only warship that did not land marines, the Consul, I understand, maintaining that French interests were not involved in the disturbances in the international settlement.

France's political influence has suffered to some extent by the abandonment of her rôle of exclusive guardian of Roman Catholic interests in China, a rôle which was inconsistent with the anticlerical legislation of a few years ago.

America, Britain, France, and Japan are committed to the policy of supporting a financial consortium composed of representative banking institutions of their respective nations, which aims, according to its published statements, at "the substitution of international co-operation for international competition, in the economic and financial affairs of China." The consortium was re-established, on American initiative, in October, 1920, its activities being limited to

existing and future loan agreements which involve the issue for subscription by the public of loans to the Chinese Government or to Chinese Government Departments, or to Provinces of China, or to companies or corporations owned or controlled by or on behalf of the Chinese Government, or any Chinese Provincial Government, or to any party if the transaction in

question is guaranteed by the Chinese Government or Chinese Provincial Government, but does not relate to agreements for loans to be floated in China.

The Chinese government has never recognized nor had any official dealings with the consortium since its re-establishment, knowing full well that it would be impossible to raise loans for administrative purposes without foreign supervision over the expenditure and the security. The consortium, however, has fulfilled a useful purpose by preventing the indiscriminate lending of money to China upon inadequate security, and with ulterior political motives.

The soviet government proposed the resumption of official relations in a telegraphic declaration dispatched in French from Irkutsk in July, 1919, in which it was stated:

> The Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people, without demanding any kind of compensation, the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all the mining concessions, forestry, gold mines, and all other things that were seized from them by the Government of the Tsars. . . . . The Soviet Government gives up the indemnities payable by China for the insurrection of Boxers in 1900.

This declaration was signed by Karahan, acting for the Commissary of Foreign Affairs, as also was another declaration dated September 27, 1920, which set forth in detail proposals for an agreement

with the Chinese Republic, which, however, reserved for a special treaty an agreement "on the way of working the Chinese Eastern Railway with due regard to the needs of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic." A. A. Joffe, former soviet ambassador to Berlin, who was expelled for being implicated in the Spartacist rising, reached Harbin in August, 1922, as soviet envoy, but was unable to reach an agreement either with China or Japan, and was replaced by Karahan, who reached Peking in September, 1923. Dr. C. T. Wang was intrusted with the negotiations with the soviet envoy, and on March 14 an agreement was actually initiated by the Russian and Chinese plenipotentiaries, which was immediately repudiated by the Chinese Foreign Office chiefly because of dissatisfaction with the clauses relating to outer Mongolia. Karahan attempted to enforce the formal signature of this agreement by a three days' ultimatum, which the Chinese ignored. Negotiations were eventually resumed between Karahan and Dr. Wellington Koo, which resulted in the signature of an agreement and a number of declarations, providing for recognition of soviet Russia, the redemarcation of national boundaries, joint control of the Chinese Eastern Railway (which was not given back to China without de-

manding any kind of compensation), the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights, and recognition of outer Mongolia as "an integral part of the Republic of China," it being left to future negotiations to arrange for the withdrawal of Russian troops from that territory. Declarations attached to the agreement made provision for the handing over to Russia of all former Russian government properties, and of the premises of the Russian orthodox mission in Peking, for the expenditure of the Russian share of the Boxer indemnity "for the promotion of education among the Chinese people, after the satisfaction of all prior obligations," under the direction of a commission composed of two Chinese and one soviet representative, whose decisions must be unanimous; and for the dismissal from Chinese government employment of "all the subjects of the former Russian Empire now employed in the Chinese army and police force." When these documents were signed on May 31, 1924, the Manchurian provinces were independent of the Peking government, whose authority they flatly refused to recognize, so that the provisions relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway could not be carried out.

During the civil war in North China of the autumn of 1924, however, while mass meetings

were being staged in Moscow in support of a "Hands off China Movement," at which the so-called "imperialistic powers" were the objects of soviet animosity, a separate agreement was signed at Mukden between a soviet representative and representatives of Chang Tso-lin, following in general terms the Peking agreement of May 31. At the time this agreement was signed, Chang Tso-lin was technically a rebel against the central government. He was induced to authorize its signature only by apprehension of soviet mischief in his rear while his armies were battling with the Chihli forces. This was the only overt act of interference in the civil war on the part of any foreign government. The members of the old Board of Directors of the Chinese Eastern Railway were immediately dismissed, and the general manager and chief of the land department have been imprisoned ever since, on vague charges, to gratify soviet spite.

A soon as China had recognized the Moscow government, the latter announced its intention of appointing Karahan its ambassador at Peking. No other power in Peking is represented by an envoy of higher rank than a minister. Protracted and somewhat acrimonious negotiations and correspondence followed with reference to the restoration of the former Russian legation to the soviet envoy. It is

situated within the legation quarter, which is surrounded by fortified walls and a wide glacis, and it was difficult to see how a bolshevik ambassador, who made use of every opportunity to insult and denounce publicly the treaty powers, and who boasted that Russia had renounced all privileges acquired by her under the tsarist régime, could be a desirable neighbor. Karahan maintained, however, that in the Sino-Russian agreement of May 31, 1924, Russia had not actually renounced, but had agreed to annul, at a conference to be held later, the so-called "tsarist treaties," and that Russia, therefore, was still entitled to the rights and privileges enjoyed by the treaty powers as a result of the Boxer protocol. At an informal conversation with the American Minister, Karahan is said to have given assurances of his intention to act as a good neighbor, and an undertaking not to bring Red troops into the quarter. The legation property was subsequently handed over to the bolshevik Ambassador, who has had its gates painted a brilliant red, and hoisted the Red flag in place of the old Russian flag. Hardly a week has passed since the signature of the Sino-Russian agreement in May, 1924, that Karahan has not addressed prolix protests to the Chinese Foreign Office or the treaty powers, on matters ranging from the use of the

glacis fronting the Russian legation, for "horse-jumping" by American marines, to the employment of White Russians in Chang Tso-lin's army, and the refusal of the Manchurian authorities to sanction the wholesale dismissal of non-soviet employees on the Chinese Eastern Railway. He has, moreover, frequently entertained, or been entertained, by Chinese politicians, educationalists, and students, whom he has openly incited to a "bloody struggle for national freedom and liberation from imperialism."

A soviet agent was attached to the Canton government, even when the latter was in open revolt against Peking, and soviet military instructors have been placed at the disposal of the Canton authorities for the instruction of their military cadets.

Thus Russia has not actually given up any privileges which had not previously been taken away from her, and she has reacquired control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. I have not the time here to dwell in detail upon soviet activities in China, but I may sum up Russian policy during the past year as having been concentrated upon fomenting anti-foreign feeling among the Chinese, and encouraging them to resist every attempt on the part of the treaty powers to assert their treaty rights.

I have dealt with the interests of the powers which have the most substantial commercial and political interests in China, and I need not say very much about the others. Belgium has extensive railway and mining interests. The Dutch are co-operating with the Belgians on the coast section of the Lunghai Railway. Italy's commercial interests are unimportant, but she has a concession in Tientsin, and has recently sent out a contingent of Italian marines for garrison duty in North China. Spain's interests are also unimportant, and her diplomatic and consular officials during the past thirteen years have probably done more than those of any other power to bring extraterritoriality and foreign prestige into disrepute. There are over three thousand Portuguese in China, most of whom are employed in subordinate clerical positions. Portugal, however, owns the colony of Macao, which may be described as the plague-spot of the East. Its commerce is of no account, and the government is supported almost entirely by opium and gaming revenues.

We may sum up the situation at the moment, then, by saying that British and American interests in China are in the main identical, both seeking, above all, to secure stable conditions for the development of their commerce; that Japan's real

interests should lie in the same direction, but that while vacillating between an aggressive and a conciliatory policy, she interferes to a greater extent than any of the other powers in China's internal affairs, though, as a rule, secretly, and with the result—if not the intent—of perpetuating internal dissensions; and that soviet Russia is bending all her efforts to creating hostility between China and the treaty powers, and dissensions among the latter, and is finding favorable soil for her poisonous activities in the discontents produced by thirteen years of misrule under the so-called Chinese Republic.

CHINA'S ECONOMIC RESOURCES

By JULEAN ARNOLD

CHINA'S ECONOMIC RESOURCES

China's geographical isolation, her unique civilization, her disregard of the civilizations of other peoples, and the overpowering, all-pervading respect of the intellect of the nation for the teachings of the ancient sages found the country at the beginnings of the twentieth century economically still a medieval civilization, although possessed of a rich heritage in a culture which has filtered down through the masses, the resultant of the millenniums of its national life. The developments following the application of steam and electricity to the industrial life of the peoples of the Occident only began to make their influence felt in China during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Topographically, China and the United States are very similar. Each is a country of vast continental proportions. The great Yangtze Valley of China may be compared to the Mississippi Valley of the United States. Without railways the population of the United States at the end of the nineteenth century would have been grouped about the seacoasts and waterways accessible thereto. The Mississippi Valley would probably have been set-

tled from New Orleans up. There would have been a situation somewhat comparable to that of China. In other words, the great land areas out of touch with water communications would have remained unsettled and undeveloped.

Although China is larger in area than Europe, or the United States including Alaska, yet six-sevenths of China's population is concentrated in one-third of its area. It is a mistaken idea to speak of China as overpopulated. There is in the lower Yangtze Valley, that is, in the Yangtze Delta region, an estimated population of forty million people in an area of fifty thousand square miles, or that similar to the state of Illinois. Mongolia, with an area equivalent to about one-and-a-half times that of the states east of the Mississippi, has a population of about two million, or less than two to the square mile. There are other regions of the Chinese Republic, comprising hundreds of thousands of square miles, more sparsely populated than any state in the American Union, due primarily to lack of economic transportation. There are also provinces in China which are cut away economically from the rest of the country, and which enjoy only a minimum of commercial intercourse. So-called West China, with an estimated population of one hundred million, is out of eco-

nomic communication with the rest of China, hence with the outside world, because of lack of railways. Much of the transportation in this section of West China is on the backs of human beings. If the cargo carried in one year by the railways for the one hundred million people of the United States had to be placed on the backs of human beings, it would require eight hundred million men working 365 days out of the year, each carrying a load of 150 pounds over an average of fifteen miles a day, to equal it. This indicates, in an impressive way, the significance of the lack of economic transportation to those regions in China out of touch with waterways. Furthermore, transportation in these sections is about ten times as expensive as railway transportation in the United States, although unskilled labor receives there not more than the equivalent of about twelve cents gold a day. To get the wheat from the rich Wei Basin in southern Shensi, where it can be purchased at one-third the price in America, to the Peking-Hankow Railway, about five hundred miles distant, increases the price to such a degree as to make it cheaper to purchase wheat in America and transport it to the milling centers of China.

Within the past few years, the Governor of the Shansi province has constructed nearly a thousand

miles of good roads in the so-called "model province." This was done with the idea of encouraging motor transportation. There are, however, in the aggregate, no more than seventy-five motor vehicles in the whole of the Shansi province, which has a population of about ten million, in an area similar to that of the state of Kansas. Transportation by pack animals and carts in Shansi averages about sixteen cents in Chinese silver, a ton-mile. Motor transportation runs from twenty to twenty-five cents a ton-mile, whereas railways should be able to carry cargo at less than three cents a ton-mile. Shansi needs a trunk-line railway from north to south, and good roads might then well serve as feeders. Without railways, the most enlightened government in that province will not make for substantial prosperity. Railways in China, operated under reasonably efficient management, are potential gold mines, as the populations have preceded the railway in many sections not yet provided with railways. They can be operated at a cost of less than 50 per cent on their operating revenues. The Chinese coolie daily wage can purchase one ton-kilometer coolie transportation or twenty tons-kilometer railway transportation, as compared with the American common laborer's wage which can purchase two hundred tons-kilometer railway

transportation—ten times the purchasing power of the Chinese wage-earner in railway transportation, or two hundred times that of the coolie carrier.

Bad internal communications in China have encouraged provincialism. This has been accentuated through the perpetuation over many centuries of the family system, interwoven with which is ancestor worship. A laissez faire governmental policy left the people to their own devices with a minimum of pressure from above. However, to safeguard against the redevelopment of a feudal system which characterized China prior to the beginnings of the Christian Era, the civil-service examinations carried with them the stipulation that the native of any province should not hold official position in that province. These civil-service examinations, perpetuated for a period of over one thousand years, also acted as a reinforcing agency, holding Chinese society together, with common ideals and aspirations. On the other hand, each community developed its own interpretation of many of the nation's institutions, as, for instance, the country's weights and measures and currency units. Often distinct dialects differentiated a community from its neighbors, although through the civil-service examinations a common written lan-

guage, a common literature, and common educational ideals were perpetuated among an aristocracy of learning. This overpowering respect for the teachings of the sages, which marked Chinese society up to the beginnings of the twentieth century, encouraged individualism but discouraged initiative, scientific research, and invention, as evidenced by the fact that the country has not as yet developed a patent office. It produced a stereotyped, self-sufficient society. Although this society has been for upward of two thousand years distinctly democratic, yet education has been for the favored few. Economic conditions were not such as to encourage but a very small fraction of the population in seeking an education. Thus, while the civil-service examination acted as a safety-valve for the ambition of the nation, yet under it the percentage of illiteracy among the masses was appalling. Nor did it result in the development of a system of public schools, for under it instruction was individual. That great agency in a modern democratic society for the encouragement of a spirit of group activity, the public school, is of recent growth in China.

China is essentially agricultural, with probably 80 per cent of the people engaged in rural pursuits. Although from time immemorial agriculture has

been honored and assigned a position next after learning in Chinese society, yet one sees but little evidence of improvements in agricultural processes over many centuries. This is demonstrated by the fact that four-fifths of the population is engaged in providing the sustenance for the nation. In the United States less than 40 per cent of the people comprise the agricultural population, yet live better and produce a proportionately greater surplus for export than do the people of China. Irrigation, afforestation, deep plowing, scientific seed selection, rural credits, effective marketing, and animal husbandry are subjects which have received but little attention on the part of the government or through organized effort in any other direction. Agriculturally, China suffers badly through poor and inadequate irrigation, through deforestation, through lack of a knowledge of proper plowing methods, through little attention to seed selection, through usurous practices in financing the farming class, through a bad and uneconomic marketing system, through poor internal communications, and, in general, through lack of co-operative effort and the application of science to productive industry, in spite of the highly developed industrious and thrifty personal traits of character of the people.

In a similar way, China was found at the begin-

ning of the twentieth century to be far behind the Occident in industrial and commercial developments. The individual business rather than the corporate enterprise, and the domestic handicraft industry rather than organized manufacturing with modern machinery, characterized the old China. In an article on "Manpower plus Horsepower," George Otis Smith, director, United States Geological Survey, made the statement:

> Edward Everett Hale charted the course of industrial development when he said that the extent to which the world had changed the laborer who uses his body into the workman who uses his head was the index of civilization. The true measure of industrial progress is found in the amount of mechanical power used to supplement manpower.

Mr. Smith calculates that the motor-power we are now using, steam and electricity, gives us the equivalent of five energy servants for every man, woman, and child in the United States, which in itself is equivalent to giving us industrially the effectiveness of five hundred millions of people working without this power. This statement can be appreciated in a country like China, where there has not yet been developed one horse-power of its wonderful potentialities in hydroelectric power, and where steam-power is only at the threshold of its possibilities in modern industry.

It is only during the past fifty years that the Chinese people have come to realize the backwardness of their country in a modern economic sense. It was about fifty years ago that the first group of Chinese students was sent abroad to imbibe Western learning. That this movement had not the sympathy of the nation at that time is demonstrated by the fact that these students were recalled before they were able to complete their education. It was a number of years after their return to China before they were reinstated in positions of honor and respect and permitted to utilize their training abroad for the benefit of their people.

The shock to the nation came in 1894 with their defeat in a war against the Japanese, a people whom they had always considered inferior to themselves. It was only then that the Chinese realized the efficacy of Western methods, as the Japanese had gone much farther in the utilization of ideas from the West than had the Chinese. The Emperor, to make amends, rushed headlong into an elaborate program of reform, and issued the most sweeping edicts, calling for drastic changes. With the Boxer troubles in 1900, there were evidences of reactionary forces again in control. During the early years of the twentieth century, feverish efforts were made by the Manchu dynasty to save

itself from the possible consequences of a revolutionary spirit rapidly developing among the thinking people of the country. Drastic reforms were introduced. Among the more important of these were the abolition, in 1905, of the ancient classics as the test in the civil-service examinations and the substitution therefor of subjects of Western learning, the appointment of constitutional commissions to proceed abroad to study foreign forms of government, the establishment of modern schools in China, and provisions for the institution of a constitutional form of government. Young China became, however, unduly impatient, and demanded more than was physically possible to accomplish. Thus, with the revolution of 1911, the Manchu dynasty was swept out of power and the republican form of government inaugurated.

Thousands of Chinese students have, during the past two decades, matriculated in Western universities, imbued with the idea of making China over along modern lines. It is only within the past few years that it has been discovered that the task is too stupendous and that no hasty progress in connection with the establishment of a new economic order in China may be expected. As a result, to some a keen sense of disappointment over the efficacy of Western ideas is manifest. This has

brought about a reaction. There are those who place the blame of the failures in these experiments in Westernization upon the foreign institutions, and advocate a reversion to the old order. The better balanced among the intellectuals, however, appreciate the fact that there has been much of the superficial in Western learning as acquired by many of those who journeyed abroad with the mistaken idea that this learning would in itself serve as a panacea for China's ills. There is now a substantial realization on the part of these better-informed persons of the necessity of adjusting what modern science and Western learning have to offer, to meet the peculiar needs of the Chinese environment.

China was not prepared for the drastic change which came with the overthrow of a monarchy of several thousand years and the sudden inauguration of a republican form of government. Under the old order the family system had been accentuated to such a degree that the individual was trained to a deep and keen sense of responsibility in his relations to the family or clan, but with little or no appreciation of a responsibility to the larger unit, the community, or the nation. Thus public opinion, so essential to the success of a representative form of government, had not been developed

under the monarchy. What protection the individual required in his relations to society was secured through his affiliations with his clan and with his trade, craft, or provincial guilds. Custom and tradition carried more weight than law. The lawyer was unknown in Chinese society prior to the beginnings of the twentieth century. A man's relations to his fellow-men were those based upon equity rather than upon legal definition. On the whole, society was very loosely knit, so far as its relations to the larger unit, the central government, was concerned. So long as China remained isolated, this condition of affairs might have continued, as there were apparently no reasons from within for a change, but the inevitable contact with the civilizations of other peoples altered the entire situation.

With the inauguration of the republic, there has been a tendency to scrap the institutions of the old China in a wholesale way irrespective of relative values, and to take on occidental institutions in form rather than in essence. For instance, the ideas of corporate business as taken from the West will no more succeed in China without an accompanying sense of the responsibility of trusteeship than they will elsewhere. Potentially, the Chinese possess the qualities necessary to the success of corporate enterprise. This has already been dem-

onstrated by a number of successful organizations of this character, but before corporate business can be developed in a large way among the Chinese mercantile communities, it becomes necessary to institute a body of law and courts competent to administer the law, and to build a solid foundation for the new order.

During the past decade, the Chinese have organized numerous manufacturing companies of a corporate nature. Under the extraordinary conditions resulting from the European war, huge profits were made, but, unfortunately, these were paid out in dividends without the building up of reserves or provisions for depreciation and maintenance. Consequently, with the leaner years following the termination of the war, many of these companies suffered financial embarrassments for lack of liquid capital. Furthermore, stockholders have often been at the mercy of promoters or rapacious officials. However, experience is educating the Chinese business man to an appreciation of the necessity of providing capital reserve in corporate enterprise and of safeguarding his investments against abuses, with the result that there has been a very noticeable slackening in modern industrial enterprise in the country. The family system, which was admirably adapted to the old order be-

fore the introduction of modern machinery and the application of the principles of modern science, handicaps in many ways the building up of trade and industry on modern lines. The responsibility of a successful member in a family for all his relatives is disastrous to the pay-roll of a corporate institution of which the successful member is a director. The institution known in China as *face*, which is so strongly identified with the family system, militates seriously against young men starting at the bottom of the ladder and working their way up. Students trained in engineering in the West return to China reluctant to participate in anything flavoring of manual labor. *Face* stands in the way. The trade and craft guilds' apprentice system also adds to the difficulties of young men of education launching upon a career in business or industrial establishments. Gradually these handicaps to the successful institution of a modern economic order will disappear, but for many years after they will have disappeared in form, the essence will continue in evidence. An analogous situation exists in Japan, where in form feudalism has disappeared, but in essence it continues to embarrass industry and trade.

The greatest handicap to the rapid institution of a successful modern economic society in China

is the disintegration of the central-government authority. Following the dissolution of the monarchy, numerous individuals working through the control of military organizations have set themselves up in various parts of the country as semi-independent rulers with the result that we now have in China over a million men under arms serving various leaders, each pitted against the others in efforts to strengthen his own political position. The economic conditions in the country generally have encouraged individuals joining the standards of these semi-independent leaders as according them a better means of livelihood than struggling to eke out an existence otherwise. Thus soldiering in China seems to be a matter of necessity rather than of choice. In other words, with improved economic conditions, particularly improved internal communications, the temptation to leave the productive employments for employment in brigand armies will be less in evidence. Thus whatever may be done to improve the economic conditions in the country generally would assist in hastening the development of a stronger central government.

A distinctly promising aspect of the situation is the sense of nationalism which is growing, particularly among the business men, bankers, and the students of the country. This, together with the

receptivity of the people generally to modern ideas, promises much for the future. The Chinese are essentially an industrious people. They possess good ethical and educational ideals. They are natural traders and show ability in the handling of machinery and the instruments of modern industry. In foreign countries, where they have worked under favorable political and economic conditions, they exhibit remarkable ability. The problems confronting the country today are stupendous. The transition from a medieval civilization to that of a modern social and economic order for a people possessing one-quarter of the world's population and an area greater than that of the United States or Europe must of necessity be attended with friction and involve the time element, especially so as the evolution is one from the bottom up rather than from the top down. The forces that work beneath the surface are, however, of such a nature that we may expect a fairly successful consummation of this transition during the next few decades.

Nothing better exemplifies China's backwardness in a modern economic sense than her per capita consumption of iron and steel, which is one-one hundred and eightieth of that of the United States, one-one hundredth of that of England or Germany, one-tenth of that of Japan, and one-

thirtieth of the average per capita consumption of the world generally. The country possesses the best coal and iron resources of any Pacific region, but very little by way of development has yet taken place in these two industries which constitute the backbone of a modern industrial society. China has 14 blast furnaces with a maximum capacity of 850,000 tons annually but which produced in 1923 about 300,000 tons. The United States has 450 furnaces, which in 1922 produced 27,000,000 tons of pig. As for coal, China produces about 25,000,000 tons annually and the United States 500,000,000 tons. China has but 7,000 miles of railways compared with America's 265,000 miles. In motor vehicles China should have, proportionate to her population and territory, four times as many as the United States, which would mean 50,000,000. Instead there are but 10,000 in use in the country. The United States can boast of 10,000,000 telephones in use throughout the country, compared with about 100,000 in use in China. Of surfaced motor roads, the United States has about 300,000 miles and a total of total of 2,500,000 miles of rural roads. In China, surfaced roads are confined at best to a very few cities, with probably an aggregate of less than 1,000 miles, and so called "good roads" about 8,000 miles. In modern manufactur-

ing industries, the United States has 7,000,000 employees compared with less than 500,000 in China. The United States annually produces 17,000,000,000 kilowatt-hour units of electric power by the utilization of her water-power resources. China, which is equally rich in water-power resources, has as yet done practically nothing to avail herself of her resources. In cotton spindles, which represent the most extensively developed modern industry in China, the country boasts of 3,000,000 compared with 37,000,000 in America, yet China is the third in importance as a cotton-growing country. It represents the largest market in the world for cotton yarn and cotton goods, and has cheaper labor for cotton manufacture than any other country.

These figures indicate clearly the backwardness of the country in a modern economic sense, and at the same time serve to convey to the mind of the American reader, who resides in a country very similar in topography to that of China, the enormous potentialities of the Chinese Republic as a modern economic society.

Among Western observers there are those who would discourage China's rise as a modern economic and political society, fearing the competition of the four hundred million industrious Chinese,

when armed with the implements of modern science. A weak, undeveloped China is a far greater menace to the world than would be a strong, well-ordered, well-nourished population, especially one possessing the rich background of culture that characterizes the Chinese people. As shown above, China is not land poor. Furthermore, Asia probably possesses more undeveloped and unsettled territory than does any other continent. The West need only fear a yellow peril so long as the economic level of China remains below that of the Occident. Through the development of China and Asia's great treasure-houses of natural resources, the economic level of the Chinese people will be elevated to that approaching America's, with a corresponding advance in the earning and purchasing powers of the individual. Thus it is to the interest of the American people to assist in every possible way in the improvement of the economic condition of the Chinese people.

It is a noteworthy fact that America has been and continues to be the largest contributor, both in funds and in personnel, to philanthropic work in China. It is estimated that the American contributions, which probably amount to ten million dollars gold a year, and the American missionary population of six thousand, who handle these funds

in China, represent more than the aggregate of the funds and facilities furnished by all other peoples. In addition to these regular contributions, special contributions are made from time to time. For instance, a few years ago seven million dollars gold were expended upon the installation of the Rockefeller Foundation Medical School in Peking, and a year later seven million and five hundred thousand dollars were raised in the United States for famine relief in North China. It is unfortunate that the modern educational institutions in China, including the many mission schools, have not adapted their curricula in a more practical way to the present-day needs of the Chinese environment. There is entirely too much of a tendency to substitute the academic training of the West for the former Chinese academic curriculum.

There was probably never a time in Chinese history when the country was so sadly in need of men trained to appreciate the significance of China's great outstanding economic needs and to devise ways and means of correcting this situation than there is today. It is a sad comment upon the intellect of the nation, possessing as she does a marvelous wealth in man-power and material resources, that it continues to be necessary to put out periodically calls to the outside world for famine

relief. Far too many men are being graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Arts whose training fits them for little more than the ability to pass down to others that which they have acquired. China is suffering from tremendous economic ills, and the brains and brawn of the country should be mobilized in efforts to correct these. The Chinese people would also do well to encourage the investments of foreign capital in the development of the natural resources of their country. There is no need of jeopardizing the future political status of China, through foreign-capital investments, any more than has America's political status been injured through the large sums of British capital which in decades gone by played so prominent a part in the development of the natural resources of the United States. America now possesses a surplus of capital which could, under proper safeguards, be invested in productive enterprises in China in a manner helpful to the correction of China's great economic ills and thereby assist China and the world generally.

THE RUSSIANS IN THE FAR EAST

By Henry Kittredge Norton

THE RUSSIANS IN THE FAR EAST

In the middle of the sixteenth century, about the time the Spaniards were beginning to garner the golden harvest of the New World and to send their people out into its wildernesses to establish there the power and the civilization of Spain, there was a similar urge toward riches and territory in the opposite corner of Europe.

The growing power of the rulers of Muscovy had been bruited abroad, and inspired their nearer neighbors and even more distant ones with concern for their safety. Some prepared for war; others sent to Moscow rich gifts, which the Russian rulers considered as tribute.

Even beyond the Urals, the high mountain wall which marks the eastern boundary of Europe, had spread the fame of Russian prowess, and the Tartar prince of this region, Kutshum Khan, sought to secure the friendship of the Tsars by sending to Moscow long trains of the finest furs. Furs in Russia were as good as gold in Spain, and if the Khan's gift excited feelings of gratitude in the palace, it excited cupidity elsewhere. When Yermak, an outlawed bandit chieftain, heard of this

princely gift, he determined to cross the Ural wall and try his fortune in the lands beyond. In 1580, with less than two thousand men, he set forth. He soon made himself master of Kutshum's country, including his capital, which was known as Sibir. Yermak called the country Siberia, and offered it to the Tsar in exchange for his pardon.

The bargain was struck, and Russia found herself facing a new world across the Urals, with its lure of conquest, riches, and death, as surely as Spain was facing a new world across the Atlantic. And the Russians were no less eager than the Spaniards to enter and explore. They swarmed across the mountain wall and advanced steadily eastward. Cossacks were in the van; herdsmen and farmers followed.

From river valley to river valley they moved, founding towns as they went. By 1651 they had reached Lake Baikal and founded Irkutsk. Thus far they had met no serious resistance, but east of Baikal they were opposed by the Buriats, a powerful tribe of the Mongol race that had produced a Genghis Khan and a Tamerlane. It took the Cossacks four years of hard fighting to subdue these doughty plainsmen. But in the north the advance had been more rapid, and other Cossack bands had reached the sea of Okhotsk as early as 1636. The

territory along the Amur from Baikal to the Pacific was still unknown.

In 1649 the governor of Yakutsk granted the request of the Cossack chieftain, Habarov, that he be allowed to enter this country in search of a short route to the Amur. Habarov started with about seventy men. Violating the governor's instructions that the natives should be treated with consideration, Habarov left behind him a wide trail of burned villages, murdered men, and tortured women. The outraged natives turned upon him, and he was obliged to return for reinforcements. With a larger force he was able to defeat the natives and establish a fortified post at Albazin on the Amur River.

Here the Russians first came into contact with the Chinese. China had never occupied the country north of the Amur, but the governor of Manchuria collected an annual tribute in furs for the emperor of China. Habarov, flushed with success, dispatched an embassy to the governor to demand a tribute "as great as he could give," and at the same time asked his own superiors for an army to conquer, not only the Amur country, but Manchuria as well. His embassy was massacred by the natives, and his request for an army was ignored, so Habarov continued his murderous course down

the river to its junction with the Ussuri, where the city of Habarovsk now stands. Here he fought off one Manchu army, and slipping around another, fixed his camp on the site of the modern Blagoveshchensk.

Quarrels with his men and with his superiors resulted in Habarov's recall, and without his grim leadership, the Russians had to resist the determined efforts of the Chinese to rid the country of their presence. They were driven out and Albazin destroyed in 1658. But seven years later it was reestablished, and by 1674 had become a large post. The Chinese emperor, Kang Hsi, renewed the struggle, and in 1685 again destroyed the settlement. No sooner had his troops left, however, than the Russians were back rebuilding the fortifications once more.

While Cossack indomitability was winning over Chinese military effort on the Amur, Russian statecraft was losing to Chinese diplomacy at Nertchinsk. By a treaty signed in 1689, China's first treaty with a Western power, Russia agreed to withdraw from the Amur and recognize the river Gorbitza (Argun?) as the boundary between the two empires.

For over one hundred and fifty years Russia contented herself with what she had gained, and

made no effort to extend her possessions in the Far East. In 1846, Tsar Nicholas I, disturbed by the increasing interest of Great Britain in China, sent an expedition to explore the mouth of the Amur. The following year he sent out Nicolai Muraviev as governor-general of Siberia. Muraviev was of the breed of empire-builders. He resolved to control the Amur at all costs. The Tsar supported him, and settlements were made at Nikolaievsk, DeCastries Bay, and Alexandrovsk. This was followed by the occupation of Saghalien. Muraviev not only organized armies and colonizing expeditions, but he won over the natives by fair treatment.

Thus it was that when the Crimean War temporarily wrecked the power of Russia in Europe, the Siberian Governor-General was able to continue with his plans in the Far East. In 1854 he started down the Amur with one steamship and seventy-five barges. This expedition enabled him to hold Nikolaievsk against the French and English so that Russia lost no ground in the Far East in the war. Other expeditions followed. The Chinese protested and Muraviev invited them to a conference, at which he assured them that he wanted nothing but peace, but he was going to establish a string of forts along the left bank of the Amur.

The Governor-General proceeded with his plans, and the Chinese continued with their protests. Peking was too busy at the time warding off English and French aggression to do other than protest, however, and in 1858 agreed with Muraviev, in a treaty signed at Aigun, that the Amur should be the boundary between the two empires as far as the Ussuri. Beyond that it was to be determined by later agreement. Russians and Chinese were to share the navigation of the river, and trade was to be free across the new boundary. The Chinese took a leaf from their experiences with the Treaty of Nanking, and provided that Chinese on the left bank should remain under Chinese jurisdiction.

There was great rejoicing among the Russians. Muraviev was made a count with the title of "Amurski," by a grateful Tsar. Holy Russia had not only reached the Amur, but had done so without hostilities or bloodshed. But Russian appetite grew by what it fed upon, and Muraviev was not slow to take advantage of the pressure then being exerted upon Peking by Britain and France to extend still farther the boundaries of his Siberian Empire. He surveyed the coast of the Japan Sea as far south as the Korean boundary, and then occupied Peter the Great and Possiet bays in 1860, an

occupation which was sanctioned and made permanent by the Treaty of Peking in the same year.

Thus Russia, as a result of the general European aggression upon China in the mid-nineteenth century, finally established her far eastern boundaries on the mainland. In the island of Saghalien she first came into contact with the newly opened empire of Japan. In 1867 she made a naïve agreement with Japan under which the island was to be jointly occupied by the two powers. Five years was enough to show the unworkability of this plan, and Russia ceded Japan the Kurile Islands in return for Japanese claims on Saghalien.

Vladivostok, "the ruler of the East," was made the chief Russian naval station in the Far East, and it was hoped for a time that it would at least realize Peter the Great's dream of an open port. Some means of communication other than uncertain rivers and poor roads was necessary for this, however. At last it came—the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In 1898 the first train reached Irkutsk from Russia, and the line was opened from Vladivostock to Habarovsk.

By this time, however, the dreams of Peter the Great had grown in the minds of the Russian bureaucracy until they had become a vision of a vast Asiatic empire under Russian sway. Vladivostok

was good, but there were other ports which were better; one of these was at the foot of the Korean peninsula, and the other was Talienwan on the Liaotung peninsula. When Japan specified the Liaotung peninsula as a part of the spoils of her victory over China in 1895, Russia, first securing the cooperation of Germany and France, stepped in and forced Japan to relinquish her claims. As a reward for this move, which she characterized as a "service to China," Russia secured in the following year the right to build a railroad across Manchuria to Vladivostok, with a branch from Harbin to Port Arthur. Two years later she secured a twenty-five-year lease on the Liaotung peninsula and the ice-free harbor of Port Arthur. The new line, known as the Chinese Eastern Railway, was opened in 1903, and at last Russia had her warm-water port.

This achievement made Russia the dominant power in Northern Asia, and the money-and-power-mad bureaucrats at St. Petersburg enlarged their vision of empire to the shores of the Yellow Sea. Under the agreement with China, Russia was authorized to send guards into the railroad zone. She had sent in troops far beyond the number needed for police purposes, and, when the Boxer revolt paralyzed China, Russia sent in six army corps and occupied the whole of Manchuria. By subtle in-

trigue during the negotiations at Peking after the Boxer trouble, Russia secured the right to remain in Manchuria nearly two years longer. Before this time expired she presented new demands to China which furnished ample evidence of her intention to stay until she was put out.

At the same time Russia had been busy at the court of Korea. Advisers were sent. Concessions were secured. Intrigue was rife. All to the end that Russian influence and Russian power might overcome the opposing wave of Japanese influence and Japanese power and reach to the very foot of the peninsula. Agreements were made between the rival empires; as readily were they broken.

Another power was watching the Russian advance with ill-concealed alarm. Britain's interests in India and China were too vast and too vital for her to allow Russia to push too far to the south without making a determined effort to resist her. Co-operation with Japan was the obvious method, and in 1902 was signed the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This assured Japan that when she and Russia came to blows, she could count on British support if any third power entered the fray on Russia's side.

Thus supported, Japan claimed to have found that Russia was sending troops into Korea in

civilian dress. Tokyo solemnly called a halt. Brief and unsuccessful negotiations were followed by the outbreak of war in February of 1904. When the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed the following year, Russia's dream of a great Asiatic empire had faded into a more distant future. The Liaotung peninsula, now known as south Manchuria, with the railroad south of Changchun, was gone; Japan had the same rights in northern Manchuria as Russia; the Russian influence in Korea was forever broken; and the island of Saghalien, as far north as the fiftieth parallel, passed to Japan.

Not even such a disaster could crush the Russian ambitions. Construction was immediately begun upon the Amur Railway line, and the line around Lake Baikal to replace the ferry there. Many stretches of the road were double-tracked. Vladivostok, which had been sacrificed to Port Arthur, again came into its own; it was heavily fortified and garrisoned with eighty thousand men. Immigration was encouraged. Industrial development was enhanced. Every preparation was made looking toward the day of revenge upon Japan.

These preparations were rendered unnecessary by the development of the international political situation. The talk of the "open door" in China, with equal opportunities for the people of all na-

tions, and the insistence upon the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire by the United States, soon made it clear to the bureaucrats of St. Petersburg and Tokyo that if they continued quarreling, international honesty might prevail and neither of them would get the rich Manchurian spoil. It behooved the spoilers to co-operate. By 1907, such co-operation had replaced any feeling of enmity left by the late war, and Russia and Japan proceeded under cover of professions of adherence to their international obligations to arrange for the division of the wealth of Manchuria between themselves.

How effective was this co-operation between the erstwhile enemies the United States was to learn to her sorrow. In 1907–8 British-American interests secured from China a concession to build two lines of railway in Manchuria. These would have connected the Gulf of Chihli and the Amur River by a line some two or three hundred miles west of the South Manchuria Railway, crossing the Chinese Eastern Railway probably at Tsitsihar. Japan and Russia protested, and Great Britain, in spite of the new aspect this Russo-Japanese co-operation placed upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was constrained to let her ally have her way. The project was killed.

In 1909 the same combination of forces as effectively quashed Secretary Knox's plan for the internationalization of the Manchurian railways. This plan, utterly impractical as it seems, is the only means yet devised which offers any possibility of permanent peace in the Far East. But it means the renunciation of imperialistic ambitions by both Russia and Japan, a renunciation which so far has been a matter of words rather than deeds on both sides.

Shut off from warm water in the Yellow Sea by Japan's victory and the later agreements which left south Manchuria and Korea in Japanese hands, Russia devised a new and still more audacious scheme to re-establish her Asian empire. After all, the direct route from Baikal to the Gulf of Chihli was shorter than the route through Manchuria, and Peking was a greater prize than Seoul. The situation in Mongolia offered an excellent opportunity for Russian intrigue in this direction. While the Mongols had voluntarily submitted to the Manchus, they had always enjoyed a large measure of independence. In the years just preceding the Chinese revolution, there was a marked increase of Chinese activity in and about Urga, the Mongolian capital. More Chinese troops were sent out, and immigration of Chinese colonists and traders was

promoted. The Mongols began to realize that their nationality was threatened. The Mongol princes were already in friendly communication with St. Petersburg, and the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty was the signal for Russian recognition of Mongol autonomy. This was followed by an agreement, signed as late as September 17, 1914, giving Russia a deciding voice in the construction of railways in Mongolia.

But the Great War was upon the world, and the days of imperial Russia were numbered. The war in Europe soon absorbed all Russia's energies, and her pressure to the East ceased. Japan was not slow to seize her advantage. She had made secret agreements with Russia in 1907, 1910, and 1912, looking to the partition of Northern China between them. But now Japan had Shantung and other advantages under the Twenty-one Demands, and in 1916, by subtly suggesting that she might join Germany, she constrained Russia to underwrite all of these gains, thus consolidating Japan's greatly advanced position.

Then came the bolshevik revolution, with results no less far-reaching in Asia than in Europe. The Siberians were at first bewildered by the changes at Petrograd. But the communists were active in the East. Soviets were formed and took

over the government; allied intervention followed; the soviets were wiped out, and support was given to the reactionary group surrounding Admiral Kolchak. This called forth a real military effort on the part of the soviet government at Moscow. Kolchak was defeated, captured, and executed and his adherents driven out of the country. The soviet line was brought eastward as far as Lake Baikal and a socialist state, known as the Far Eastern Republic, was set up in the territory between the lake and the Pacific.

The Japanese military party was determined that the confusion in Russia should be taken advantage of to extend Japan's possessions on the mainland. The agreements between the Allies as to the intervention were openly and repeatedly violated, and upon the withdrawal of the Allied arms, the intervention became a Japanese occupation with Japanese troops in control as far west as Lake Baikal.

The Siberian peasants are not of those who lightly tolerate foreign rule. With help from Moscow they organized as partisans and gradually cleared their country of Cossacks and Japanese, thus making the Far Eastern Republic a reality from Baikal to the Pacific, with the exception of Vladivostok, which was still held by the Japanese

and Russians they could control, and of Saghalien, which was occupied by Japanese troops. The infant republic struggled on for nearly two years, but while it was able to make itself master in its own house, it was cut off from the rest of the world by a continuous line of reactionary Cossacks and Japanese, who kept the man-power of the country constantly under arms ready to repel invasion, and who literally starved the republic. In November of 1922, it quitely slipped into soviet Russia, as, according to some observers, it had intended to do from the beginning.

Of the many raids and counterraids across the borders of the republic, one is of special importance. With the breakdown of the Russian power, the Chinese had renewed their efforts to subject Mongolia to their rule. The resulting hostility of the Mongols made it easy for the Russian reactionary, Baron Ungern, when he fled from Siberia, to drive the Chinese from Urga, and to occupy the town as a base from which to make attacks upon the Far Eastern Republic. In the summer of 1921 he made his great raid. He was speedily repulsed, and the pursuing Russians not only effected his capture but themselves took Urga, where they set up a sort of Mongolian soviet régime, which has continued to the present time.

After this coup, Russia seriously undertook the re-establishment of her former position in the Far East. Soviet diplomacy had begun its efforts with a dramatic renunciation of claims inherited from the tsarist régime. After a preamble declaring that "all nations should have their independence and self-government, and should not submit to being bound by other nations," Moscow offered to deal with Peking upon a new basis. Territory seized by the tsarist régime was to be returned; the Chinese Eastern Railway was to be handed over to China without a cent of compensation; the Boxer-indemnity payments were renounced; extraterritoriality for Russians was to be canceled; and all treaties made by imperial Russia with Japan or other powers which were unfair to China were to be annulled.

The Chinese people had just come through a very painful experience in their dealings with the Allies. Entering the war against Germany at the urgent request of the United States, and on the theory that by thus making common cause with the Allies she would have the opportunity to secure a fair hearing and an equitable settlement of her demands at the Peace Conference, China had found herself bound hand and foot and delivered over to the mercies of Japan. The name Shantung

stands as the symbol for all of the wrong that was done and the right that was undone to China at the Peace Conference. To a humiliated and embittered China, the voice of Russia offering to deal with her in the spirit of fairness and equity was like balm on an aching wound. Was this at last a great and powerful nation from the West ready to stand by China in her struggle against exploitation and bondage? The Chinese people were ready to give her a chance at least. Russia could not treat her worse than had Japan and the Allies.

But the foreign office at Peking was inclined to be cautious. They knew of many a previous occasion when Russia had spoken fairly—yes, when Russia had stood with them against their enemies. They remembered her friendly offices after the Sino-Japanese War, when the Liaotung peninsula was saved to China. They remembered her support in the negotiations of 1901 after the Boxer trouble, and they also remembered the high cost of Russian friendship. Three years after Russia saved the Liaotung for China, it was in Russian hands and China has not got it back yet. And three years after the Boxer negotiations were over, Russia was still sprawled all over Manchuria; and when Japan drove her back China must stand by and watch the erstwhile combatants make an agreement to divide

her great dependency between themselves. It was small wonder that the Chinese diplomats were a bit wary of this new Russia which came bearing gifts.

Events soon showed that there was justification for this attitude. The soft words, first spoken in 1919 and repeated in September of 1920, were put to the test of good faith in the summer of 1921. It will be remembered that Russian troops had entered Urga, and that a soviet régime had been established there under the *aegis* of Moscow. When, in the face of this old-fashioned aggression, the soviets asked for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking, the Chinese demanded the immediate evacuation of Mongolian territory. Russia offered to negotiate about it; China insisted upon evacuation as a condition precedent to any negotiation.

Under these circumstances, Moscow sent one of her cleverest diplomats, Joffe, to further her interests in the Far East. Joffe is as good a publicity agent as he is a diplomat, and his plan was to play upon the sentiments of the Chinese people in order to bring the Chinese government to his way of thinking. "Why," he asked, "was there so much fuss about a people's army in distant Urga when the capitalistic nations all had troops within the very walls of Peking?" The usual bolshevik at-

tacks upon the imperialistic nations of the West were spread broadcast throughout the country. America came in for a special diatribe because of the friendly feelings which many Chinese still entertained for the United States.

Having created what he thought was a favorable atmosphere, Joffe began to make known his demands upon China. Outstanding among these was a large measure of control in the Chinese Eastern Railway. This was hardly consonant with earlier professions of intention to turn over the railroad to China "without a cent of compensation," and Joffe attempted to explain the discrepancy. He pointed out that the renunciatory declaration promised to relinquish rights which had accrued from the "predatory and violent policy of the Tsar's government," but that it "did not at all annul Russia's legal and just interests in China." "Even if they turned over the Chinese Eastern Railway to China, for instance," he said, "this will not annul Russia's interests in this line, which is a portion of the Great Siberian Railway and unites one part of the Russian territory with another." And he closed with the threat that, if China continued in her refusal to recognize Russian interests, Russia would "consider herself free" from her voluntary promises.

This was music of an entirely different *tempo*. It was now clear to China and the world that the new Russia, despite her idealistic protestations and her professed adherence to the principle of self-government and the entire independence of nations, was as active and aggressive a neighbor as the tsarist Russia which she had replaced.

Japan had long realized this, and had lost no opportunity to strengthen her own position and to counter the expected Russian advance. Her ambitions in Shantung, in Siberia, and on the Chinese Eastern Railway had been thwarted, and in each case the weight of America's influence has been thrown into the scale against her. Japan looks upon Russia in Asia as her enemy rather than China's, and it is not to be wondered at if she looks upon Washington's efforts as opposition to her rather than as assistance to China. Japan has no present fear of a *rapprochement* between Washington and Moscow, however, and so—now humoring Uncle Sam, now blustering against him, sometimes even threatening him—Japanese statecraft is directed toward securing for the island empire as large a share of the spoils of Northern Asia as is possible.

For the directing minds of both Russia and Japan the northern half, at least, of the Chinese

territory is a legitimate subject of partition. The vast fertile plains of Manchuria, the grazing lands and mineral wealth of Mongolia, and the teeming cities and ports of the northern provinces of China proper are the stakes of a vast game of diplomacy, intrigue, economic exploitation, and war.

The present state of affairs in China itself tends strongly to encourage this cynical view, and offers an excellent opportunity for the imperialistic players to exercise all their skill in the game they are playing. The Chinese Republic has never been anything but a name. It is merely a euphemism for a succession of military adventurers whose great aim in life is the enhancement of the prestige of their ancestors as measured by the wealth they themselves are able to accumulate. Their chief concern has been to get their hands upon the sources of revenue which the control of Peking gives to them. For them, too, China is but a vast field for exploitation.

With a few such leaders in power in Peking and with many others of similar character striving to supplant them, there is a standing invitation to aggressive and unscrupulous diplomacy to use wholesale bribery and corruption to secure its ends. That the hands of both Russia and Japan are at work in the disorganization of the Chinese

Republic is not to be denied if we would look at the realities of the situation. The very vigor and frequency of denials would do much to convince the sophisticated observer if there were not ample other evidence available.

Out of the sorry tangle of political corruption and diplomatic intrigue have come three so-called "treaties." What purport to be the terms of these, have been published. If we recall the history of Russo-Japanese and Russo-Chinese diplomacy and the vast differences which have been shown to exist between the published terms and the actual terms of their agreements, we shall be forgiven if we suspect that the published terms of these new agreements do not tell the whole story. But let us consider them as they are published, and then look at the actual situation.

First, in point of time, is the Sino-Russian agreement of May 31, 1924. China holds Russia to her generous offer in part. A conference is to be held "within one month" to annul the tsarist treaties. Agreements between the tsarist government and third powers detrimental to China are declared null and void. China's sovereignty over Mongolia is affirmed, withdrawal of soviet troops to be arranged at the forementioned conference. Bolshevik propaganda in China is prohibited.

Boundaries and navigation rights are also to be fixed by the conference. Concessions, the Boxer indemnity, and extraterritoriality are renounced. On its face, it is a fair string of victories for Chinese diplomacy. What did the soviets get? First, recognition, possession of the old Russian legation and consulates, and, by making her representative the first ambassador to China, the deanship of the diplomatic corps. Second, the promised suppression by China of White Guard activities in her territory. Last, but far from least, the promise of joint control of the great artery without which Russia's position is hopeless—the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Such was the first of the three treaties. What did it mean? The promised conference is still in the future. Russia is quite as desirous of being freed from the old agreements as is China. While Moscow blandly recognizes Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia, she as blandly enters into a treaty with the latter country recognizing Mongolian autonomy, which Chicherin has described as being "practical independence and allowing the Mongolians full freedom in foreign affairs." Russia has within the last few weeks withdrawn her troops from Urga, first taking care to establish there a Mongolian soviet government wholly in sympathy

with Moscow and which will facilitate the speedy return of those troops when occasion demands. Concessions, extraterritoriality, and the Boxer indemnity had long since gone by the board, abolished by the Chinese themselves. As for bolshevik propaganda, there is every evidence that it has increased rather than diminished since the treaty was signed.

Russia gave practically nothing. What did she get? Joint control of the Chinese Eastern Railway? The Chinese government's promise was clear and unequivocal. But the Chinese government's power is very limited. It is extremely shadowy in Manchuria, where Chang Tso-Lin is no slower than the Mongolians to assert his autonomy; and the Chinese Eastern Railway is in what he chooses to call the "autonomous three eastern provinces." Before Russia may have joint control of any railroads in his territory, Chang, not Peking, must be seen. He ignored the treaty until he found himself at war with Peking and the Russians making disconcerting demonstrations in his rear. Chang must choose between loss of the railway and complete overthrow. In September, 1925, a new treaty between Moscow and Mukden was given publicity. This reiterated many of the provisions of the previous document, and the arrangement for the joint

control of the railway was affirmed. Soviet Russia at last secured the long-desired joint control over the coveted railway, and is now busily engaged in converting this into sole control as rapidly as circumstances will permit.

One paragraph found in both of these treaties is significant. In each case the contracting parties "agree that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the exclusion of any third party or parties." This is plain notice to Great Britain and France with their investment interests, to the United States with her internationalization schemes, and to Japan with her own designs upon the road that Russia is going to fix the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway with China alone, and that the ultimate arrangement is to be in no way detrimental to Russia.

The progress of soviet diplomacy was becoming alarming, and Japan determined to arrive at an adjustment of outstanding differences. Hitherto she had been very dictatorial in announcing her terms for recognition, and the Russians had been hardly less extreme in their demands. The irreconcilable attitude was now softened on both sides. New negotiators, Karakhan and Yoshizawa, took up the task, and on January 20, 1925, the latest

Russo-Japanese treaty was signed. The soviets secured recognition of the old Russian legation and consulate properties, the revision of all treaties since that of Portsmouth, the suppression of White Guard activities, and the evacuation of northern Saghalien. In return, Japan obtained a ratification of the Treaty of Portsmouth; temporary fishing-rights in Russian waters; the prohibition of bolshevik propaganda; an agreement for the settlement of Russian debts on as favorable a basis as any other nation may receive; and, most important, extensive rights of exploitation for oil and coal in northern Saghalien. In addition, she received an expression of the personal regret of the Russian negotiator for the Nikolaievsk incident.

The difference between the Russian concessions in this treaty and the exaggerated Japanese demands of four years ago is the measure of the extent to which Russia has come back in the Far East. It has been possible to do little more than suggest the processes by which Russia has re-established her position in Northeastern Asia. It took a great deal of diplomacy, four conferences, and a large amount of irregular fighting. But Russia has come back. The soviets today occupy all of the territory in Siberia within the boundaries of the former Russian Empire, and in addition they have a firm hold on

Mongolia. The Chinese Eastern Railway is once more in their grasp, carrying the products of Siberia and Manchuria to Vladivostok, which is again a Russian port.

In spite of the turmoil of war and revolution, Russia finds herself in as strong a position in the Far East today as in 1914. And she is the same old Russia—the Russia of one hundred and fifty million people constantly pressing outward, constantly thirsting for warm water; the same old Russia—expansive and expanding, dominating and domineering, who has done her full share to keep the world in arms for more than a century. Her leaders are no whit more scrupulous—and be it said, no whit less so—than those of imperial days.

Thus Russia and these leaders find themselves in an unusually favorable position in the Far East. The slogans of the war—democracy, self-determination, and independence—have echoed through the Orient, and have stressed the discord between occidental preaching and occidental practice. The reluctance of the treaty powers to make any concessions, however justifiable; the long delay of France in ratifying the results of the Washington Conference; the refusal of Japan even to discuss withdrawal from south Manchuria, at the expiration of the Russian lease; and, above all, the con-

stant assumption of superiority both in word and deed by Europeans, Japanese, and Americans have exasperated the more awakened section of Chinese opinion to the limit of endurance.

This makes a rich soil in which bolshevism may sow its troublous seeds. Communism as an economic or political doctrine is wholly opposed to the genius and tradition of the Chinese race. But extreme nationalism, an instrument highly favored at Moscow, despite internationalist professions, is eagerly seized upon by the more active Chinese as a possible means of freeing their country from the claims in which Europe and Japan, and, to a lesser extent, America, now hold her. The evidences of Russian activity along this line are too abundant to leave any doubt as to its existence. Having reestablished her old position by arms and diplomacy, Russia is now preparing for still further advances by stirring up the Chinese against her two chief rivals and her only likely foes—Japan and Britain.

For it is the Japanese and the British that have felt the full weight of the present outburst of xenophobia. That this is not spontaneous but due to conscious direction is shown by a curious feature of a number of the recent outbreaks. They started as strikes against the foreigner. A few days

later, about the time necessary for communication with Peking, Americans had been suddenly excluded, and the strike continued with renewed vigor against the others. It is apparent, then, that care is being taken not to antagonize America and China for the present, nor to drive America over to the side of Great Britain and Japan. They are the enemies. America may still be useful in restraining Japan if any untoward opportunity should offer for her to advance once more.

That Japan will advance, if such opportunity does offer, is as sure as history and the covert construction of strategic railroads in Manchuria can make it. That she is even now supporting the Manchurian overlord and using his forces as a screen to cover her own purposes is as certain as anything in the political realm can be. There is as little question that Russia is supporting and maneuvering behind the rival forces of Feng, the much-heralded Christian general. Open warfare between these two foreign-supported Chinese factions may come with surprising suddenness. How long the struggle would be confined to the Chinese rivals it is useless to speculate, but unless some unexpected distraction occurs, the two great imperial rivals are so close to the front and their interests are so deeply involved that we are forced to contem-

plate the possibility—even the probability—of another great war. It will start, at least, in the East, and it will begin, not between Japan and America, but between Japan and Russia.

What America's part in such a war would be, no man can tell. Neutrality would be the obvious course, and it is difficult to imagine this country sending its sons to fight at the side of either soviet Russia or imperial Japan—or it would be difficult if Roosevelt had not threatened to go to the aid of Japan in 1904, and if American troops had not already served under Japanese generals in Siberia in 1919. America's interests as a great trading nation and America's prestige as a great power would be seriously endangered in a renewal of the struggle between Japan and Russia. We could hardly stand by and hope to escape scot-free, and a thousand things might happen to drag us into war.

While such possibilities are abroad in the world, it were well for us not to dwell too happily on silks and cherry blossoms, or too disdainfully on bolsheviks and soviets, or too ethereally on peace and disarmament, but to realize that in the Far East there is going on at this moment a desperate game of world-politics, no less fraught with danger to America and American interests than the game which culminated at Sarajevo in June of 1914.

APPENDIX

LEADING STATESMEN OF MODERN CHINA[1]

THE MANCHU EMPEROR

P'u Yi (Hsuan Tung), former emperor.—Son of Prince Ch'un (Tsai Li) and nephew of Emperor Kwang Hsu. Born on February 11, 1906. Succeeded to the throne, under the regency of his father, on November 14, 1908, and adopted the reign-title of Hsuan Tung. Abdicated on February 12, 1912. His mother was the daughter of the late Jung Lu. Under the republic the former emperor continued his studies under his old tutors and also received instruction from Mr. R. F. Johnston, C.B.E. On June 30, 1917, Chang Hsun carried out a monarchical coup in the interests of the Manchu dynasty. Hsuan Tung ascended the throne, but the "monarchy" survived little more than a week and once again his name was affixed to an "abdication." Cut off his queue in May, 1922. Married in December, 1922. Ejected from the palace by the "Christian general" on November 5, 1924, and fled to the Japanese legation on November 29 and Tientsin on February 24, where he is now residing in the Japanese concession.

THE MODEL TUCHUN

Yen Hsi-shan.—Shamsi. Born, 1882. A graduate of a military-staff school in Japan. Lieutenant general with the brevet rank of general of the army, and *tutuh* of Shansi. In Japan he joined the Tungmenghui, and after returning from that country he was appointed director of the military school

[1] *China Year Book*, (1925), edited by H. G. W. Woodhead.

and chief of the Eighty-sixth Regiment. When the Revolution broke out, he took up the revolutionary cause, and was elected *tutuh* of Shansi. He led an army and occupied Koupei and district. Was the first to propose that the troops should be disbanded in order to curtail expenses, and he himself disbanded more than 30,000 troops in his province. When the rebellion in the south broke out he was a strong supporter of the central government. Tuchun of Shansi since 1916. Concurrently civil governor of Shansi. Non-partisan. Author of *The Discipline of the Revolutionary Army*. Known as the "model tuchun."

YUAN SHIH-KAI

YUAN SHIH-KAI.—Born, 1859. Chinese resident at Seoul at age of twenty-six. Expelled during Sino-Japanese War. Judicial commissioner, Chihli, 1897. Director general for training of modern army, 1895. Assisted Empress Dowager in coup d'état, 1898. Governor, Shantung, 1899, where he protected foreigners against Boxers in 1900. Viceroy, Chihli, 1901. Minister, Army Reorganization Council, 1903. President, Board of Foreign Affairs, 1907. Dismissed from all offices in January, 1909, after Empress Dowager's death, and remained unemployed and in retirement until the 1911 Revolution when he was appointed Hukuang viceroy, with command of naval and military forces (October 14), and premier (November 1). Authorized to arrange peace with revolutionaries, and eventually arranged abdication of Manchus (in February, 1912), himself becoming provisional president of republic. Elected formal president, October, 1913. Whereafter he ruled autocratically until latter part of 1915, when he attempted to make himself emperor. A widespread revolt followed, and he abandoned project, dying in June, 1916.

APPENDIX

DR. SUN YAT-SEN

Sun Wen (Sun Yat-sen).—Kwantung. Born in 1866, the son of a farmer in the Hsiangshan district. Learned English at an early age, and studied under Dr. Kerr, of the American Mission. Enrolled as a student of the Alice Memorial Hospital at Hongkong in 1887, whence he graduated as "Licentiate of Medicine and Surgery, Hongkong," in 1892. Started to practice in Macao, where he organized the Young China party. Subsequently settled in Canton, where he became an active revolutionary. After the failure of a conspiracy at Canton in 1895 he fled to Macao, and thence proceeded to Hongkong, Japan, Honolulu, and America, in all of which places he obtained adherents to the reform party. Arrived in England in 1896, and on October 11 of that year was kidnapped outside the Chinese legation by order of the Chinese Minister. It was intended to ship Dr. Sun to China as a lunatic, but he managed to make his plight known to Dr. Cantlie, who was instrumental in effecting his release after twelve days' imprisonment. Subsequently Dr. Sun toured through Europe, America, and the East as a revolutionary propagandist. In Japan (with General Huang Hsing) he was instrumental in founding the Tungmenghui. Was in England when the Wuchang outbreak occurred, but came out to China at the end of 1911, and was elected provisional president of the republic by the Nanking Council. Resigned from the presidency on the abdication of the Manchus, on the understanding that Yuan Shih-kai should be elected to succeed him, and proceeded on a tour to Wuchang and South China, where he advocated a socialistic policy. Came to Peking at the President's request in August, 1912, and was accorded an enthusiastic welcome. Advocated an extensive program of rail-

way construction, and on September 10 was appointed by the President "to consider and draft plans for a national system of railways," and to "submit and discuss the same with international financiers." Visited Kalgan, and on September 17 left for Taiyuanfu and Shanghai. Strongly advocated the transfer of the capital from Peking to Wuchang or Nanking. His authority as chief of the National Railway Corporation was canceled on the outbreak of the rebellion, and Dr. Sun subsequently took up his residence in Japan. Dr. Sun was in Shanghai in 1920, but proceeded to Canton in 1921 when the Kwangsi officials were ejected by General Chen Chiung-ming, and was elected president of China by the so-called "parliament" there in April, 1921. He was expelled from Canton by Chen Chiung-min in the summer of 1922, and returned to Shanghai, where he remained until February, 1923, when he again established himself in Canton. Maintained himself in Canton in 1924 by Yunnanese and Hunanese mercenaries, who supported themselves on opium, gambling, and brothel licenses. Became closely allied with the soviet. Quarreled with and massacred merchant volunteers. Died in Peking on March 12, 1925, one of his last messages being one of friendship to the soviet.

THE "CHRISTIAN GENERAL"

FENG YU-HSIANG.—Anhwei. Commander of the Eleventh Division. Appointed acting tuchun of Shansi on August 25, 1921, upon sudden and mysterious death of Yen Hsiang-wen, who had been appointed only two months previously when Chen Shu-fan fled. Transferred to Honan, May 10, 1922. Was appointed inspector of army and transferred his troops to Peking, October, 1922. His troops played a decisive part in the Chihli-Fengtien War. His troops being stationed at Nan

Yuan, near Peking, Feng was influential in the politics of Peking during the spring and summer of 1923. His untimely resignation in June was considered to have brought about the flight of President Li to Tientsin and the coup d'état of 1923. *Tupan* (director) of defense on northwestern frontier, May, 1923. Known as the "Christian General," Second Order of Merit. A full general in the army. Responsible for the coup of October, 1924, when he seized Peking and the President and established a provisional government. Ejected Manchu emperor. Has established his headquarters at Kalgan, but still has some troops at Peking.

THE LOYANG WAR-LORD

Wu Pei-fu.—Shantung. Born, 1873. Obtained his degree of Hsiutsai (B.A.) at the age of twenty-one. Graduated with honor from the Kai Ping Military Academy, near Tientsin, 1898. After a brief service under the late General Nieh Shih-cheng, entered a military school of which Marshal Tuan Chi-jui was director. After graduation, General Wu joined the Third Army Division, of which General Tsao Kun was then commander. Was promoted to battalion commander. Participated bravely in the military campaigns in Shansi, Szechwan, and Honan, since the republic. Awarded Fuwei Chiangchun. Became Commander of the Sixth Brigade of the Third Division early in 1916. When General Tsao Kun was made military governor of Chihli, Wu was instructed to act for him as commander of the Third Division. Participated in the fight against General Chang Hsun's monarchical movement, summer, 1917. His division was sent to recapture Yochow and Changsha from the south in the spring of 1918. General Wu was successful as these two cities were retaken by the Third Division. The return of his troops from Hunan to Chihli in

the summer of 1920 was opposed by Marshal Tuan, resulting in the armed conflict responsible for the downfall of the Anfu Club. Appointed vice-inspecting-general of Chihli, Shantung, and Honan, 1920. Inspector-general of Hupeh and Hunan, 1921. Defeated the Fengtien invasion of Chihli in the spring of 1922. Appointed minister of war, June 12, 1922, but did not accept. Made Fu Wei Shang Chiang Chun, January 1, 1923, succeeded Tsao Kun as inspector-general of Chihli, Shantung, and Honan when Tsao became president of the republic—October, 1923. Was asked to promote highways in the three provinces, January, 1924. First-class Tashou Paokwang Chiaho decoration. Defeated in the civil war of 1924, owing to Feng Yu-hsiang's treachery. At present in Yochow.

DR. W. W. YEN

Yen Hui-ch'ing (W. W. Yen).—Shanghai. Born, 1877. Had early education in local schools. Studied in the Episcopal High School, Virginia, U.S.A., 1895–97, winning therefrom gold medal for English composition and debating. Studied in the academic and law departments of the University of Virginia, receiving degree of B.A. and law diploma. Member of the Phi Beta Kappa Society. Professor of English, St. John's University, Shanghai, 1900–1906. Chinshih, Hanlin. One of the founders and honorary secretary of the World's Chinese Students' Federation, Shanghai. Member of various educational and social organizations. LL.D., Peking, 1906. Secretary to the Chinese legation at Washington, 1908–10. Was recalled to Peking to organize the Press Bureau, becoming its director. Junior councilor, ministry of foreign affairs, 1911. After various promotions, was appointed vice-minister of foreign affairs, April, 1912. Minister to Germany and Denmark, 1913, 1918–20. Plenipotentiary to the Opium Confer-

ence at The Hague, May 26, 1913. Appointed minister of foreign affairs, August 11, 1920. Appointed acting premier, December 18, 1921, upon resignation of Chin Yun-p'eng. Reappointed acting premier, June 11, 1922, when Li Yuan-hung reassumed the presidency, but resigned a few weeks later. President, Commission on Adjustment of National Finance, August, 1923. Minister of agriculture and commerce, January 12, 1924. Author, translator, and editor of various books. Second Order of Merit. Chairman, Western Returned Students' Club, Peking, 1923. Appointed premier after outbreak of civil war in September, 1924. Resigned after the "Christian general's" coup of October 23, 1924.

FORMER PRESIDENT HSU SHIH-CH'ANG

Hsu Shih-ch'ang—Honan. Probationary grand councilor, June, 1905. Minister of Government Council, June, 1905. President, Board of Police, October, 1905. Grand councilor, February, 1906. Removed from Grand Council, November, 1906. Special Mission to Manchuria, December, 1906. President, Board of Interior, December, 1906. Viceroy of Manchuria, April, 1907. President of Board of Communications, February, 1909. Director-general, Tientsin-Pukow Railway, July, 1909. Grand secretary, February, 1910. Grand councilor, August, 1910. Appointed vice-premier in Prince Ching's cabinet, May, 1911. Removed from that post and appointed vice-president of the Privy Council on November 1, 1911. Chief of General Staff, November, 1911. High commissioner for training imperial guard, and grand guardian to the emperor, December, 1911. Relieved of post on general staff, February, 1912. On the resignation of the Prince Regent was appointed, with Shih Hsu, grand guardian of the emperor. A "sworn brother" of President Yuan Shih-kai. Secretary of

State, 1915. With Chao Erh-hsün, Li Ching-hsi, and Chang Chien received the title of "the four friends of Sungshan" (i.e., of Yuan Shih-kai). On the failure of Yuan Shih-kai's attempt to establish a monarchy, Hsu Shih-ch'ang resigned his secretaryship and retired to Honan. Returned to Peking, November, 1916, to mediate between the president, Li Yuan-hung, and the premier, Tuan Chi-jui. During the unsettled period, 1917–18, he remained detached from Peking politics, but without losing his influence over the contending factions. On September 4, 1918, elected president of the republic of China, at a joint meeting of the Senate and House of Representatives of the so-called "Tuchuns' Parliament," by 425 out of 436 votes. Received honorary Doctor's degree from University of Paris. Sent Chu Chi-chien to represent him, June, 1921. Vacated presidency, June 1, 1922, and left for Tientsin on the following day, where he still resides.

THE MUKDEN WAR-LORD

CHANG TSO-LIN.—Mukden. General Chang is under fifty years of age. He received no education in his youth. Fought on the side of Japan during the Russo-Japanese War. After the war General Chang surrendered to the Chinese government at the request of Japan. He and his Hunghutze were taken into the Chinese government service and received quick promotion on account of their bravery. Appointed military governor of Fengtien in 1911, which position he is still holding. First commanded the Twenty-seventh Army Division and now has under control nearly 300,000 men scattered all over China. Served Former President Yuan faithfully until the collapse of the latter's monarchical movement in 1916. When General Chang Hsun made his coup d'état in 1917, he assisted General Tuan Chi-jui in restoring the republic. Was ap-

pointed inspector-general of the three eastern provinces in 1918. Jointly with General Tsao Kun, led an expeditionary force to disband the Anfu Political Club in the summer of 1920. Attended the "Super-Tuchuns' Conference" at Tientsin in May, 1921. Ordered to be relieved of all his posts after being defeated by the Chihli party, May, 1922. After his dismissal he defied the central government and ruled Manchuria as an independent province. Victorious in 1924, civil war, and has since occupied and garrisoned Chihli, Shantung, Anhwei, and Kiungsu.

FORMER PRESIDENT LI YUAN-HUNG

LI YUAN-HUNG.—Hupeh. Born, October 19, 1864. Studied at Pei-yang Naval College, graduating in 1888 after a course of six years. Served on a cruiser during the Sino-Japanese War. After the war he was engaged for service at Nanking by Viceroy Chang Chih Tung. On the latter's transfer to Wuchang he accompanied him to assist in the organization of the modern troops there. Thence he went to Japan for two years to study fortification. On his return he became a major in the cavalry in 1895, and subsequently held several commands, including that of colonel in the Twenty-first Brigade. He was in charge of the organization of the Changteh Maneuvers in 1905 and for the five following years served on the staff at Wuchang. On the outbreak of the Revolution at Wuchang he was forced into accepting the command of the revolutionary forces, whose operations he directed thenceforward. He was mainly instrumental in arranging for the Shanghai Peace Conference. After the abdication of the Manchus he was elected vice-president of the republic and appointed chief of the general staff and *tutuh* of Hupeh (November, 1911). Given rank of general on September 7. Acting *tutuh*, Kiangsi, June 8, 1913. Re-elected

vice-president of the republic, October 7, 1913. On the death of Yuan Shih-kai, became president of the republic (June, 1916), resigned July 1, 1917, when Chang Hsun carried out his coup d'état. When Hsu Shih-chang left the capital, June, 1922, Li was asked to reassume the presidency. Was compelled to leave the capital September, 1923, when plans were perfected for Tsao Kun to become president; first fled to Tientsin and later went to Shanghai and Japan. Author of various lecture notes not published. Formerly member of Chinputang but resigned therefrom when accepting chief of general staff. First Order of Merit. First class of Chiaho and Wenhu decorations. Now resides in Tientsin.

THE PROVISIONAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE

TUAN CH'I-JUI.—Anhwei. A graduate of the Peiyang Military School. Yuan Shih-kai's chief military adviser while viceroy of Chihli. Brigade general in Fukien in 1906, deputy lieutenant general of the Chinese Bordered Yellow Banner, October, 1907; and general commanding the Sixth Division of the Luchun, December, 1909. Commander-in-chief, Kiangpeh, December, 1910. He was in a large measure responsible for the reorganization upon modern lines of the northern army, and after Yuan Shih-kai accepted the premiership in November, 1911, he succeeded him as viceroy of the Hukuang provinces. On the recall of Baron Feng Kuo-chang, General Tuan took command of the First Army. He was one of the most prominent of the military commanders who signed the memorial to the throne at the end of January, urging the emperor to abdicate. On the formation of the first republican cabinet he was elected minister of war. Given rank of general (Shang Chiang), September 7, 1912; the field marshal, 1915. Chief of the headquarter's staff, 1915. Acting premier, May

1, 1913, to July 19, 1913. Acting *tutuh* of Hupeh (during vice-president's absence in Peking), December 10, 1913. Chiang-chun and acting governor of Fengtien. Minister of war, 1914. Granted sick-leave, June 1, 1915. In May, 1916, Tuan Chi-jui was appointed premier and charged with the formation of a responsible cabinet. Dismissed by Li Yuan-hung, May, 1917, but resumed office in July after the failure of Chang Hsun's monarchical coup d'état. Resigned October, 1918. Attempting to rescue the Anfu Club, organized without authority an army, called by himself the Ting Kuo-chun, and personally directed it to oppose the combined march of Chihli and Feng-tien forces on Peking, 1920. Retired and resided in Tientsin, 1922. Installed as provisional chief executive by Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang in November, 1924.

TANG SHAO-YI

Tang Shao-yi.—Kwangtung. Educated in America. Secretary to Yuan Shih-kai while the latter was imperial resident in Korea. Consul-general in Korea after the Sino-Japanese War. Then employed on the staff of the Northern Railway Administration. In Shantung with Yuan Shih-kai, winter, 1900. Customs Taotai, Tientsin, February, 1902. Special commissioner to Tibet, September, 1904. Proceeded to India as special envoy, to negotiate the Tibet Convention, which was subsequently completed at Peking in April, 1906. Acting junior vice-president of the Board of Foreign Affairs, November, 1905. Substantive junior vice-president of the Board of Foreign Affairs, February, 1906. Director-general Shanghai-Nanking, and Lu-Han railways, 1906. Controller-general, Revenue Council, May, 1906. Senior vice-president of Board of Communications, November, 1906. Continued to act as vice-president of Board of Foreign Affairs. First gov-

ernor of Fengtien on reorganization of government of Manchuria, April, 1907. Special envoy to America to thank the government for waiving part of the Boxer indemnity, July, 1908. Resigned governorship of Fengtien, July, 1909. Expectant vice-president, Board of Communications, and acting president, August, 1910, and resigned in the spring. Appointed minister of communications on the dismissal of Sheng Hsuan-huai on October 26, 1911. Proceeded to Shanghai as Yuan Shih-kai's delegate to negotiate with the revolutionary leaders in December. Resigned his position as delegate on December 27. Appointed premier, after abdication of the manchus on February 12. Resignation as premier accepted on June 27, when he was appointed superior adviser to the president on state affairs. A member of the Tung Meng Hui. One of the four directors of the Canton government, 1918. Minister of finance at Canton, 1919–22. First-class Tashou Chiaho Paokwang decoration. Li Yuan-hung appointed Tang premier, August 5, 1922, to succeed Dr. Yen. Tang refusing to come up to Peking, his appointment was canceled on September 19, whereupon Dr. C. H. Wang was made premier. Appointed but refused office as minister of foreign affairs, in November, 1924.

FORMER PRESIDENT TSAO KUN

Tsao Kun.—Chihli. Born, December 12, 1862. Graduated from Peiyang Military Academy. Was on active service during the Sino-Japanese War. Until recently general of Third Army Division. Tuchun of Chihli, 1917–23 (that office was thereupon abolished). Appointed inspector-general of Szechwan, Kwangtung, Hunan, and Kiangsi, June, 1918, for operations against the south. When Chang Hsun re-established the Manchu monarchy, July, 1917, Tsao directed his forces

against Chang's forces in concert with Former Marshal Tuan Chi-jui. With Marshal Chang Tso-lin's army, Tsao's forces succeeded in dissolving the Anfu Political Club, 1920. Inspector-general, Chihli, Shantung, and Honan provinces. Elected president of the republic, October 5, 1923, by the Peking parliament, most of whose members were reported to have been lavishly bribed for the purpose. Seized, and since imprisoned in his palace, after the "Christian general's" coup of October, 1924.

SUN YAT-SEN'S ENEMY

CHEN CHIUNG-MING.—Kwangtung. *Tutuh* of Kwangtung, June, 1913. Drove out the Kwangsi tuchun, Mo Yung-hsin, in 1920 and was appointed civil governor. Concerned in the Yunnan revolt, 1915–16. Commander-in-chief of the Kwangtung troops. Civil governor of Kwangtung. Minister of war in the Canton government. In 1922 his troops attacked and overthrew Sun Yat-sen, and after the latter's flight, Chen reassumed command of all the Kwangtung forces, but was himself driven out of Canton in January, 1923. Persistently fought against Sun Yat-sen, 1923–24. His forces were recently attacked and defeated by the Kuomintang army (chiefly Yunnanese mercenaries) in Kwangtung.

LITTLE HSU

HSU SHU-TSENG.—Kiangsu. Was private secretary to Former Marshal Tuan Chi-jui. Sent to Japan to study military science by Tuan. Secretary-in-chief of the cabinet; resigned, November, 1916. Played a prominent part in Peking in 1917–18. Sent on a special mission to Japan, October, 1918. During the armed struggle between the Chihli military leaders and Anfu Club, in 1920, Hsu, who was commanding general of the northwest frontier army, was in chief command. After the

Anfu army was defeated, Hsu fled for refuge in the Japanese legation, which notified the Chinese government on November 16, 1920, that he had mysteriously escaped. He has remained at large ever since. Generally referred to as "Little Hsu." In October, 1922, was implicated in the revolt against the Fukien tuchun, and another mandate was issued ordering his arrest. Expelled from Shanghai during the civil wars of 1924. Now touring in Europe as special industrial commissioner of the chief executive.

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